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In recent decades, policymakers in all advanced Western nations have im-
plemented encompassing welfare state reforms, breaking with past wel-
fare arrangements. Social democracy, in particular, engaged in significant 
policy change under the Third Way paradigm (Giddens 1998; Cuperus et 
al. 2001; Green-Pedersen et al. 2001; Clasen 2002; Bonoli & Powell 2004; 
Merkel et al. 2008; Huo 2009; Randall & Sloam 2009; Keman 2011). The 
transformation and modernisation of social democracy under Third Way 
agendas was a successful strategy in the early and mid-1990s, as many 
social democratic parties regained power after often long periods in op-
position (Cuperus & Kandel 1998; Powell 2004). The Third Way was an 
explicit appeal to new voters from the centre ground, using well-known 
labels such as New Labour in Britain or ‘die Neue Mitte’ (the New Centre) 
in the case of the German social democratic party (spd). In office, the new 
agenda became visible as Third Way social democracy introduced welfare 
state reforms that broke with social democracy’s traditional reputation on 
welfare, with which ties with its core constituency in the 20th century had 
been forged (Esping-Andersen 1985, 1990; Bonoli & Powell 2004; Merkel 
et al. 2008; Huo 2009).1
 However, in many Western countries, social democratic parties suf-
fered a remarkable electoral decline after the turn of the millennium. 
Parliamentary elections in countries such as Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom resulted in disastrous losses for 
the incumbent social democratic parties that had gained office under 
the Third Way agenda. The 2009 European Parliament elections showed 
similar tendencies at the supra-national level. The losses were typically 
concentrated among social democracy’s core constituency of manual 
workers and lower white-collar employees, indicating that these parties 
will continue to suffer a weakened position in the near future. In con-
trast, many parties on the left and right wings of the party spectrum 
 INTRODUCTION
increased their electoral strength or even emerged as new competitors. 
In a postscript to a volume on the Third Way (Bonoli & Powell 2004), 
Bonoli (2004: 210f ) compares party shares from the early 2000s with cor-
responding figures from the 1990s and characterises the Third Way as an 
electoral failure.
 This book provides a comparative study of the electoral consequences 
of Third Way welfare state reforms. It investigates whether Third Way re-
forms alienated traditional social democratic core constituents and sheds 
some light on the factors causing variation between countries. The book’s 
main argument is that Third Way reforms indeed produced an electoral 
setback for social democrats, and that the nature of the setback is contin-
gent on the electoral system and the party competition social democrats 
face when reforming the welfare state.
 The interplay between social policy reforms and social democracy’s 
performance at the ballot box has been largely neglected in the litera-
ture, even though the importance of the welfare state for social democ-
racy’s electoral fortunes was emphasised from very early on (for a review, 
see e.g. Castles 1978; Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1985, 1990; Therborn 
1987; Keman 1988, 1993). Only recently have scholars begun to examine 
the electoral consequences of welfare state reforms (Armingeon & Giger 
2008; Giger 2011; Giger & Nelson 2011; see also Karreth et al. 2012 for 
the electoral effects of social democracy’s move to the centre). However, 
these contributions remain at the macro-level, since only party shares or 
vote choice for the incumbent have been used as the dependent variable, 
rather than the party choices of individual voters. This book adds analysis 
at the micro-level by using election studies and survey data to study the 
electoral effects of welfare state reforms implemented under social demo-
cratic governments in four West European countries.
 Analysing the electoral consequences of Third Way welfare state re-
forms from a comparative perspective, this study speaks to both the 
welfare state literature and political sociology. Welfare state research is 
voluminous and, in recent decades, has often focused on the political con-
straints and opportunities that shape and condition the prospects of re-
trenchment and welfare state reform. Political sociology debates typically 
concern whether class voting has declined as a general political phenom-
enon in modern Western societies.
 Paul Pierson’s seminal ‘New Politics of the Welfare State’ approach 
(1994, 1996, 2001) states that the logic of welfare state reform diverges 
from the logic of welfare state expansion as policymakers can only claim 
credit for the latter. The reason is that the welfare state has formed its 
EMPIRICAL PUZZLE
own constituency and, consequently, policymakers interested in re-elec-
tion refrain from making encompassing reforms. Accordingly, in Pierson’s 
perspective, the electoral threat accounts for the resilience of the welfare 
state, but the actual consequences of the reforms have not been thor-
oughly analysed. This book analyses how the electoral threat materialises 
after policymakers have reformed the welfare state. In particular, it re-
veals the extent and context-specific nature of the electoral hazard social 
democrats face if they reform the welfare state in ways that conflict with 
the attitudes of its own welfare-minded constituency.
 This is in contrast to Fiona Ross (2000), who claims that a ‘Nixon-goes-
to-China logic’ is at work, as social democratic parties can reform the 
welfare state without being seriously punished by the electorate. Unlike 
market-liberal and conservative opponents, these parties are regarded as 
defenders of the welfare state who undertake reform out of necessity and 
not due to ideological motivations (see Klitgaard 2007 for a similar argu-
ment). Therefore, given their ownership of welfare issues, social demo-
crats are expected to evade serious electoral consequences after having 
reformed and retrenched the welfare state. This book demonstrates that 
this is not true; Ross’s claim about issue ownership is rather static and 
does not account for the loss of the welfare issue as a result of reforms that 
break with social democracy’s traditional social policy image. If this hap-
pens, and other parties win the issue, the electoral setback occurs against 
a Nixon-goes-to-China logic.
 Turning to recent debates in political sociology, my contribution is 
twofold. Beginning with the heated controversy over whether class voting 
or, more generally, cleavage-based voting declined in the late 20th centu-
ry, scholars of party competition and electoral behaviour increasingly fo-
cused on changing patterns of party competition and de-/realignments of 
major parties’ core electorates. Class voting was said to decline as social 
structures change, indicating that the working-class vote was becoming 
less important for political competition (e.g. Przeworski 1980; Przeworski 
& Sprague 1986; Kitschelt 1994, 1999). Moreover, the rising share of people 
with higher education and thus cognitive skills would reduce the impor-
tance of social structural attributes such as class or religion for voting be-
haviour (e.g. Franklin 1985; Dalton 1996). One weakness of this literature 
is that it neglects the role of the welfare state and social policy for voting 
behaviour, whereas societal change is the predominant explanation for 
changing patterns of voting behaviour.
 In contrast to the structural reasoning in large parts of the class voting 
literature, the present study offers a more concrete policy explanation for 
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the suspected decline of class voting. If class-based parties such as social 
democrats engage in policies against the political preferences of classes 
traditionally affiliated with the party, patterns of class voting may change. 
The question of whether social democrats have sacrificed their core con-
stituency in the Third Way reforms is an important one. A stable core 
constituency is typically the backbone of political parties that secures 
them a certain level of electoral support, regardless of whether the party 
is in government or not, has decent leadership or not, and so on. If these 
voters dealign, parties find themselves in a weakened electoral position, 
as the guaranteed support from the core constituency has waned substan-
tially. This can, of course, be compensated politically if social democracy 
wins new coalition options and is strategically more flexible in terms of 
office-seeking (Kitschelt 1994, 1999; Häusermann 2006, 2010). In this re-
spect, this book offers a policy explanation to the debate on whether class 
voting has declined or changed.
 Similarly, by examining the prospects of the realignment of social demo-
cratic core voters with new populist left and authoritarian right-wing par-
ties, this book speaks to the literature on dealignment and realignment. 
Since the 1970s, political sociology has studied the rise and establishment 
of new radical right parties (see Kitschelt 2007 for a comprehensive re-
view). One consistent major empirical finding has been that these par-
ties enjoy strong backing among the working class. Moreover, Kriesi et 
al. (2008) argue that right-wing parties have played an important role in 
the transformation of West European party systems as a consequence of 
globalisation, as they absorb the ‘losers of globalisation’. The literature 
typically focuses on socio-cultural issues, in particular immigration, to 
explain the rise and breakthrough of this party family. This study pro-
poses that the welfare state and social policy can also be important de-
terminants for the electoral breakthrough of such parties. Another recent 
development is the rise and consolidation of left-wing populist parties 
in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands. The present book 
reveals how the Third Way has driven the emergence of this type of party 
in some countries, and examines whether the Third Way can be seen as 
a favourable context for the rise and establishment of parties on the far 
left and the far right. As the Third Way loosens the ties between social 
democracy and its traditional core constituency, these parties may have 
a chance to foster a realignment of these voters. I will now briefly outline 
the main arguments.
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1.2 The arguments in brief
In a comparative study on the social democratic Third Way, Huo (2009) 
theorises the ideological background of social democracy, the change 
to the Third Way paradigm and the institutional factors accounting for 
country-specific differences in policy outcomes. Specifically, Huo (2009: 
10ff ) argues that the paradigm shift implies an electoral trade-off for so-
cial democracy, as the party may appeal to other voters than the core con-
stituency, which is in turn alienated by the reform agenda. This is because 
Third Way reforms do not represent the social policy preferences of social 
democracy’s core constituency, namely working-class voters. Against this 
backdrop, several social democratic parties experienced declining elec-
toral support after they engaged in significant policy change under the 
Third Way.
 However, what is lacking in the literature is a framework that theorises 
the decline of social democracy as a consequence of the Third Way and 
its contextual conditions. Such a framework would allow a comparative 
empirical analysis of the electoral consequences of Third Way reforms.
 To theorise the role of the welfare state and social policy for the align-
ment of social democracy’s core constituency, this study reintroduces 
Esping-Andersen’s classic work (1985, 1990) on the importance of social 
policy for the electoral fortunes of social democracy. In this perspective, 
the welfare state is crucial for the long-term mobilisation of the social 
democratic core constituency: the working class and lower white-collar 
employees. These voters demand decommodification of labour in their 
own interest, and social democrats represent their natural political ally 
by advocating a decommodifying welfare state. This leads to the align-
ment between social democracy and the working class and lower white-
collar employees. Given the book’s focus on the electoral consequences 
of social democratic welfare reforms, Esping-Andersen’s theory also pro-
vides a story about social policy’s feedback effects. Social democracy risks 
a dealignment of its core constituency if it engages in policies that go 
against the preferences of its core constituency. Core constituents may 
dealign from social democracy or even realign with other parties if the 
decommodification tie is broken by social democratic policy.
 Since Third Way reforms have been seen as recommodification of la-
bour (e.g. Dingeldey 2007; Merkel et al. 2008; Huo 2009), we should ex-
pect social democracy to lose considerable electoral support, especially 
among core constituents alienated by the reforms. Therefore, the basic ar-
gument is that welfare state reforms implemented under Third Way agen-
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das have caused a lasting electoral setback for social democracy among its 
traditional core constituency.
 Moreover, I claim that the extent and nature of the electoral backlash 
that follows the reforms is contingent on the electoral system under which 
social democrats reform the welfare state, and which type of challengers 
they face. This claim rests upon arguments from the New Politics and 
retrenchment literature, which originally regarded institutions and party 
competition as crucial determinants for the process of welfare state re-
form. Institutions and features of political systems structure the politi-
cal constraints and opportunities policymakers face when they want to 
reform and recalibrate mature Western welfare states (e.g. Pierson 1994, 
1996; Kitschelt 2001a; Green-Pedersen 2002a; Korpi & Palme 2003; Allen 
& Scruggs 2004; Starke 2008). This book will apply and refine the respec-
tive arguments from the literature to theorise the contextual conditions 
for the actual electoral consequences of Third Way welfare state reforms.
 In a nutshell, I argue that a majoritarian electoral system effectively 
prevents reform-minded mainstream parties, in this case social demo-
crats, from being challenged by parties on the margins or protest parties 
that may emerge as consequence of the reforms (Kitschelt 2001a; Starke 
2008). Under majoritarian voting systems, social democrats should ex-
perience a dealignment of their dissatisfied core voters, as these voters 
stay home given the lack of competitive, credible, and efficient alterna-
tives. For instance, Britain’s first-past-the-post (fptp) system may explain 
why New Labour was not challenged by parties on the margins after it 
abandoned its traditional working class programme. Hence, I claim that 
a majoritarian electoral system leads to lower turnout among the social 
democratic core constituency as a consequence of dissatisfaction with 
ideological realignment and Third Way welfare reforms.
 By contrast, proportional representation (pr) electoral systems do not 
prevent social democrats from being challenged by competitor parties. 
Rather, the welfare state reforms may not only lead to dealignment, but 
may also realign the core constituency with other parties. Serious chal-
lengers can exploit the window of opportunity opened by Third Way re-
forms and forge a realignment of social democratic core constituents.
 I maintain that leftist parties represent one type of serious challenger, 
as they are typically pro-welfare and advocate a generous welfare state 
that reflects the social policy preferences of social democracy’s core con-
stituency (Esping-Andersen 1985; Kitschelt 1999, 2001a; Arter 2002, 2003; 
March & Mudde 2005). Parties of the new right represent a second type 
of dangerous challenger, as their stance on socio-cultural issues is close 
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to the attitudes of social democracy’s core constituency (Lipset 1981; 
Kitschelt 2001b; Scheuregger & Spier 2007; Houtman et al. 2008; van der 
Waal et al. 2010). Moreover, if these parties appear welfare-minded, they 
particularly target social democratic core voters by representing social 
protectionist attitudes. These aspects come to the fore after social demo-
cratic parties have broken their ties with the core constituency (Kitschelt 
2003, 2004). I claim that an authoritarian right-wing party can exploit the 
Third Way electorally by realigning with social democracy’s traditional 
core constituency.
 This book offers insights on how the Third Way has constituted a 
favourable political context for the gains of a new populist left and the 
breakthrough and establishment of parties on the far right. Another 
electoral effect can be gains for established mainstream parties, such as 
Christian democrats. Mainstream contenders may exploit the political 
space opened by Third Way social democracy by positioning themselves 
closer to the political preferences of the social democratic core constitu-
ency during the reform period.
 However, these proposed effects of the reforms do not occur automati-
cally, as the prospects of realignment are contingent on voters’ credibility 
considerations. Challengers damage their credibility if they endorse a re-
form agenda or previously participated in reforms in a legislative or for-
mal coalition. My claim is that challenger parties that have been involved 
in reforms or plan to become so in the future spoil their chances of forging 
realignments with social democratic core constituents.
 My arguments offer some useful explanations for why Third Way re-
forms may have different electoral consequences under different condi-
tions and circumstances. The absence or presence of particular competi-
tor parties and their actual credibility do affect the nature of the electoral 
backlash faced by Third Way social democrats after reforming mature 
Western welfare states.
1.3 Structure of the book
Chapter 2 elaborates the theoretical framework for the study of the elec-
toral consequences of Third Way reforms. The chapter conceptualises the 
role played by social policy and the welfare state in the ties that were 
formed between social democracy and its core constituency during the 
second half of the 20th century. I discuss how the core constituency risks 
being alienated from social democracy in a lasting manner as a conse-
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quence of Third Way reforms that contradict these voters’ social policy 
preferences. Next, I discuss the electoral system and competitor parties 
that condition the electoral consequences of Third Way reforms and thus 
account for cross-country variations.
 Chapter 3 describes the design and methodology, case selection and 
strategy of comparison, the approach to analysing the reforms and their 
electoral consequences, and lists the data sources.
 Chapter 4 analyses the electoral consequences of Third Way reforms 
under the majoritarian fptp electoral system in the United Kingdom. The 
chapter demonstrates that fptp systems lead to a dealignment of social 
democratic core constituents. The ideological transformation of British 
social democracy in the form of New Labour and the welfare state reforms 
under the New Deal led to lower turnout among former core Labour sup-
porters after 1997. In addition, the Liberal Democrats captured some for-
mer Labour voters who were dissatisfied with the new policies adopted by 
their old party.
 Chapter 5 shows how dangerous a pro-welfare and populist left-wing 
challenger can be for Third Way social democracy. The chapter analyses 
the setback suffered by the German spd after engaging in serious policy 
change after 1998, when the party implemented path-breaking welfare 
state reforms under Agenda 2010. Afterwards, the spd was challenged 
by the Left Party as a competitor on welfare grounds. The results reveal 
that the spd lost reform-averse core constituents, who realigned with the 
socialist challenger. Abstention is another reason for social democratic 
decline in Germany as a consequence of Third Way reforms.
 Chapter 6 demonstrates that an authoritarian right-wing challenger 
can be extremely dangerous, as it exploits the favourable context created 
by social democracy’s adoption of a Third Way agenda. After the Danish 
social democrats (sd) introduced three rounds of labour market reforms, 
they lost a considerable part of their core constituency, which realigned 
with the rightist Danish People’s Party in 2001. The People’s Party has 
now retained these voters for almost a decade. Chapter 6 tests and con-
firms the arguments that contenders need to be credible to mobilise social 
democratic core voters. The results show that by supporting the sd dur-
ing the reform period, the Socialist People’s Party damaged its potential to 
benefit from the reforms. In addition, the Danish case reveals that a main-
stream party can benefit from Third Way reforms. Having modernised 
its own programme, the liberal party Venstre gained a foothold among 
the traditional voter base of Danish social democracy during the reform 
period.
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 Chapter 7 analyses the electoral effects of Swedish social democracy’s 
social policy in the period between 1991 and 2006. Sweden serves as a 
sort of control case, given that the social democratic party (sap) did not 
abandon its traditional stance on welfare and only introduced moderate 
reforms, many of which were temporary, as they were reactions to an eco-
nomic crisis rather than part of a distinct Third Way agenda (Merkel et 
al. 2008: chap. 8). The results show that the sap did not suffer lasting a 
dealignment or even a realignment, as it recaptured votes that it had lost 
in the 1998 election, four years later. This confirms the expectation that 
social democrats do not lose their core constituency per se, as long as they 
are able to stick to a more traditional social policy.
 Chapter 8 offers a comparative perspective, summing up the findings 
from the four case studies in light of the theoretical arguments. Alterna-
tive explanations are discussed and contrasted with the empirical find-
ings.
 Chapter 9 concludes and discusses the theoretical framework and the 
study’s empirical findings, situating them in the existing literature and re-
cent political developments. It discusses the political implications of the 
results and their generalisability to other cases where social democratic 





This chapter develops the theoretical framework for the analysis of the 
electoral consequences of Third Way welfare state reforms. It begins with 
an outline of social democracy’s transformation under the Third Way, and 
the background to this transformation. Then, it theorises the role of so-
cial policy in the formation of the social democratic core constituency’s 
partisan alignment; delineates the potential dealignment that is risked by 
social democracy if it engages in policy change that goes against the core 
constituency’s political preferences; and conceptualises the social demo-
cratic core constituency in terms of a class framework. It continues with 
a discussion of the effect of electoral systems and the role of particular 
competitor parties for the electoral fortunes of Third Way social demo-
crats. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the suspected decline 
of class voting as the most obvious rival to the explanation presented in 
this book.
2.1 The political-economic and societal background to Third Way 
policies
Against a background of poor election results and a wave of centre-
right governments in the Western world in the 1980s, a time when so-
cial democrats were out of office for long periods in countries such as 
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom and 
the United States, social democracy had to reconcile its electoral appeal 
with changed circumstances (Kitschelt 1994; Giddens 1998; Cuperus et al. 
2001). The economic and demographic changes that had been occurring 
since the 1970s forced social democratic parties to transform their elec-
toral programmes and to develop new electoral winning formulas (Prze-
worski 1985; Kitschelt 1994, 1999; Pontusson 1995). If they failed to do so, 
social democracy’s future vote- and office-winning chances were thought 
to be slim.
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 As for the economic challenges for social democracy, the two oil crises 
in 1973 and 1981-82, high inflation rates and the emergence of structural 
unemployment stripped social democrats of their traditional Keynesian 
macro-economic toolkit and left the provision of largely passive social se-
curity benefits no longer practicable (Pontusson 1995; Huber & Stephens 
1998; Huo 2009; Lindvall 2010). Given the accumulated public debts – 
often in combination with high inflation – deficit spending and demand 
management had ceased to be feasible options for social democratic gov-
ernments by the 1980s, and this became even more pronounced after the 
fall of the Iron Curtain and intensifying globalisation (e.g. Pontusson 1995; 
Huber & Stephens 1998; Notermans 2006; cf. Merkel et al. 2006, 2008 for 
reviews of the literature). These changed macro-economic conditions put 
pressure on the social security provisions that social democracy had tra-
ditionally advocated.
 Th e unemployment problem that emerged following the fi rst oil crisis 
in 1973 constituted another challenge for social democracy, since its tra-
ditional social and labour market policies were no longer part of the solu-
tion, but rather part of the problem. Encompassing social security schemes 
that provided passive and generous transfer incomes in case of unemploy-
ment or sickness were designed for temporary redundancies and frictional 
unemployment, but led to problems of social exclusion and long-term un-
employment after the Golden Age of the welfare state (Huo 2009). Fac-
ing budgetary constraints and mass unemployment, social democracy was 
confronted with the problem of how to reform and defend the welfare state 
at a time when its old policy instruments had become ineff ective (e.g. Hu-
ber & Stephens 1998; Merkel et al. 2006, 2008; Huo 2009; Lindvall 2010).
 At the societal level, social-structural change has constituted another 
political challenge for social democracy in recent decades. First, changes 
in the employment structure of Western societies have led to a decline in 
the number of manual workers, the traditional electoral backbone of so-
cial democratic parties. The same goes for the declining union member-
ship in many (but not all) Western countries. These trends will automati-
cally lead to a weaker electoral and political position for social democratic 
parties, unless this is offset by winning new groups of voters and by shap-
ing new electoral coalitions (e.g. Przeworski 1985; Przeworski & Sprague 
1986; Kitschelt 1994, 1999).
 A second, related aspect is the rise of the service sector professions and 
the growing electoral importance of the salaried middle class (Kitschelt 
1994; Van de Werfhorst & de Graaf 2004; Oesch 2006). Although not tra-
ditionally inclined to vote for social democratic parties, these voter seg-
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ments are considered to be new target constituencies for social democracy 
in post-industrial societies that ought to be wooed by new electoral poli-
cies. However, the changed electoral appeal of social democratic parties 
towards more market-oriented policies on the one side, and more liberal 
socio-cultural policies on the other, constitutes an electoral dilemma in 
itself, since the working class may be scared off by the changed electoral 
agenda (Kitschelt 1994, 2001b).
 A third factor that has been discussed in the literature is demographic 
change. As Western societies age and life expectancy rises, the fiscal bur-
den for Western welfare states is increasing (oecd 2000). Accordingly, 
the changing ratio between working-aged citizens and the elderly requires 
a re-allocation of public revenues and thus a re-balancing of welfare pro-
visions to account for ageing societies. However, this has implications for 
the future strategies of social democratic parties, although these are less 
straightforward than the other economic and societal trends mentioned 
above (cf. Merkel et al. 2006, 2008).
 To cope electorally with these challenges, it was argued that social 
democracy ought to engage in programmatic and strategic realignment, 
especially because the working-class core constituency is shrinking and 
the electorate is becoming more heterogeneous. This argument was made 
most prominently in Kitschelt’s seminal book (1994) and Giddens’ writ-
ings (1998, 2000). These works spelled out several general strategies for 
the future political success of social democratic parties that take account 
of economic and social change in post-industrial societies. First, on the 
socio-cultural dimension, social democratic parties ought to shift their 
policies towards more libertarian positions in order to attract the rising 
share of salaried middle-class voters. Second, increasing international 
competition and further processes of economic change call for a modera-
tion of social democracy’s positions on the socio-economic dimension in 
order to remain electable for broader segments of the electorate. This may 
also come at the expense of a clear distinction between social democracy 
and mainstream bourgeois parties with regard to this dimension of politi-
cal competition.
 Social Democracy’s transformation towards the Third Way
The above-mentioned arguments for the transformation of social democ-
racy found their distinct expression in the early 1990s and afterwards, 
when many social democratic parties adapted a Third Way agenda to 
reach out to new constituencies (Cuperus et al. 2001; Green-Pedersen et 
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al. 2001; Bonoli & Powell 2004; Merkel et al. 2008; Huo 2009; Keman 
2011). The Third Way has typically been used as a catchphrase to charac-
terise the modernisation of social democracy, inspired by Gidden’s writ-
ings (1998, 2000). The term will be used to subsume the transformation 
of social democratic parties after the 1980s, albeit the fact that not ev-
ery party explicitly referred to this term, while others modernised with 
a similar change of policy before the catchphrase became ubiquitous (cf. 
Green-Pedersen et al. 2001).
 Under the Th ird Way, social democracy indeed moderated its policies in 
many areas (Green-Pedersen et al. 2001; Bonoli & Powell 2004; Merkel et 
al. 2008; Huo 2009; Randall & Sloam 2009). In economic, fi scal and social 
policy, many old policy instruments were given up and replaced by policy 
instruments that are typically assigned to centre-right parties (Green- 
Pedersen et al. 2001; Green-Pedersen & van Kersbergen 2002; Merkel et al. 
2008). Th us, in line with Kitschelt’s claims, social democracy abandoned 
many of its distinct traditional leftist positions and became less egalitar-
ian, focusing more on equality of opportunity than of outcome.
 Th ird Way social security reforms aimed to replace the ‘welfare without 
work’ principle with the ‘welfare to work’ principle (Green-Pedersen et al. 
2001). Th is reconstruction of the welfare state marked a departure from 
the decommodifi cation principle, as incomes could no longer be realised 
outside the market for longer periods, as originally claimed by Esping- 
Andersen (1985, 1990). Rather, the reforms were intended to enforce labour 
market participation. Old social democracy had explicitly seen the function 
of social security as providing a source of non-market income that allowed 
a suffi  cient standard of living, to be ensured by relatively unconditional and 
unlimited access to generous and universal social security benefi ts.
 Labour market participation would be promoted by improving the em-
ployability of benefit claimants. Third Way reforms placed much more 
emphasis on Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) and enabling policies. 
On the one hand, job placement services and training programmes for 
the unemployed were improved and expanded. On the other hand, the re-
forms introduced coercive elements, as passive behaviour was sanctioned. 
In combination with the increased conditionality, this policy change goes 
against Esping-Andersen’s notion (1990: 21ff, 47ff ) that decommodifica-
tion is appropriately secured by rather unconditional access to benefits 
regardless of the claimants’ behaviour, actual performance or labour mar-
ket attachment. Taking part in activation is no longer a right, but a duty 
(e.g. Green-Pedersen et al. 2001: 316). In this respect, Third Way reforms 
replaced welfare with workfare and security with flexicurity.
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 On a more philosophical level, Huo (2009: chap. 2) has conceptual-
ised the Third Way as a departure from two traditional social democratic 
principles: egalitarianism and solidarity. The Third Way transformed 
these principles into prioritarian egalitarianism and productivist solidar-
ity. Old social democracy’s notion of egalitarianism was to improve the 
core constituency’s standard of living by redistribution and social security 
schemes, on the grounds that the working class was typically the worst-
off labour market group in industrial society. This was secured by wage 
compression and wage replacement if a worker was not able to derive 
his income from the market. Thus, egalitarianism incorporated the de-
commodification principle (Huo 2009: 13). Old social democracy’s notion 
of solidarity was targeted at the rather homogenous working class, even 
though it also showed solidarity with the poor. The notion relied on the 
instrument of the social security system with passive benefits, but with-
out an emphasis on work (Huo 2009: 20).
 Prioritarian egalitarianism and productivist solidarity, by contrast, 
take into account the unemployment problem that emerged in the 1970s 
and, more generally, the changing economic and social structures. The 
Third Way is seen as a response to these developments, since it incorpo-
rates a more heterogenic electorate into social democracy’s appeal and 
strategies (Giddens 1998: 20ff; Kitschelt 1999; Huo 2009: chap. 2) – but 
not without costs. Social democracy is facing a dilemma, since the two 
new principles do not make the core constituency the focal group of social 
policy, but instead emphasise new social risk groups and other margin-
alised social groups outside social democracy’s traditional core constitu-
ency (Huo 2009: 11, 21ff, 315f ). In terms of policy, this means a shift from 
social protection through decommodification and wage compression to 
enabling policies and poverty reduction (Huo 2009: 18).
 To understand the difference between traditional social democracy 
and Third Way social democracy, the next section delineates Esping-
Andersen’s arguments on the importance of the welfare state for social 
democratic voter alignment.
2.2 Social policy and the welfare state as a base for social democratic 
alignment
Esping-Andersen (1985, 1990, 1999) conceptualised the welfare state as 
an agency to tie and mobilise the social democratic core constituency. As 
social democracy advocates an encompassing and generous welfare state, 
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it attracts a particular social group, the working class, because the wel-
fare state has a risk-hedging function and thus decommodifies individu-
als from pure market dependency. In turn, the manual classes argue for 
decommodification due to their limited resources, which leave them in a 
precarious position in the labour market and with low living standards if 
they are exposed to pure market forces. Furthermore, decommodification 
works as one element of egalitarianism, a key theme for social democracy, 
and improves the living conditions of the working class and other less 
well-off segments (Esping-Andersen 1985; Huo 2009: chap. 2). Thus, so-
cial democracy formed an alignment with the manual classes by offering 
the politics of decommodification and the welfare state as agency. This 
was expanded to include lower white-collar employees who held simi-
lar positions in the labour market and who were demanding risk-hedging 
policies (Esping-Andersen 1985).
 To account for the social democratic mobilisation by using decom-
modifying welfare policies and the welfare state, we have to draw on vot-
er preferences and interests; that is, to look at the individual level. This 
allows us to establish a theoretical link between the partisan alignment 
of particular voter groups and social democracy and to explain partisan 
dealignment due to welfare state reforms, which is discussed later.
 The basic claim here is that traditionally, social democrats have suc-
cessfully mobilised the manual classes via the politics of decommodifi-
cation because those voters should have a particular individual interest 
in the decommodification of labour given their position in the labour 
market. Pure exposure to market forces would create particular hardship 
for these individuals, as labour is only a discrete commodity depending 
on labour demand and the price of labour (Esping-Andersen 1985: 31). 
Labour as a commodity is therefore the most conflictual issue in social 
policy (Esping-Andersen 1990: 35). Moreover, the risk of unemployment 
is contingent on the economic context and an individual’s human capital.
 A related feature is the effect of commodification on individual living 
standards. Given commodified labour, an individual’s living standard is 
contingent on his or her skills and the demand for these skills. As the 
manual classes have limited skills that are abundant on the labour mar-
ket, the logic of pure competition on manual labour is likely to decrease 
wages and thus living standards. Moreover, a low skill level implies lim-
ited chances of individual promotion. Collective action and institution-
alised wage bargaining by trade unions should therefore be in the interest 
of manual workers since this, unlike the predominantly market allocation 
of manual labour, will improve their living standards (Esping-Andersen 
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1985: 31ff; Weakliem & Heath 1994: 244ff; Korpi 2006). Moreover, as 
manual workers are expected to have below-average incomes, they also 
have an interest in income redistribution, wage compression and gen-
erous welfare entitlements that will increase their living standards by 
decommodifying labour. Based on these arguments, Esping-Andersen 
(1990: 22) claimed that decommodification has always been a priority for 
labour.
 Decommodification in favour of the working class is understood as 
the establishment of generous and unconditional income maintenance in 
case of unemployment or sickness. If this is fulfilled, the living standards 
and economic fortunes of the working class are no longer purely contin-
gent on market forces, but can be improved independent of market forces 
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 37; cf. Huo et al. 2008). Decommodification is 
institutionalised by a universal welfare state and legislation guaranteeing 
generous and unconditional benefits, accompanied by high income re-
placement rates (Esping-Andersen 1985: 33; Esping-Andersen 1999: 78ff ).
 By engaging in the politics of decommodification, social democracy 
is therefore the natural political ally of classes that wish to hedge their 
risks. This match between the working class’s interest-based claim for de-
commodification and social democratic policy accounts not only for sim-
ple electoral mobilisation, but also for the formation of the party’s core 
constituency and its long-term mobilisation, as long as social democrats 
represent the politics of decommodification and pursue corresponding 
social and economic policies (Esping-Andersen 1985). Hence, the social 
democrats are seen to own the welfare issue, which binds them to their 
core electorate as long as the party is able to hold on to the issue via its 
programmes and policies (Blomqvist & Green-Pedersen 2004).
 However, not all voters are expected to have a strong preference for 
decommodification. Originally, Esping-Andersen (1990: 22) regarded em-
ployers as the main opponents due to their economic interests, especially 
their weakened bargaining power if decommodification is institution-
alised. This perspective can be extended to particular groups of wage-
earners. Breen (1997) has argued that some occupational groups do not 
prefer the decommodification of labour, as they have more to gain from 
market-based arrangements given their assets and/or a fortunate bargain-
ing position in the labour market, implying higher remuneration. These 
are typically wage-earners endowed with scarce but highly demanded 
skills and qualifications, who would lose parts of their income if the de-
commodification of other wage-earners were realised by means of high 
tax burdens for the well-off (see also Korpi 2006).
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 On that score, the present book’s theoretical model of voting and the 
arguments to follow below are embedded in the partisan politics theory. 
In this perspective, political parties represent the socio-economic inter-
ests of their social constituencies (e.g. Hibbs 1977; Schmidt 1982; Korpi 
1983, 2006; Esping-Andersen 1985). This theoretical approach – and its 
related variant, power resources theory – argues that socio-economic 
interests are class-based, since working class voters demand a generous 
and encompassing welfare state to compensate for their weak resource 
endowment and to alleviate their exposure to market risks. Social demo-
cratic and other leftist parties were thus the natural allies of working-
class voters. By contrast, middle-class voters, the self-employed and capi-
tal owners were represented by secular bourgeois parties that advocated 
leaner welfare states to reduce the tax burden for their constituents and 
to enhance economic competitiveness. Christian democratic parties were 
able to attract voters from both the working and the middle class, given 
their cross-class appeal that sought to find a compromise between the 
interests of business and labour (van Kersbergen 1995).
 While originally focused on explaining the emergence of the welfare 
state and different welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi 
2006; Manow 2007), partisan politics theory also provides a policy-based 
explanation for class-based party alignments and therefore a microfoun-
dation for patterns of class voting (see Korpi 2006, esp. 172ff ). The pol-
icy preferences of working-class voters account for their alignment with 
social democracy, this being the party family that reflects these policy 
preferences in its welfare and economic policies (Hibbs 1977; Schmidt 
1982; Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1985). Furthermore, the partisan poli-
tics perspective provides a dynamic perspective on class-based party al-
legiances, as voters located in classes are tied to parties due to policy 
preferences given their risk exposure and not due to the class location 
per se (Korpi 2006). As I outline in detail below, this means that parties’ 
changing policy positions and the break with previous policies may cause 
dealignments of hitherto stable social constituencies.
 Given the book’s focus on social policy reforms and their effect on the 
commodification and decommodification of labour, I take the partisan 
politics approach to political behaviour as the theoretical point of de-
parture for the arguments in the following sections. Moreover, applying 
partisan politics theory is not generally incompatible with more recent 
approaches to the study of electoral behaviour, such as issue voting or 
proximity voting. This will be briefly addressed in Section 2.5.
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2.3 Welfare state reform as a catalyst for partisan dealignment
For Esping-Andersen (1985: 35), social policy not only accounts for par-
tisan alignments, it can also foster the opposite development, namely 
partisan dealignments and realignments. By 1985, Esping-Andersen had 
already delineated the electoral risks of policy change for social demo-
cratic parties. If social democratic parties were to engage in policy change 
that went against the economic interests and social policy preferences 
of their core constituency, they would risk alienating these voters. The 
voters might not only dealign from the party, but might also realign with 
challengers that appealed to them by offering credible policies.
 Esping-Andersen (1985) used Danish social democracy’s electoral mis-
fortunes during the 1970s as an example. In contrast to its Norwegian and 
Swedish sister parties, the Danish social democratic party had trouble 
maintaining high and stable support among its core constituency. One 
reason was that Danish social democracy (sd) had joined political agree-
ments that liberalised the Danish housing market during the 1950s and 
1960s (ibid: chap. 6). This created a divide not only between owners and 
tenants, but also within the social democratic core constituency. The So-
cialist People’s Party spoke for the tenants and argued that they had been 
disadvantaged by the sd’s policy. This continued in the 1970s, when by 
trying to reduce the homeowners’ tax privileges, the sd split its own voter 
base, as many workers had bought houses during the phase of liberalisa-
tion. The Socialist People’s Party reinforced its position among the ten-
ants, whereas the sd suffered a weak electoral performance and saw its 
right wing break out to form a new party, the Centre Democrats.
 The sd’s tax policy underwent a similar development in the same pe-
riod. At that time, the tax burden in Denmark was among the fastest 
growing in the world, and the social democratic expansion of the welfare 
state produced equity conflicts in the Danish electorate. Workers were 
also concerned by the high tax burden, and some workers became disaf-
fected with the social democrats and their welfare policy as other soci-
etal groups benefited from the expansion of the welfare state (Esping-
Andersen 1985, esp. chap. 8). These voters turned to the new protest party 
‘Fremskridtspartiet’ (the Progress Party) in the 1973 election and the re-
mainder of the 1970s. The sd was weakened in this period as its policies 
went against the economic interests of its own core constituency, which 
defected to parties on the margins.
 By contrast, the Norwegian Labour Party and the Swedish social demo-
crats avoided dividing their electorate as a consequence of their housing 
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policies or tax policies, as well as the increased and cross-cutting politi-
cal salience of those issues. As they did not engage in policies that went 
against the social policy attitudes of their core constituencies, they held 
on to these voters. Esping-Andersen’s explanations of electoral change are 
thus policy-based. He theorised and demonstrated the feedback effects 
that occur when social democrats engage in policies that conflict with the 
interests of their core voters and their own historical principles.
 Similar arguments apply when we theorise the electoral consequences 
of Third Way welfare state reforms. As the Third Way implied a departure 
from basic social democratic principles, as I will outline below, we can 
expect this paradigm shift to produce electoral risks for social democracy. 
This is particularly true for the decommodification principle, which has 
been identified as crucial for the alignment of the core constituency, but 
which was violated by Third Way reforms.
 Given the social democratic core constituency’s aspiration for decom-
modification, policies that reflect a recommodification of labour are 
simply not in line with the interests and preferences of the party’s core 
constituency. Consequently, if social democrats engage in policies that 
deviate from the politics of decommodification, they face a serious elec-
toral risk (Esping-Andersen 1985: 148f ). This implies not only short-term 
effects due to dissatisfaction, but also a dealignment of the party’s core 
electorate; or, in Esping-Andersen’s words, a ‘social democratic decom-
position’ (ibid: 35) as the voter-party mechanism is suspended. In other 
words, social democracy is in danger if it loses the welfare issue due to a 
policy change (Blomqvist & Green-Pedersen 2004: 597f ). This also im-
plies that Ross’s claim about the effect of issue ownership which prevents 
an electoral setback for social democrats may be too static and does not 
secure blame-avoidance at the very end.
 As pointed out, a decommodifying welfare state and its social policy 
are characterised by generous and unconditional benefits as well as high 
replacement rates to reduce the individual’s reliance on the market as the 
main source of income and to protect his or her skills and assets. More 
concretely, Esping-Andersen (1990: 47) has spelled out an operationalisa-
tion of social policy in terms of decommodification and recommodifi-
cation that will be applied in this book and described in more detail in 
Chapter 3.
 Esping-Andersen refers to three dimensions of commodification. He 
first considers the accessibility of benefits; that is, eligibility rules and 
restrictions on entitlements. Decommodification is ensured if there is 
easy access to (generous) social security schemes and if this access is not 
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contingent on previous contributions or employment records, labour 
market attachment or means-testing. Similarly, eligibility is not restricted 
through entitlement periods. Recommodification means that the right to 
benefits from a social security scheme is contingent on previous contribu-
tions or employment records, means-testing, labour market attachment 
or other types of restrictions. Limited and shortened eligibility periods 
also indicate recommodification. Likewise, recommodification is rein-
forced if these principles are reinforced by legislative changes.
 A second dimension concerns the degree of income maintenance. De-
commodification is reflected by having a large share of one’s former in-
come replaced by high benefit levels to secure a sufficient standard of 
living. Recommodification occurs if benefit levels do not match a suffi-
cient share of former income and benefits fall considerably below average 
earnings, which forces the unemployed back to the market quickly. The 
third dimension is the universality of entitlements. A guaranteed citizens’ 
wage would reflect a very high degree of decommodification, whereas re-
stricted and particularistic schemes indicate the opposite.
 Accordingly, reforms that introduce less generous benefits, and tight-
ened eligibility and suitability criteria, make benefits more conditional, 
and reduce replacement rates clearly mark a departure from the politics 
of decommodification. By implementing these policies, social democrats 
risk losing their core constituency, which, as outlined above, has a prefer-
ence for the decommodification of the wage-earner.
 Having outlined Esping-Andersen’s arguments on the various aspects 
of decommodification, I now embed the policies implemented under 
Third Way agendas into the framework to demonstrate that the Third 
Way indeed produced a potential dealignment between social democracy 
and its core constituency.
 Comparison of traditional social democratic and Third Way social policy
This section contrasts the social policies of social democracy before and 
under the Third Way, showing why social democracy risked a dealign-
ment of its core constituency as a consequence of Third Way policies.
 The Third Way was responsible for a recommodification of the wage-
earner, since many social policy arrangements and provisions were re-
formed in ways that conflicted with social democracy’s traditional notions 
and principles. In contrast to the decommodification principle, Third 
Way social policy reforms enforce labour market participation by creat-
ing incentives to enter (or re-enter) the labour market and not to rely on 
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benefits over long periods. This was typically implemented by means of 
stricter eligibility criteria, shorter entitlement periods, tighter suitability 
criteria and less generous benefits, in particular lower replacement rates 
(e.g. Green-Pedersen et al. 2001; Bonoli 2004; Powell 2004;  Dingeldey 
2007). Furthermore, Third Way reforms introduced means-testing for so-
cial benefits, which is in line with prioritarian egalitarianism. The main 
recipients of benefits were no longer the working class, in line with the 
notion of wage replacement, but other marginalised social groups, as a 
means of poverty alleviation. More generally, a social investment state 
was to replace the old welfare state (Keman 2011).
 The contrast between Third Way reforms and old social democratic 
principles and policies in labour market and social policy is illustrated in 
Table 2.1.
 It is obvious that the measures implemented under Third Way agendas 
contradict traditional social democracy’s principles and policies in labour
Table 2.1 Social and labour market principles and policies under traditional and Third 
Way social democracy




Focus on Equality of Outcome Focus on Equality of Opportunity
Traditional Welfare State Social Investment State
Rights No rights without responsibilities
Universalism Mix universalism and selectivity
Security Flexicurity
Policies
Welfare without work: passive social 
security benefi ts
Conditionality and Active Labour 
Market Policies
High services and benefi ts High services but low benefi ts
High replacement rates (especially for 
core work force)
Lower replacement rates or even fl at-
rate benefi ts
Lenient eligibility criteria for social 
security benefi ts
Tightened eligibility criteria
Long or unlimited eligibility period for 
benefi ts
Shorter eligibility periods for benefi ts 
(often accompanied by mandatory 
activation)
No or moderate Job Suitability Criteria Tight Job Suitability Criteria
Source: Own compilation drawing on Green-Pedersen et al. (2001); Bonoli 2004; Powell 2004: 
Table 1.1; Dingeldey 2007; Keman 2011.
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market and social policy. The table’s upper half shows that the Third Way 
transformed many traditional social democratic principles. The lower half 
demonstrates that this was accompanied by considerable policy changes. 
Most importantly, decommodification was suspended by Third Way so-
cial democracy, since access to benefits was no longer an unconditional 
social right, but limited by eligibility and conditionality. In this respect, 
the (re-)commodification of labour as the enforcement of labour market 
participation was an explicit Third Way goal (e.g. Green-Pedersen et al. 
2001; Huo 2009).
 Consequently, this book will explicitly study the actual policy changes 
implemented by social democratic parties to assess whether actual labour 
market reforms did indeed depart from traditional social democratic pol-
icies. In other words, the analysis of the reforms will investigate whether 
the policy change illustrated in the lower half of Table 2.1 took place under 
social democratic governments. Admittedly, such an approach implies a 
rather narrow focus on Third Way reforms. Nevertheless, this operation-
alisation captures the core of Esping-Andersen’s notion of decommodifi-
cation. Looking at actual policies captures the issue of whether labour is 
commodified or protected against the risks of the labour market through 
social security arrangements. This cannot be ensured by only analysing 
manifestos, as these might announce policy changes that were never re-
alised in the political praxis or leave out policy changes that were actually 
realised. I will nonetheless briefly review party constitutions and analo-
gous statements to identify the parties’ ideological stance on social policy 
in terms of my framework. The issue of analysing labour market reforms 
will be further discussed in Chapter 3.
 In sum, having engaged in welfare state reforms under the Third Way 
paradigm, social democrats no longer fulfil the conditions for the long-
term alignment of their core constituency, since the reforms go against 
the social policy demands of their traditional supporters. The Third Way 
aimed to enhance labour market participation by means of active labour 
market polices, which made benefits contingent on the individual’s will-
ingness to take up work or training. Moreover, replacement rates were 
decreased (at least in the long run) and opportunities to leave the labour 
market with a relatively high share of one’s former income were consid-
erably reduced. In particular, Merkel et al. (2008: 14) claim that ‘the de-
commodification objective has been partially substituted by a principle 
of conditionality’ (cf. Dingeldey 2007: 823 for a similar summary). Hence, 
the essential argument is: by introducing recommodifying reforms under 
the Third Way, social democrats violated their original programmatic as-
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pirations and thus risked alienating their core constituencies. The main 
proposition to be examined is: social democratic parties that engage in 
the recommodification of labour risk alienating their core constituen-
cies, as these reforms conflict with the social policy preferences of these 
voters.
2.4 Decommodifi cation, social class and conceptualising the social 
democratic core constituency
This section conceptualises the notion of the social democratic core 
constituency to be applied in the empirical analysis. It operationalises 
the argument, made by Esping-Andersen and others, that the preference 
for decommodification is class-based and thereby explains the align-
ment between particular classes and social democracy. In this respect, 
it is fruitful to draw on a class concept that takes the individual’s posi-
tion in the labour market, skills and the resulting claim for protection 
against risks into account (Korpi 2006). The notion of ‘risk classes’ is 
the crucial underlying rationale (Baldwin 1990; Esping-Andersen 1999: 
40f ) and allows us to delineate those classes that originally formed the 
social democratic core constituency to give us an analytical construct 
for the empirical investigation. One such conception is the class scheme 
proposed by Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (e.g. Erikson & Gold-
thorpe 1992; Goldthorpe 2007) – henceforth the egp scheme – which 
systematically incorporates the human capital of wage-earners, employ-
ers and the self-employed. As mentioned above, human capital in terms 
of assets and skills and the resulting position in the labour market are 
the important aspects of an individual’s desire for decommodification. 
Moreover, individuals with typical wage relationships should be most 
concerned with decommodification (Esping-Andersen 1999: 45; see also 
Korpi 2006: 172ff ). In this regard, the egp scheme accounts for human 
asset specificity influencing type of work contract, chances of promo-
tion and risk of redundancy, and classifies occupations in terms of these 
factors (see Goldthorpe 2007). In my opinion, this class scheme is ap-
propriate for classifying claims for decommodification, and I argue that 
classes with a labour contract and low human capital have formed the 
social democratic core constituency via the decommodification linkage.
 The egp scheme can be seen as the basis for a more systematic treat-
ment of occupations than Esping-Andersen’s original work, which 
mainly drew on labour force statistics to distinguish classes. The egp 
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scheme enables a coherent operationalisation of individuals’ decom-
modification claims in line with Esping-Andersen’s arguments. More 
generally, the scheme allows us to test the arguments drawn from the 
partisan politics literature on the social policy preferences of differ-
ent social constituencies with individual-level data. Table 2.2 lists the 
classes distinguished by the egp scheme, their endowment with human 
capital, differentiation of employment contracts, and expected claims 
for decommodification.
 The classes iiib, vi and vii, manual workers and lower-white collar 
employees, exhibit features that lead to a claim for decommodification, as 
they have labour contracts and only limited human capital. This is in ac-
cordance with both Esping-Andersen’s theoretical claims for social demo-
cratic class alignments (1985: chap. 1) and the descriptive analysis on the
Table 2.2 EGP-Class, labour market position and claim for decommodifi cation













II Professionals and managers, 






IIIa Routine non-manual 
employees, higher grade
Mixed Low-Intermediate No





IV Small proprietors and 
employers and self-employed 
workers
Self-employed Not classifi ed No
V Technicians, lower-grade; 




VI Skilled manual workers Labour 
(modifi ed)
Low Yes
VIIa Non-skilled manual workers 
(other than in agriculture)
Labour (very) Low Yes
VIIb Agricultural workers Labour (very) Low Yes
Notes:  a. Classifi ed according to Goldthorpe (2007).
  b. Own classifi cation following Esping-Andersen (1985: chap. 1; 1990, 1999: chap. 3); 
modifi ed means that labour contract accounts for some specifi c individual skills.
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class distinctiveness of Scandinavian social democrats in the post-war 
era (1985: 122ff ). The egp scheme has two main virtues. First, it theoreti-
cally distinguishes classes based on their position in the labour market, 
which conditions claims for decommodification. Second, this allows us 
to identify the social democratic core constituency in line with Esping-
Andersen’s decommodification linkage. It also distinguishes other social 
classes opposing decommodification on the basis of their own economic 
interests, given their human capital and highly marketable skills. These 
individuals should benefit from commodification as an effect of their la-
bour market position and are thus distinguishable from social democ-
racy’s core constituency.
 Research on social policy preferences and attitudes towards the welfare 
state has shown that manual workers and lower white-collar employees 
have the strongest affiliation to social protection, income maintenance 
and egalitarian policies (e.g. Goul Andersen 2003b; Svallfors 2006;  Edlund 
2007). In line with Esping-Andersen, manual workers, and to a lesser ex-
tent lower-white collar employees, have had a significantly higher pro-
pensity to vote for social democratic or labour parties in recent decades 
(e.g. Manza et al. 1995; Evans 1999; Brooks et al. 2006; Knutsen 2006; 
Merkel et al. 2006: 80ff; Bartolini 2007). Using the egp class scheme or 
similar classifications of occupational groups, the literature has demon-
strated that in several Western countries, unskilled and skilled workers, 
as well as the lower non-manual strata, could be identified as the social 
democratic core constituency until the 1990s.
 One might object that changing social policy attitudes and political 
preferences among the social democratic core constituency paved the way 
for Third Way reforms. If social democratic voters had developed more 
meritocratic attitudes in the years preceding the Third Way, the electoral 
risk of recommodifying reforms might have been alleviated. In a similar 
vein, less egalitarian social policy preferences among the electorate may 
have eased social democracy’s electoral trade-offs in switching to a more 
market-oriented Third Way agenda.
 The work of Svallfors (2006: chap. 5; 2007) and Edlund (2007) has ana-
lysed data on social policy attitudes and attitudes towards redistribution 
collected around the turn of the millennium, and thus during the initial 
phase of the Third Way. Using a similar class scheme to that presented in 
Table 2.2 above, the analyses reveal that there is still a considerable class 
cleavage on socio-economic issues such as the welfare state’s generosity, 
taxation, redistribution and acceptable wage inequalities. Working class 
and routine non-manual employees are most supportive of a welfare state 
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that secures generous and encompassing social security benefits and the 
public (rather than private) provision of welfare services. The same goes 
for state intervention in markets and the correction of market outcomes. 
These occupational groups are less tolerant of large income differentials 
than other groups with more marketable skills, and want to maintain ex-
isting decommodifying welfare schemes in line with the arguments made 
in sections 2.2 and 2.3. Hence, one can hardly say that social democratic 
core voters had become heavily inclined towards meritocratic ideals by 
the change of the millennium, as demonstrated by Svallfors’ and Edlund’s 
analysis.
 Similarly, Boeri et al.’s analysis of survey data on attitudes towards wel-
fare state retrenchment (2001) has shown that the lower social strata ob-
ject to reforms and the retrenchment of the welfare state, even in an age 
of fiscal austerity. These patterns will be confirmed by analysing the atti-
tudes towards welfare reform proposals in the case study chapters below. 
In sum, around the turn of the millennium, the occupational groups con-
ceptualised as the social democratic core constituency still demonstrated 
strong egalitarian preferences, were inclined to support generous and 
encompassing social security benefits, and rejected proposals to reform 
the welfare state. Therefore, while social policy preferences might have 
changed between the Golden Age and the 1990s, the social democratic 
core constituency continued to harbour attitudes that implied a serious 
electoral backlash for social democratic parties that moved away from 
their traditional social policy principles. In this respect, Edlund (2007: 
69) has stated ‘that inertia, not change, is the most likely outcome as far 
as the contemporary development of political cleavages [around socio-
economic issues, ca] is concerned’. This also means that the partisan poli-
tics approach to electoral behaviour, as applied in this book, still has its 
merits, because it is possible to distinguish social classes by their demand 
for decommodification and link this to party choice and electoral change.
 Given the theoretical and empirical evidence, I conceptualise the so-
cial democratic core constituency as consisting of manual workers and 
lower white-collar employees. This implies that I often use a straight-
forward twofold or threefold definition of the electorate in the empirical 
analyses. This is, of course, a rather simple operationalisation of social 
groups given the heterogeneity of the workforce and the discussion on 
new class divisions within the workforce (e.g. Müller 1999; Kitschelt & 
Rehm 2005; Oesch 2006). On the other hand, this approach employs a 
theoretically stringent and clear concept to study voter alignments over 
time and space. I am aware that this also implies a loss of information, 
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but as not all data sources used in this book allow for the use of more 
elaborate class schemes, my operationalisation is sufficiently distinct, as 
the above-cited research on social policy preferences and voting behav-
iour has shown. Moreover, related research on social democracy and the 
insider-outsider problem has often applied similar parsimonious opera-
tionalisations of the workforce to study dynamics over time or space (e.g. 
Rueda 2005, 2006, 2007; Lindvall & Rueda 2012). Further research on the 
electoral consequences of Third Way reforms must, of course, dig deeper 
by using more fine-grained class operationalisations and testing new class 
schemes.
 Returning to the general claim that recommodifying reforms imply a 
risk of an electoral setback for social democracy, the next section discuss-
es the role of the electoral system and competitor parties. On the basis of 
this discussion, some arguments are elaborated for the expected patterns 
of electoral consequences of the reforms in a given context.
2.5 Political system, party competition and welfare reforms
 The impact of the electoral system for the electoral eff ects of the 
reforms
The argument made in this section is that the electoral effects of welfare 
reforms in fptp systems are different from those in pr systems, because 
fptp protects reform-minded social democrats from being challenged 
by competitors on the margins or other welfare parties. One should note 
that both the arguments on electoral consequences made below and the 
book’s analytical focus in general refer to those social democratic parties 
that held office and were responsible for welfare state reforms. Analys-
ing the electoral fortunes of those parties that were out of office at that 
time is beyond the scope of the book, although recent developments in 
the Swedish case for the oppositional social democrats will be discussed 
in Chapter 7.
 fptp systems typically produce single-party governments with compe-
tition between two major parties or between two major parties and a mi-
nor third party with regional (or other socially defined) strongholds that 
allow it to survive. Scholars of welfare reform often embed this feature in 
veto-player logic and argue that welfare state retrenchment can be pur-
sued more easily under Westminster-style fptp systems (Kitschelt 2001a; 
Starke 2008, esp. 30f, 196ff ). It is easier for established parties to imple-
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ment otherwise unpopular reforms and cutbacks, since leftist or Chris-
tian democratic pro-welfare parties that may block reforms or gain votes 
afterwards remain marginalised. The same is true for the radical right or 
other types of protest parties.
 The absence of such challengers in parliament and the electorate’s 
knowledge about the ineffective support for these parties make reforms 
more likely under fptp systems. Starke (2008: 208) claims that fptp is the 
strongest institutional determinant for retrenchment, especially when so-
cial democrats support the reforms (such as New Zealand’s Labour Party 
in Starke’s case). As the main opponent of the social democrats is a mar-
ket-liberal conservative party, which cannot credibly oppose or block the 
reforms, they have relatively broad leeway to implement their policies. 
Disaffected core supporters can only abstain or vote for ineffective leftist 
parties (Kitschelt 2001a: 283). The dependent variable in this literature is 
the likelihood of welfare state reforms. I claim that the arguments can be 
rewritten to predict the electoral consequences of reforms and the role of 
the electoral system in a first step, and the importance of particular par-
ties in a second step.
 In other words, the arguments can be used to theorise the electoral 
system’s impact on the electoral effects of the reforms under an fptp sys-
tem, in contrast to those countries that use pr. As the electoral system 
effectively prevents the emergence of serious challengers to Third Way 
social democracy, and the second mainstream party is not credible, the 
electoral trade-off for reform-minded social democrats is reduced to a 
non-voter dilemma. In an fptp electoral system, abstention on the part of 
reform-averse core constituents should be the typical electoral effect of 
recommodifying welfare state reforms implemented by social democrats.
 This effect was confirmed by Kriesi and colleagues’ examination of the 
role of globalisation in electoral change (Kriesi et al. 2008). Examining 
the establishment of right-wing parties in the context of globalisation, 
Kriesi et al. (ibid., esp. 38ff ) claimed that the established parties in the uk 
were not seriously challenged by this type of contender thanks to the fptp 
system. By contrast, during the past three decades of increasing globalisa-
tion, countries with pr systems have typically seen the rise or emergence 
of parties on the political margins.
 Nevertheless, if a country with an fptp system has a third party that 
challenges the two major parties, such as the Liberal Democrats in the 
uk, some social democratic core voters may shift to this relatively mar-
ginalised party if there is a realistic chance that it might win in the re-
spective constituencies. In the British context, the Liberal Democrats 
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have often attracted voters who are dissatisfied with both Labour and the 
Tories (as the party positioned itself in equidistance until the mid-1990s). 
Moreover, its regional strongholds in England’s south-west and south-
east, as well as Scotland, allowed it to survive against an oversimplified 
interpretation of Duverger’s law. Thus, apart from the non-voter trade-
off discussed above, the existence of a centrist minor third party under 
fptp needs some empirical inspection to see whether this produces a 
diverging effect against my general claim of the dealignment of social 
democratic core voters under fptp as a consequence of recommodifying 
reforms.
 Having borrowed the arguments from both the retrenchment literature 
and the party competition literature, I argue that an fptp system basically 
leads to a dealignment of social democratic core voters after recommodify-
ing reforms have been implemented by ‘their’ party. We should not expect 
considerable realignments with other parties, as these are marginalised by 
this electoral system and voters are aware that shifting to non-established 
parties means a wasted vote. I thus expect that the electoral system condi-
tions the electoral consequences of the reforms, as while social democracy 
is only threatened by dealignment under fptp systems, it faces challenger 
parties under pr that implies realignment to other parties.
 Figure 2.1 summarises these expectations in a highly stylised fashion.
Figure 2.1 Role of electoral system for main electoral eff ects of welfare state reforms
Reforms FPTP PR
No Core constituency sticks to party
Yes Dealignment (abstention) Realignment (gains for 
competitors)
This brings us to the question of what happens if the electoral system is pr 
and thus does not prevent reform-minded social democratic parties from 
being challenged by other parties as a consequence of the reforms.
 Competitor parties for social democracy after Third Way reforms 
under PR
This section develops the arguments relating to which competitor par-
ties are most dangerous for social democrats reforming the welfare state, 
and under which conditions. Of course, non-voting remains an option 
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for dissatisfied social democratic voters under pr systems, but the crucial 
difference is the likelihood of realignments to dangerous challengers that 
are not marginalised by the electoral system.1 My main argument is that 
leftist challengers represent the first type of dangerous competitor and 
authoritarian right-wing parties the second type. Further arguments con-
cern the role of other mainstream parties and the electorate’s credibility 
considerations regarding these challengers.
 Challenge from the left
Esping-Andersen (1985) maintained that the most serious competitor for 
a social democratic party that has implemented recommodifying wel-
fare reforms is a party to its left. Similarly, Kitschelt (2001a: 276) claimed 
that due to their stance on welfare policy, these parties ‘are likely to be-
come the recipients of disappointed social democratic voters’. Thus the 
retrenchment literature saw leftist parties as veto players, as they consti-
tute an electoral dilemma for reform-minded social democrats in advance 
(Kitschelt 1999, 2001a; Merkel et al. 2006, 2008). Moreover, due to their 
programmatic stance, they are not only a short-term threat.
 This problem has also been identified in earlier research on social 
democracy (Przeworski 1980, 1985; Przeworski & Sprague 1986; King & 
Wickham-Jones 1990). This literature generally discussed the electoral 
dilemmas relating to different strategic options: whether a social demo-
cratic party should be an orthodox working-class party or a party with 
broader societal appeal, as it later aspired to implement a Third Way 
agenda. Social democrats would risk losing working-class voters to other 
class-based parties, such as communists and left-socialists, if they became 
more moderate and broadened their appeal to attract middle-class voters 
(Przeworski & Sprague 1986: 55f, 70ff; King & Wickham-Jones 1990: 390). 
Competition from the left thus constitutes a serious electoral trade-off for 
social democrats that wish to appeal to the centre, as their working-class 
constituencies are now ideologically closer to the left-wing challenger.
 In this respect, left-wing parties do not only pose a short-term threat, 
as they particularly attract the (former) social democratic core constitu-
ency, which demands risk-hedging welfare policies. Such parties also ad-
vocate universal and generous social security schemes with a high degree 
of income replacement. Accordingly, they reflect the attitudes of social 
democratic core constituents and may try to mobilise these voters with 
their stance on welfare. In this respect, communist or leftist socialist par-
ties may present themselves as ‘original’ social democrats after the social 
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democrats have adopted Third Way agendas and moved towards the ideo-
logical centre (Arter 2002; Blomqvist & Green-Pedersen 2004; Volkens 
2004). Left-wing competitors therefore have a chance to draw on the de-
commodification mechanism that originally tied the social democrats to 
their core constituency, to foster electoral realignment after welfare state 
reform has taken place.
 Although the present book takes arguments from the partisan politics 
literature as its theoretical point of departure, the danger of left parties (as 
well as other challengers) can also be conceptualised from the perspec-
tive of issue voting theories. The arguments from the perspective applied 
in this book are by no means contradictory to or mutually exclusive of 
arguments from the issue voting literature. Even if political competition 
is increasingly structured around issue competition, ‘there is no reason to 
assume that a responsive electorate is inconsistent with substantial class 
differences in party preference’ (Evans & Tilley 2012: 141).
 In short, the issue voting literature assumes that voters elect politi-
cal parties or politicians on the basis of their perceived competence on 
salient issues on which they have developed policy preferences (Budge & 
Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996). Moreover, parties own particular issues: social 
democratic parties have built a reputation on welfare issues and fight-
ing unemployment, whereas centre-right parties are typically regarded 
as fiscally prudent and able to enhance competitiveness (e.g. Budge & 
Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996). The fact that social democrats have tradi-
tionally ‘owned’ the welfare issue due to their function as an advocate 
of welfare state development has also been used as an argument for why 
social democrats have more leeway in reforming the welfare state (Ross 
2000; Green-Pedersen 2002a). However, stable issue ownership for so-
cial democrats due to previous policies is a rather static assumption, and 
disregards the position of left-wing competitors under conditions of is-
sue competition after social democracy has shifted to a Third Way policy 
platform, as argued above. On that score, social democrats may lose the 
welfare issue that they traditionally owned (Blomqvist & Green-Pedersen 
2004). As a consequence of Third-Way-induced policy change, left-wing 
competitors can take over the welfare issue from the social democrats 
and win voters who prioritise welfare, something that is particularly true 
for the social democratic core constituency. The welfare state and the 
fight against unemployment have typically been highly salient issues in 
Western European electoral contexts (Aardal & van Wijnen 2005), and 
this should particularly be the case when policymakers adopt policies 
that depart from their parties’ traditional issue reputations. In this vein, 
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arguments from the issue competition approach provide a different link-
age between partisans and parties, but not one that is incompatible with 
the partisan politics literature, as both use voters’ policy preferences as a 
common core for theorising partisan alignments.2
 Moreover, in the language of spatial models of party competition, left-
ist parties may now occupy the gap on the left where the more centrist 
Third Way reform agenda should have created a vacuum (Neugebauer & 
Stöss 1999; Arter 2002; Blomqvist & Green-Pedersen 2004; Patton 2006; 
Allen 2009). A left-wing challenger can now be used for compensational 
or directional voting as former social democratic voters are punishing 
their parties by shifting to parties that are closer to their policy positions 
(Adams et al. 2005; Kedar 2005). Summing up the theoretical arguments, 
we can expect left-wing (socialist) parties to constitute dangerous com-
petitors for reform-minded social democrats. As a consequence of re-
commodifying welfare reforms, these parties may draw on the welfare 
link that originally tied social democracy to its core constituency and 
therefore foster a realignment of this voter segment. Furthermore, these 
parties are not expected to engage in retrenchment given their position 
on social policy issues, making them credible alternatives for the social 
democratic core constituency. On the other hand, if they were previously 
involved in welfare state reforms or advocate future reforms, they may 
have seriously damaged their credibility. This will be addressed below.
 Challenge from the right
The literature also maintains that right-wing parties are increasingly chal-
lenging social democracy, as they typically attract the same segment of 
voters as social democrats do (cf. Kitschelt 2007 for an extensive litera-
ture review). These arguments often refer to Lipset’s classic thesis (1981) 
on working-class authoritarianism; that is, a cross-pressure effect for 
workers who are leftist on economic issues but rightist on socio-cultural 
issues. As I will argue in this section, this can also be linked to the Third 
Way. For the sake of clarity, I exclude traditional conservative and market-
liberal parties here, and mean parties of the new right or far right when I 
refer to ‘right-wing parties’.
 Authoritarian right-wing parties are serious challengers to social 
democratic parties, as they represent the attitudes of social democratic 
core voters on socio-cultural issues such as the environment, immigra-
tion or law and order (Kitschelt 2001b; Scheuregger & Spier 2007; Hout-
man et al. 2008; Kriesi et al. 2008). The authoritarian attitudes of the 
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manual classes bear the potential for realignments with parties on the 
right (Kitschelt 2001b; Achterberg 2006; van der Waal et al. 2007; Kriesi 
et al. 2008).
 Given these arguments, there are strong indications that right-wing 
parties constitute dangerous challengers to Third Way social democ-
racy. Once the welfare link between social democracy and its core con-
stituency is broken, right-wing parties may foster realignment with social 
democracy’s core constituency, basing their attitudes on socio-cultural 
issues. More generally, the Third Way has a more centrist electoral ap-
peal, which implies that social democratic and mainstream centre-right 
parties, such as Christian democrats, converge on the welfare economics 
dimension (Keman et al. 2006; Huo 2009). In this respect, cultural voting 
benefits right-wing challengers (Kitschelt 1997; Carter 2005: 206ff; see 
also Kitschelt 2001b: 431f; Achterberg 2006; Houtman et al. 2008; van 
der Waal et al. 2010). This danger is particularly virulent if the right-wing 
party itself takes a social protectionist stance by defending core social 
security schemes to attract working class constituencies that oppose wel-
fare reforms (Kitschelt 2003, 2004). Kitschelt (2001b: 435) has proposed 
that far right parties could turn into post-industrial labour parties, to the 
detriment of social democratic parties.
 Following these lines of reasoning, I argue that Third Way reforms pro-
vide a favourable context for the realignment of social democratic core 
constituents with authoritarian right-wing parties. However, I claim that 
it is not the cultural dimension per se that causes the realignment, but 
rather the reforms themselves, because the latter break the ties between 
social democracy and its core voters and trigger the shift to right-wing 
parties, provided these are not (distinctly) anti-welfare. Of course, these 
parties may now capitalise on their position on cultural issues, once social 
democracy is no longer able to hold on to its voters with social policy.
 However, there has been substantial variation in the success of au-
thoritarian right-wing parties in Western countries (e.g. Kitschelt 1997, 
2007; Arzheimer & Carter 2006; Stöss 2006). Some countries have seen 
the emergence and electoral breakthrough of such parties, whereas other 
countries have not. This is of particular importance in the case of Ger-
many, one of the cases in this book. In contrast to many neighbouring 
countries, there was neither a far right party at the federal level before 
the spd adopted a Third Way agenda nor after the spd gained office in 
1998 (Dolezal 2008). This needs to be discussed briefly in order to clarify 
why the chapter on Germany is almost exclusively focused on competi-
tion from the left.
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 The existing German far right parties – the German People’s Union 
(dvu), the National Democratic Party (npd) and the Republikaner – 
were by no means successful competitors at the federal level during the 
period under review, as they never came close to surpassing the thresh-
old for parliamentary representation and did not pose a dangerous chal-
lenge to the established parties.3 This is because they either declined to 
compete due to internal struggles at that time (Republikaner), or were 
still associated with the national socialist legacy (dvu and npd) (Stöss: 
2006: 555ff ).4 Moreover, the two parties did not distance themselves from 
this legacy in an authentic manner, but rather remained ambivalent in 
public appearances or even cooperated with violent extremists. This has 
led to the enduring political marginalisation of the dvu and npd and to 
only occasional electoral gains in second-order elections. Moreover, the 
dvu and npd belong to the extreme right, and not to the family of so-
called populist or new right parties, such as the Danish People’s Party or 
the Norwegian Progress Party, which have been far more competitive in 
recent decades (e.g. Stöss 2006; Dolezal 2008: 218). The npd was even 
threatened with being banned in 2001, due to its suspected opposition 
to the German Constitution and its affiliation with the national socialist 
legacy. Given these arguments and the outright failure of the far right in 
the German case, the respective chapter is focused on the electoral chal-
lenge from the left for the reform-minded spd after 1998. This marks a 
contrast to the Danish case, where a competitor from the right had elec-
toral success during the period under review, and where the competitor 
did not hold extremist views that prevented the party from becoming 
competitive.
 In sum, there is also serious potential for a realignment of social demo-
cratic core voters with authoritarian right-wing parties as a consequence 
of recommodifying Third Way welfare state reforms. Once such reforms 
have taken place, right-wing parties can attract this segment of voters 
with a combination of authoritarian socio-cultural appeal and a social 
protectionist stance on welfare. The two sections above on left- and right-
wing competitors yield the following proposition: pro-welfare leftist and 
authoritarian right-wing parties constitute the most dangerous challeng-
ers for reform-minded social democrats under pr.
 Credibility considerations and the prospects for challenger parties
Having argued that leftist pro-welfare parties and authoritarian right-
wing parties are the most dangerous challengers to reform-minded so-
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cial democrats, I nevertheless claim that some qualifications have to be 
made with respect to the competitors’ actual electoral prospects. Re-
alignments do not occur automatically; challengers must appear cred-
ible in terms of their own policy and their current political positions on 
social policy.
 A crucial aspect for the credibility of challengers is whether they have 
‘dirty hands’ from participation in previous retrenchment and reform. If 
potential competitors were part of a legislative or formal coalition that 
engaged in retrenchment and welfare state recalibration, they have al-
ready damaged their credibility. This effect has been demonstrated by 
Heinisch’s analysis (2003) of the Austrian Freedom Party (fpö). Having 
attracted large shares of working class votes during the 1990s, the fpö lost 
parts of its working class constituency in the 2002 election after imple-
menting controversial welfare and tax reforms in coalition with the Chris-
tian Democratic People’s Party (övp). The party could no longer exploit 
its anti-establishment appeal and ‘clean hands’ image, which had attracted 
working-class voters.
 I make a similar point for the case of the Socialist People’s Party in 
Denmark in this book. This party typically represents a left-socialist party 
that should have constituted a dangerous challenger for reform-minded 
social democrats, as outlined before. However, as the chapter on Den-
mark will show, the party gave parliamentary support to the social demo-
cratic minority government after 1994, a government that was responsible 
for three rounds of encompassing labour market reforms. The party failed 
to show credible opposition to the reforms and acted too compliantly to 
be seen as a credible challenger to the social democrats. In this vein, the 
party got ‘dirty hands’ by giving parliamentary support to a reform coali-
tion and thus damaged both its credibility and its chance to win social 
democratic core voters at that time. This is different from the case of 
Germany, where we also find a left-socialist challenger, but a credible one. 
The Left Party that emerged during the period of welfare state reform in 
Germany under Chancellor Schröder was by no means involved in the 
legislation around the reforms and cuts, and therefore posed a credible 
challenge for the spd. Thus, the cases of Denmark and Germany enable us 
to test the credibility argument by looking at the electoral fortunes of the 
left-socialist parties in these two countries, which differed in their politi-
cal strategy during the respective reform periods.
 Lastly, potential challengers that promote their own reform agendas 
damage their credibility and thus their prospects of attracting social demo-
cratic core voters. Under normal circumstances, these voters cannot be 
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expected to shift to a party that proposes even harsher reforms than their 
traditional political ally. Hence, potential challengers to social democra-
cy damage their credibility and weaken their chances of attracting social 
democratic core voters if they have ‘dirty hands’ or promote their own 
reform agendas. This can be summed up in the following proposition: 
challengers have to be credible and cannot have supported reforms in the 
past or plan to do so in the future.
 Mainstream parties as potential challengers
To conclude the discussion on competitor parties for Third Way social 
democracy, I want to consider mainstream parties that have a reputation 
on welfare or try to abandon an anti-welfare image by counteracting a 
social democratic challenger’s Third Way agenda with their own stra tegic 
move. They are typically, but not exclusively, Christian democratic par-
ties. Christian democratic parties are seen as welfare parties that also ad-
vocate some degree of decommodification (Esping-Andersen 1990; van 
Kersbergen 1995), and thus constitute an electoral competitor for social 
democratic parties engaging in welfare state reform in a few countries. 
In opposition to reform-minded social democrats, they may benefit from 
public discontent about welfare reform due to their pro-welfare image 
and thus take over the welfare issue among some voters (Kitschelt 2001a; 
Schmidt 2006).
 Similar points can be made if a social democratic party faces another 
mainstream party that is not distinctively anti-welfare and that moder-
ates its appeal to incorporate workers and lower white-collar employees 
in its electoral considerations. Such parties may also benefit from disaf-
fection with social democratic welfare state reforms, but it is more ques-
tionable whether this will lead to outright and lasting realignments. Like 
left-socialist and authoritarian right-wing parties, mainstream parties 
may benefit if their positions are close to those of the social democratic 
electorate, but they cannot be a credible alternative if these parties ad-
vocate conflicting positions. This may be the case if a mainstream party 
endorses its own reform agenda or takes a libertarian position on socio-
cultural issues. In contrast to their left-wing and right-wing opponents, 
who directly target working-class constituencies, the role of mainstream 
parties seems more ambiguous in terms of the electoral consequences of 
Third Way reforms.
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2.6 Social democracy and declining class voting
Th e claims outlined above have to be brought into the context of another 
apparent and probably the most obvious rival explanation, the postulated 
decline of class voting as a trend in modern societies. If this is true, class-
based social democratic parties should lose support as a logical conse-
quence of social change, which is presumed to be the driving force for the 
decline of class voting. Th e literature on the decline of class voting off ers 
various explanations for the weakening eff ect of voters’ social class back-
ground on vote choices and party alignments. More precisely, there are 
fi ve discernable theories (Manza et al. 1995; Goldthorpe 1996; Evans 2000).
 The first explanation points to the ‘embourgeoisement’ of the working 
class and the ‘proletarianisation’ of white-collar work as an explanation 
for declining class voting (e.g. Goldthorpe et al. 1968). This is supported 
by claims about increased occupational and social mobility blurring class 
effects on political choice (De Graaf et al. 1995).
 A second line of reasoning has argued that new or re-emerging cleav-
ages, such as gender, race, ethnicity or consumption, are replacing the 
hitherto dominant class cleavage as the predominant predictor for politi-
cal behaviour (e.g. Dunleavy 1980; Huckfeldt & Kohfeld 1989; Inglehart & 
Norris 2000).
 The third set of explanations relates to increasing levels of educational 
attainment and thus the ‘cognitive mobilisation’ of the electorate. Political 
preferences no longer originate from class-based social identities, but can 
increasingly be traced to rationality considerations and political learning 
processes. This leads to a decline in class voting, whereas issue voting and 
voting based on assessment are expected grow (e.g. Dalton 1984, 1996; 
Franklin 1985; Heath et al. 1991).
 The fourth line of reasoning is probably the most influential and wide-
spread explanation for the decline in class voting in Western societies: 
that the increasing importance of postmaterialist values has reduced the 
role played by materialist values in society (e.g. Inglehart 1984, 1990), and 
that voting decisions are therefore based on values rather than on class 
affiliations. The result is a division of the left into an old class-based left 
consisting of workers and a new postmaterialist left drawing support from 
the new middle class. This is said to weaken the traditional left-right di-
vision structured by class, while overall class voting is not expected to 
decline (e.g. Lipset 1981; Inglehart & Rabier 1986; Weakliem 1991).
 The fifth argument is that as the share of manual workers was never 
sufficient and has declined substantially, class-based social democratic 
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parties cannot reach a majority based on their working-class constituen-
cies. They thus have an incentive to broaden their appeal to the middle 
classes. This dilemma of electoral socialism has led to a general decline 
in class-based politics and has reduced the importance of class in the 
vote choice for social democratic parties (Przeworski 1980; Przeworski & 
Sprague 1986; King & Wickham-Jones 1990). Przeworski, Sprague and lat-
er Kitschelt further conceptualised the electoral trade-off faced by social 
democrats if they try to attract new voters outside their traditional core 
constituency by moving to the political centre (Przeworski 1980; Prze-
worski & Sprague 1986; Kitschelt 1994, 1999). Since this requires compro-
mise and reformist policies that do not reflect orthodox social democratic 
policies, the core constituency is likely to be alienated and its support to 
become uncertain.
 These explanations typically concern the period prior to the Third 
Way; that is, the period between the 1970s and the early 1990s. In this 
respect, the present book speaks in particular to the fifth type of expla-
nation, because the origins of the Third Way lay in the kind of electoral 
dilemma that Przeworski and others referred to. Given the insufficient 
and declining number of workers in modern Western societies, social 
democrats had to broaden their electoral support to capture the centre 
ground and to mobilise new voters from other social groups, specifically 
the middle class (Kitschelt 1994; Giddens 1998; Huo 2009; Häusermann 
2010). This would be realised by transforming social democracy’s stance 
on various policy areas to appeal to middle-class voters, especially labour 
market policy. The very mechanism that tied social democrats to their 
core constituency – decommodification – was suspended by means of a 
serious policy change. Accordingly, we would expect electoral dilemmas 
to materialise under the Third Way.
 Table 2.3 shows the share of the occupations in 1995 that I treat as the 
social democratic core constituency for the four cases examined and 
for other selected Western European electorates. It becomes clear that 
around 1995, manual workers and routine non-manual employees com-
prised what was far from being a non-negligible political group for so-
cial democracy. With the exception of the Netherlands, these occupations 
represented at least one-fourth of Western electorates at a time when 
most European social democratic parties had begun to transform them-
selves and re-calibrate their electoral messages under Third Way agen-
das. This is not to say that the changing occupational structure had no 
long-term repercussions for social democracy, as outlined in the previous 
passage, but it clearly illustrates that alienating the core constituency by 
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implementing Third Way reforms implied a considerable weakening of 
social democracy’s long-term electoral strength, as in 1995, every fourth 
voter still belonged to those occupational groups.



































































26.5 29.6 23.9 27.9 26.9 30.6 28.0 21.0 24.7 29.1
Non-core 
constituency
29.9 24.4 28.0 27.9 27.8 23.0 24.9 29.1 26.1 28.8
Non-labour force 43.6 46.0 48.1 44.2 45.3 46.4 47.1 49.9 49.2 42.1
Source: Eurobarometer Trend File 1970-2002 (ZA-Nr. 3521), own calculations.
Furthermore, critics may argue that the findings of this study merely re-
flect a continuation of the general trend towards the declining importance 
of class for vote choice, as anticipated by the scholars cited above. This 
is especially evident as the endeavour here is to investigate the expected 
dealignment of social democracy’s core constituency. One might claim 
that the dealignment from social democracy merely reflects a secular and 
ubiquitous trend towards declining class voting, irrespective of social 
 democracy’s actual policies. Contrary to this claim, I argue that patterns 
of changing class voting are policy-induced when it comes to the align-
ment of social democracy’s class constituency. Social democracy under 
the Third Way does not lose its core voters due to a secular trend. Rather, 
Third Way policy change, in the form of recommodifying welfare reforms, 
produces dealignments from social democracy. We can control for this by 
investigating the developments in a case where the social democrats did 
not adapt a Third Way agenda.
 If I find diverging trends between countries with moderate reforms and 
countries with encompassing or even path-breaking reforms, the concern 
about a secular trend of declining class voting can be rejected. Moreover, 
the Third Way and welfare reforms under this ideological adaptation of 
social democracy may not only be a response to the suspected decrease in 
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class voting, but also a further catalyst of this trend. If the reforms have 
an independent effect on the decline of social democratic voting among 
social democracy’s core constituency, then the decline of class voting is 
not necessarily a rival explanation to the book’s arguments, but rather a 
compatible perspective. Against this backdrop, my theoretical arguments 
and findings provide a more policy-based explanation for the suspect-
ed decline in class voting. In line with the partisan politics perspective, 
policy matters for the strength of class-based alignments to social demo-
cratic parties, and not just structural change, as typically emphasised in 
the literature on class voting.5 This book thus draws on micro-level data to 
investigate this electoral dilemma and its effect on class voting. The next 
chapter lays out the thesis’s research design and methodology.


3 Design and Methods
This chapter describes and discusses the design of the study, the data and 
the methods used for the empirical analysis in the following chapters. 
I begin with a delineation of the case selection strategy that allows me 
to test the propositions from Chapter 2. Following this, I describe the 
measures, concepts and data that are used to analyse the policy of the 
social democratic parties under review and the labour market reforms 
implemented in terms of the recommodification framework outlined in 
the previous chapter. Next, I present the statistical methods and the data 
sources applied to study the postulated electoral effects.
3.1 Case selection and strategy of comparison
The empirical analysis of the electoral consequences of Third Way welfare 
state reforms in the following chapters is based on a comparative analy-
sis of four Western European countries. The rationale of the case selec-
tion is to choose cases that make it possible to test the propositions from 
Chapter 2 empirically. I apply theory testing case studies to examine causal 
claims (George & Bennett 2005: 75), and the recommended intentional 
selection is based on the research objective and strategy (King et al. 1994: 
139f ). More concretely, selecting typical cases on the variables of interest 
is the suggested method for this type of study (Gerring 2007: 91ff ).
 The case selection comprised three stages. First, I had to choose a coun-
try in which a large social democratic party did not undergo an encom-
passing Third Way transformation during the 1990s, unlike many other 
social democratic parties at the time. This was the case in Sweden, where 
the reforms were more moderate and often temporary (e.g. Lindbom 
2001).1 Sweden is used as a ‘control case’ where the key explanatory con-
cept – the welfare state reforms under Third Way agendas – takes a differ-
ent value (King et al. 1994: 200ff ); that is, the reforms are more moderate 
and do not represent an outright break with existing policy principles. 
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Another reason is that Swedish social democracy has always advocated 
active labour market policies and did not have to introduce these policies 
in a way that conflicted with previous policy principles. The choice of 
Sweden also controls for the decline of class voting as a general explana-
tion for the electoral decline of social democracy. Due to the existence of 
an established left-wing challenger (Vänsterpartiet) at the beginning of 
the period of investigation (1991), the choice of Sweden also controls for 
whether challengers gain strength irrespective of social democratic policy 
choices. Accordingly, the case of Sweden is analysed in the final empirical 
chapter to compare the electoral effects in countries with Third Way so-
cial democracies with those in a country where no explicit transformation 
took place.
 Second, to study the proposed effect of the electoral system, I had to 
choose a country where a social democratic party had adopted a Third 
Way agenda and implemented path-breaking reforms in office under an 
fptp system. This constellation can be found in the United Kingdom, with 
the transformation of the Labour Party as the prototype of Third Way 
social democracy under a single-member constituency electoral system. 
The United Kingdom was thus chosen as a typical case (Gerring 2007) of 
an fptp system, given the theoretical proposition on the role of electoral 
systems for the electoral consequences of the reforms.
 Th ird, Denmark and Germany were chosen as cases where social democ-
racy faced competitor parties of theoretical relevance under pr systems, 
as argued before. In both countries, social democratic parties faced left-
socialist parties (the Party of Democratic Socialism, pds) and later the 
Linkspartei (Left Party) in Germany, and the Socialistisk Folkeparti in 
Denmark after their ideological realignment and implementation of path-
breaking welfare state reforms. However, the respective chapters will 
show that the two leftist competitors adopted different political strate-
gies. This feature allows me to investigate the respective arguments on 
the credibility of challenger parties. In contrast to the German Left Party, 
the Danish socialists were part of a legislative coalition with the social 
democrats. The expectation is therefore that the party would fail to forge 
a realignment, in contrast to its German equivalent, which was a pure op-
position party when reforms were implemented.
 The Danish social democrats also face a right-wing challenger, the 
Dansk Folkeparti, which fits the above description of this type of party 
quite well. This case allows us to test the proposition regarding the suc-
cess of right-wing parties. In Germany, the social democratic party (spd) 
is also challenged by an established mainstream Christian democratic 
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party, which has also traditionally had a welfare reputation (van Kers-
bergen 1995). The spd, however, did not face a serious challenger from 
the far right, despite the pr system. As argued in Chapter 2, the German 
People’s Union (dvu) and the National Democratic Party (npd) represent 
extremist anti-system parties and not parties of the new right. Thus, in 
the empirical analysis in Chapter 5, the German case is treated as having 
no competitive challenger from the right. In sum, the two countries are 
typical cases, as they have pr systems and their party systems contain the 
parties identified as the most dangerous challengers to reform-minded 
social democrats. They also allow us to test the argument on the credibil-
ity of challengers.
 On the other hand, the countries vary considerably on other aspects 
that are often emphasised in the welfare state literature, especially the lit-
erature on welfare state retrenchment. Beginning with Esping-Andersen’s 
classic welfare state typology (1990), I have drawn cases from each of the 
three clusters: the United Kingdom belongs to the liberal type of welfare 
state, Denmark and Sweden to the social democratic type, and Germany 
represents the archetypal Christian democratic welfare state. Although 
this distinction has sometimes been used to predict the likelihood of wel-
fare state reforms with the institutional logic of the welfare regime (ex-
amples are Esping-Andersen 1990; Bonoli 2001; Huber & Stephens 2001; 
Korpi & Palme 2003), I do not regard this as a determinant for the elec-
toral consequences. The reason is that we find similar reforms in three 
different welfare regimes, as the case studies of Denmark, Germany and 
the United Kingdom will show, and the social democratic parties show 
sufficient similarity in the type of policies they have traditionally advo-
cated, as the review of their programmatic and social policy records will 
reveal.2 They were also tied to similar voter groups as core constituencies, 
although with some variation. For instance, the Labour Party was not as 
successful as the Swedish sap in attracting lower white-collar employees. 
Nonetheless, irrespective of the type of the welfare regime in which the 
parties act, the respective electorate can be expected to have sufficiently 
similar expectations of the country’s social democratic party.
 Other variations concern the political system and institutions, as the 
four countries differ substantially. The uk has the archetypal Westmin-
ster system, with few veto players given the single-party government rule, 
the unitary state structure and the dominant position of the lower house. 
The two Scandinavian countries have multi-party (often minority) gov-
ernments and a unitary state structure with a unicameral parliamentary 
system, but corporatist structures. Finally, Germany has a variety of veto 
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players due to its bicameralism with a federal state structure, which often 
leads to a divided government. Germany is also characterised by major-
ity coalition governments, juridical review and a strong corporatist tra-
dition. Although these features are often used to explain the capacity to 
reform and retrench the welfare state (cf. the reviews of Green-Pedersen 
& Haverland 2002; van Kersbergen 2002; Starke 2006; see also the com-
position of different arguments in Starke 2008: chap. 2), they offer no pe-
culiar arguments on the electoral consequences of the reforms, but reflect 
variation that does not directly conflict with the theoretical propositions.
 Another aspect is that the countries’ features that I identified as theo-
retically relevant cannot always be disentangled from the other proper-
ties emphasised by the literature, but remain mutually supportive. For in-
stance, a Westminster-style political system with a majoritarian electoral 
system typically goes hand in hand with a liberal welfare state (Iversen 
2005: chap. 4; Manow 2007). Countries with pr systems typically belong 
to the social democratic or Continental European welfare state cluster. 
Other theoretically possible combinations do not exist in reality.3
 While these caveats should be kept in mind, I argue that the other 
sources of variation do not infl uence the empirical results as they basically 
point to the conditions for reforms, but not to the actual consequences 
of those reforms, once implemented. Rather, understood in the logic of 
diverse cases, comparative case studies face the challenge of ‘variation 
and representativeness’ (Gerring 2007: chap. 5). Th e case selection thus 
refl ects the variation on the crucial features mentioned in Chapter 2 that 
are necessary to test the arguments. Th e variation is theoretically moti-
vated and rests on these crucial and distinctive features. Accordingly, the 
case selection includes a country with less encompassing reforms, the two 
types of electoral systems (fptp and pr), and countries with party systems 
that include those parties that I characterise as the most dangerous chal-
lengers to reform-minded social democrats. Th is is illustrated in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Electoral system, party competition and possible contenders for reform-
minded social democrats in the early 1990s
FPTP PR
Reforms Competitors marginalised Left challenger Right challenger
No Non-existent Sweden -
Yes United Kingdom Germany, (Denmark) Denmark 
Source: Own compilation. Parentheses indicate non-credible challenger.
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In the period of investigation, many European social democratic parties 
underwent a transformation under Third Way agendas and regained of-
fice in the early to mid-1990s, until they were voted out of office during 
the first decade of the millennium. This was the period in which the Third 
Way materialised in terms of actual policies, and not only as an academic 
construct. As we saw in Section 2.3, after having replaced centre-right 
governments, social democrats implemented labour market reforms that 
contradicted traditional social policy principles. In other words, choos-
ing the period in which social democrats held office allows us to study the 
electoral effects when the actual policy change came into play. As a point 
of reference, I also use the last election before the Third Way agenda, as 
well as the first election after the parties lost office or partly left the Third 
Way. This yields the following periods for the four countries: Denmark 
(1990-2005), Germany (1994-2009), Sweden (1991-2006) and the United 
Kingdom (1992-2010). The periods cover time spans of 15 to 18 years and 
at least four elections in each country.
3.2 Analysis of reforms
Each chapter begins with a brief description of the ideological stance and 
political objectives of the four social democratic parties and a summary 
of their policy record prior to the 1990s, to illustrate that they did in-
deed reflect the decommodification principle in ideology as well as poli-
cy. After wards, I characterise the transformation of the three parties that 
 adopted Third Way agendas and the more orthodox programmatic appeal 
of Swedish social democracy.
 Subsequently, I analyse the policies and reforms implemented in the 
countries from both a qualitative and a quantitative perspective. Th is two-
pronged approach bridges the gap between the two schools of thought in 
the literature on welfare state change (cf. Green-Pedersen 2004; Clasen & 
Siegel 2007; Starke 2008: chap. 2). Th is provides a more comprehensive pic-
ture, in view of the fact that both approaches have defi ciencies and virtues, 
as discussed in the literature on the ‘dependent variable problem’ for the 
study of welfare state change (Green-Pedersen 2004; Clasen & Siegel 2007).
 Given the key theoretical claim that recommodification is the cause of 
social democratic decline, recent advances in the literature have devel-
oped concepts and measures that come very close to Esping- Andersen’s 
conceptualisation and thus allow an elaborated operationalisation. Starke 
(2008: 19) classifies as retrenchment those policy changes that lead to:
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1) reductions in benefit levels and duration,
2) tightening of eligibility, and
3) restrictions in benefit coverage.
This matches the measures that – based on Esping-Andersen (1985, 1990) 
– are classified as recommodification and contain a qualitative as well as 
a quantitative element. Beginning with the qualitative aspects, Clasen & 
Clegg (2007) developed a conditionality framework to study qualitative 
changes over time, which elaborates on the concept of commodification. 
In short, the rationale behind this framework is whether legislative chang-
es introduce/strengthen or abolish/diminish the conditions attached to 
drawing unemployment benefits. This can be applied as a qualitative 
measure for recommodification that captures changes in the universal-
ity of social insurance, eligibility criteria and entitlements by describing 
and classifying legislative changes of unemployment support. The clas-
sification rests on three levels and levers of conditionality, as it incorpo-
rates conditions of membership (universality of benefits), conditions of 
circumstance (e.g. eligibility criteria and requirements) and conditions 
of conduct (behaviour). I define the legislative changes in conditionality 
(i.e. reforms) in Clasen & Clegg’s framework as recommodification in a 
qualitative sense that is, or can be, classified as tighter or more intensive 
conditionality, respectively.
 Fortunately, Clasen & Clegg’s empirical work (2007; Clasen 2005) al-
ready covers labour market reforms in three of the four countries quite 
extensively, as major legislative changes concerning unemployment sup-
port in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom are classified for the 
period between 1979 and 2005. I will supplement the empirical findings 
with my own literature review for the three countries. In the case of Swe-
den, I make an analogous compilation of the legislative changes that uses 
the same practices to classify the labour market policies by reviewing the 
literature.
 Turning to the quantitative operationalisation of recommodification, I 
draw on the widely used replacement rates as indicators of welfare state 
generosity developed and applied by Scruggs (2006, 2007) and the oecd 
(2010a and various years for other sources). The data allows me to quan-
tify welfare state entitlements and changes to these over time in terms 
of the commodification approach applied in the present study, as they 
measure ‘the portion of income replaced by a social welfare programme’ 
(Scruggs 2007: 143). The data sources thus allow me to study income re-
placement over time, which is a crucial component of decommodification 
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in Esping-Andersen’s work; he used similar indices with data that were 
not publicly available (1985, 1990).4 Recommodification in a quantitative 
sense is thus understood as lower replacement rates as a consequence of 
labour market reforms.
 The reason for using two data sources is twofold. First, using two in-
dicators of income replacement that apply slightly different methods to 
calculate the figures increases the validity of the conclusions. Investigat-
ing whether recommodification in a quantitative sense took place due 
to the reforms implies taking a more conservative approach. One will 
be more cautious if one data source shows somewhat extreme develop-
ments, whereas the other data source does not indicate a similar de-
velopment. A second and more pragmatic reason is that not all years 
for each country are covered by the same data set, meaning that one 
has to draw on a second data source. For instance, Scruggs’ data (2006) 
does not cover the labour market reforms in Germany between 2003 
and 2005, as the data series ends with 2003. By contrast, using oecd 
summary data (2010a) allows me to investigate the effect of the reforms 
on replacement rates and thus the generosity of social security over the 
years, but the reports on ‘Benefits and Wages’ do not cover the reforms 
of the mid-1990s.
 The unemployment replacement rates obtained from Lyle Scruggs’ 
‘Welfare State Entitlements Dataset’ Project (2006) include the degree of 
income replacement for 18 Western countries over the period 1971-2002 
(or even longer). The data include information on benefit replacement 
rates, qualifying conditions, coverage and take-up ratios obtained from 
various national and international sources. A comprehensive description 
of the data including codebooks and operationalisation procedures can be 
found in Scruggs (2006, 2007).
 The oecd has developed a ‘Summary Measure of Benefit Entitlements’ 
that is ‘defined as the average of the gross unemployment benefit replace-
ment rates for two earnings levels, three family situations and three dura-
tions of unemployment’ (2010a).5 It thus contains measures for gross re-
placement rates over the period 1961-2007 for uneven years and allows me 
to investigate the effect of labour market reforms on the degree of income 
replacement in the case of unemployment in general. When necessary, 
this is supported by using specific information and replacement rates for 
particular unemployment situations from the oecd’s series ‘Benefits and 
Wages’ that started in 1998.6
 In sum, by applying elaborate measures and concepts on both the quali-
tative and the quantitative aspects of labour market reforms, my operation-
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alisation of (re)commodification comes very close to Esping-Andersen’s 
theoretical conceptions (1985, 1990).
3.3 Analysis of the electoral consequences of reforms
The electoral consequences of the reforms will be analysed in two steps. 
First, a descriptive part looks at attitudes towards welfare policy, welfare 
state reforms and policy changes among the social democratic core con-
stituency and the remaining voters. I also present the vote shares of the 
theoretically important parties among the different voter groups to give a 
first general indication of patterns of electoral change during the period 
of reforms, looking in particular at whether social democracy’s vote share 
among the core constituency declined during the Third Way period (or 
1991-2006, in the Swedish case).
 The statistical part examines whether attitudes towards labour market 
reforms, welfare policies and policy changes had electoral consequences, 
and which types of electoral consequences, in terms of the theoretical ex-
pectations. The technique used is that of multinomial logistic regression 
models, which is well suited to and widely used in the study of voting be-
haviour, as party choice is typically a categorical dependent variable (e.g. 
Long & Freese 2006).
 The independent variables in the logistic regression models consist of 
at least two measures: the respondents’ voter group and a variable that 
captures attitudes towards the reforms that will be described in more 
detail in the country chapters. Other variables will be described in the 
country chapters as well. The voter group variable distinguishes between 
non-core constituency, non-aligned core constituency and aligned core 
constituency. Aligned core constituency means belonging to the social 
democratic core constituency as defined above and having voted for the 
social democratic party before, operationalised via the respective vote re-
call questions in the data sets. I use confirmative analyses for elections 
after a major electoral change to check that these changes were not re-
versed in the following election. This is done by adding a category for the 
voter group variable that captures voters from the social democratic core 
constituency who have chosen the option that I theoretically expect as a 
consequence of the reforms. For instance, in the British case, I first inves-
tigate whether Labour core voters abstained in 2001 as a consequence of 
their disaffection with Labour’s policy change. Afterwards, I investigate 
whether non-voters from the core constituency (captured by this addi-
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tional category) had a tendency to return to the Labour Party in the 2005 
general election. Given the lack of applicable and available panel data sets 
for all cases under review, this at least controls for lasting effects in a 
probabilistic sense, as a large outflow of social democratic core voters as 
an effect of reforms at T1 that is not followed by a considerable backflow 
to the social democrats at T2 gives a clear pattern of lasting electoral con-
sequences. Similarly, this controls for lasting gains for challenger parties 
among the social democratic core constituency or an increased tenden-
cy for these voters to abstain in an fptp electoral system. Together with 
the descriptive results on party shares during the Third Way period, this 
should yield some pretty robust results. In this vein, both one-shot effects 
and longer lasting changes to party affiliations can be identified, given the 
absence of panel data.
 In the logistic regression models, I only included the main effects for 
the dummy variables and did not introduce any interaction effects, given 
the ongoing discussion on the proper application and interpretation of 
interaction effects in logistic regression models (Ai & Norton 2003; Nor-
ton et al. 2004; Berry et al. 2010). The core argument made by Berry and 
collaborators is that statistically significant interaction terms are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the interaction term to have a meaningful 
effect on the values of the dependent variable. Given the nature of the 
logit function, even the significance level and the sign of an interaction 
may yield misleading results that are difficult to interpret in a meaning-
ful manner. Rather, I followed the authors’ recommendation to model the 
effects with conditional probabilities using the Clarify programme (King 
et al. 2000; Tomz et al. 2003). This is especially feasible given the dummy 
coding of each variable that makes it possible to model the presence and 
absence of one or more conditions, as well their interaction, without in-
cluding a product term. The results are presented as conditional prob-
abilities and not as regression coefficients.7 Moreover, Clarify presents 
confidence intervals for the predicted probabilities, which makes it pos-
sible to identify significant differences between party shares under given 
conditions. For instance, does the share of social democratic voters in the 
group of reform-minded voters differ significantly from its share among 
the reform-averse voters? The tables in the country chapters present the 
effects of social policy attitudes on the probabilities of voting for a par-
ticular party, shifting to another party or abstaining in the different voter 
groups.8
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3.4 Data sources for the statistical analysis
The data sources are only briefly introduced and described here, as I ex-
plain the variables in detail in the country chapters. I use national elec-
tion studies and exit polls for the British, Danish and Swedish cases and 
the Politbarometer surveys for the German case. The respective national 
election studies comprise the Danish National Election Studies for elec-
tions to the Folketing 1990-2005, the Swedish Election Studies and exit 
polls for Riksdag elections 1991-2006, and the British General Election 
Studies (bes) for Westminster elections 1992-2010. In the German case, I 
decided not to use the German National Election Studies (dnws) for the 
logit models, as the Politbarometer data sets after 2004 contain items that 
directly ask respondents about their attitudes towards the reforms after 
2002, which are not available in the dnws. However, the Politbarometer 
Studies, which are conducted by the German Institute for Election Re-
search (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen), have often been used by electoral re-
search as an alternative to the dnws. Given the superior information in 
the data sets, I draw on Politbarometer surveys for most of the statistical 
analysis in the German case.
3.5 Organisation of chapters
The chapters are organised in accordance with the methodological ap-
proach outlined above. Each chapter starts with a brief introduction to the 
political situation in the relevant country and the initial situation of the 
country’s social democratic party. I then review the party’s programme 
and social policy record, on which its ties with its core constituencies 
were based. I then analyse the reforms using the qualitative and quantita-
tive measures described above, and place them in the national political 
context. This is followed by a discussion of the electoral system, party 
competition and possible competitor parties to spell out the hypotheses 
for the individual chapters. After a description of the variables and items 
used, I analyse the electoral effects of the reforms by means of descriptive 
and statistical analysis. The last section sums up the findings and dis-
cusses implications and developments in the national context. Figure 3.1 
summarises the relevant features of the countries’ party systems and the 
hypothesised developments. The background for the formulation of the 
hypotheses will be further elaborated in the case study chapters, in which 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Th is chapter examines the proposition that an fptp electoral system only 
produces a non-voter trade-off  for Th ird Way social democrats, as it eff ec-
tively constrains the electoral fortunes of those challengers that have been 
identifi ed as dangerous in the theoretical framework. Th e United Kingdom 
is used as a typical case on the basis that the Labour Party should face diff er-
ent opportunities and constraints to engage in welfare state reforms com-
pared to its continental sister parties, thanks to the British single-member 
plurality electoral system (e.g. Kitschelt 2001a; Randall & Sloam 2009). In 
this respect, Randall & Sloam (2009) have claimed that the adoption of 
Th ird Way agendas by social democratic parties and the political reforms 
under these agendas imply higher political costs for continental social 
democratic parties than for Labour. Th e same holds true for the electoral 
aftermath of those reforms, as the corresponding electoral dilemmas for 
the Labour Party should have a distinct character, as discussed in Chapter 2.
 The Labour Party’s transformation in the 1990s is often seen as the 
prototype of Third Way social democracy. In 1997, after 18 years in op-
position, the Labour Party returned to power having undergone a process 
of ideological transformation, as indicated by the label ‘New Labour’. In 
office, the party’s changed ideological position on social and economic 
policy became visible as New Labour implemented the ‘New Deal’ welfare 
state reforms, indicating a policy change from Labour’s old social policy 
legacy (e.g. Shaw 2003, 2007; Clasen 2005).
 On the other hand, Labour’s only challengers were the existing com-
petitors on the national level, the Conservatives and the Liberal Demo-
crats. Neither did a serious challenger on the margins emerge after 1997. 
The most striking development was a decline in turnout of more than 10 
percentage points under the aegis of Tony Blair, which fits the hypoth-
esised effect of fptp electoral systems for the electoral consequences of 
Third Way reforms. This chapter investigates the proposed effect of the 
unique electoral system; that is, an expected dealignment of Labour core 
voters into the non-voter camp.
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4.1 The social policy of the Labour Party
With respect to social policy commitments, Labour does not have a party 
constitution comparable to those of the German SPD or the Swedish sap 
(Shaw 2007: 18). Rather, the Beveridge report published in 1942 and the 
writings of Crosland (1956), Marshall (1950), Tawney (1964) and Titmuss 
(1958) provided the basis of Labour’s post-war social policy commit-
ments. In terms of the party’s ideology, Shaw (2003, 2007) has charac-
terised Labour’s traditional programmatic stance on the welfare state as 
representing core social democratic values in line with Esping-Andersen’s 
(and Huo’s) thoughts outlined above. Labour’s ideology reflected income 
maintenance through entitlements, full employment, egalitarianism, soli-
darity and, most importantly, the decommodification of labour through 
social rights (Shaw 2003: 7ff, 2007: chap. 1). Moreover, collectivism and 
egalitarianism had been identified as Labour’s traditional policy aspi-
rations, and the party had been ideologically committed to a universal 
welfare state (see also Ellison 1997). This was reflected in Labour’s so-
cial policy record in the second half of the 20th century, before the party 
transformed its image as New Labour.
 Labour’s actual policy record closely reflects the party’s social policy 
aspirations. The 1945-1951 Labour government introduced the National 
Health Service (nhs), a major social policy innovation in the history 
of the British welfare state (Hill 1993: 31ff ; Glennerster 2007: chap. 3). 
Labour also reformed the National Insurance system, indicating higher 
levels of benefits for various social groups. After Labour lost the gen-
eral election in 1951, the party went into opposition for 13 years. Before, 
the party had criticised its conservative opponent for its stance on wel-
fare and tried to mobilise voters on expected cuts in welfare services 
and social spending. However, between 1951 and 1964, the Conserva-
tive governments had some achievements in welfare policy, which were 
also ascribed to electoral considerations (Hill 1993: 61f; Glennerster 
2007: 95).
 In order to return to power in 1964, Labour brought forward an 
ambitious electoral manifesto in terms of welfare state expansion 
(Glennerster 2007: 97ff ). Labour promised to increase social security 
benefit levels, especially income maintenance in case of unemployment 
or sickness. A reconstruction of the social security system was pro-
posed that would turn means-tested schemes into a contribution-based 
income replacement scheme. Pensions would no longer only be based 
on the flat-rate Beveridge scheme, but extended with a wage-related 
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supplement. In reality, the Wilson government increased the social se-
curity benefits for unemployment, health and pensions, although some 
critics regarded the expansion of social security as insufficient given 
Labour’s ambition for a more comprehensive expansion of the British 
welfare state (cf. Hill 1993: chap 5; Glennerster 2007: chap. 5). Labour 
also introduced income replacement schemes in case of unemploy-
ment and sickness, but only with a temporary eligibility period. Some-
what surprisingly, Labour lost the general election in 1970, and Edward 
Heath’s Conservative government lasted until 1974. The Heath govern-
ment’s record on social policy is mixed. The period was characterised 
by social policy expenditure and extended use of means-tests (see Hill 
1993: chap. 6).
 In 1974, Labour returned to power. The government introduced some 
major social security measures until 1976, when the premiership changed 
from Harold Wilson to James Callaghan and Britain’s economic situation 
started to deteriorate (cf. Glennerster 2007: 122). Most importantly, La-
bour implemented the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (serps), a 
new pension scheme intended to guarantee replacement rates up to 100 
per cent in the long run, but that also included non-labour market partici-
pants such as people bringing up children and carers (Glennerster 2007: 
114f ).
 The economic crisis in 1976 marked a watershed for both British social 
policy and the Labour Party (Hill 1993: 122; Ellison 1997: 45; Glennerster 
2007: 168ff ). The party had to bring public spending under control and 
introduce cuts. Labour lost the general election in 1979 and remained 
in opposition until 1997, a period during which the party fiercely criti-
cised the Conservative governments’ social policy (Heffernan 2001: 21, 
70). Until 1992, when Labour was increasingly changing its programme, 
including its commitment to the welfare state to regain power, Labour’s 
post-1979 stance on economic and social issues had been characterised 
as predominantly in line with the party’s basic principles (Heffernan 
2001: 69).
 Summing up, the Labour Party’s social policy record is in line with 
Esping-Andersen’s framework on social democratic policies, even though 
one has to take into account the particular character of the British welfare 
state. The same is true for Labour’s ideological commitment to traditional 
social democratic goals. Thus, we should expect particular classes to be 
aligned to Labour as its core constituency.
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4.2 Alignment of the social democratic core constituency in the United 
Kingdom
Table 4.1 shows the major parties’ vote shares among selected social 
classes. The figures reveal that between 1964 and 1997, Labour attracted 
the working class as its core constituency. Lower white-collar employees 
did not align with Labour to the same degree, but constituted the class 
outside the working class in which Labour performed best over time (cf. 
 Evans & Norris 1999: 90).1
 The support of the working class has been highly stable over time. How-
ever, in the period under review, support for Labour was lowest among 
workers, as well as among the electorate in general, during the two elec-
tions in the 1980s. This had been attributed to the emergence of the Social 
Democratic Party (sdp) in the 1980s, which formed an electoral alliance 
with the Liberal Party in 1983 and 1987. Being a splinter of the Labour Par-
ty, the sdp was able to attract parts of Labour’s voter base given Labour’s 
distinct left-wing stance on socio-cultural issues and its perceived incom-
petence (Heath et al. 2001: chap. 5).2 After Labour’s abandonment of this 
stance in the 1980s, the party’s new leadership and the sdp’s merger with 
the Liberal Party, Labour was able to recapture these voters in the 1990s. 
Labour thus represents the classic working-class-based social democratic 
party in the British post-war era (e.g. Butler & Stokes 1974). This is sup-
plemented with a sizable backing among lower white-collar workers.
Table 4.1 Party choice by selected social classes, United Kingdom 1964-1997




1979 1983 1987 1992 1997
Labour RNM 26 41 40 29 32 32 20 26 30 49
Skilled 70 73 63 59 62 58 47 48 50 67
Unskilled 66 70 61 61 65 53 49 48 60 69
Cons. RNM 59 49 51 45 44 52 53 51 54 33
Skilled 25 22 33 23 20 28 33 31 37 14
Unskilled 26 25 32 24 22 34 29 31 28 18
Liberals RNM 15 10  9 26 24 16 27 23 16 18
Skilled  5  5  4 18 18 14 20 21 13 19
Unskilled  8  5  7 15 13 13 22 21 12 13
Source: Evans et al. (1999: 90, Table 5.1), drawing on British Election Studies data.
Notes: RNM: Routine non-manual employees. Skilled: skilled workers; Unskilled: unskilled 
workers. Liberals: 1964-79: Liberal Party; 1983-87: Alliance of SDP and Liberal Party; after 1990: 
Liberal Democrats.
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Table 4.2 gives an overview of the vote shares of the three major parties 
and turnout in Britain in the last four decades. What is striking, in terms 
of the purposes of this chapter, is the drop in turnout after 1997 (cf. also 
Denver & Fisher 2009). Before the 2001 election, turnout remained in a 
rather narrow interval between approximately 72 and 78 per cent. After 
New Labour’s first term it dropped below 60 per cent and did not recover 
in the following election. This gives a first impression of the proposed 
effect that there is a dealignment of core voters in an fptp system after 
social democrats undergo a Third Way transformation.
Table 4.2 Vote shares for three major parties and turnout in British general elections, 
1964-2005




1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005
Labour 44.1 47.9 43.0 37.1 39.2 37.0 27.6 30.8 34.4 43.3 40.7 35.2
Cons. 43.3 41.9 46.4 37.8 35.8 43.9 42.4 42.3 41.9 30.7 31.7 32.4
Liberals 11.2 8.5 7.5 19.3 18.3 13.8 25.4 22.6 17.8 16.8 18.3 22.0
Turnout 77.1 75.8 72.0 78.1 72.8 76.0 72.7 75.3 77.7 71.5 59.4 60.9
Source: Butler & Kavanagh (2002: 261f ); Norris & Wlezien (2005). Notes: Liberals: 1964-79: Liberal 
Party; 1983-87: Alliance of SDP and Liberal Party; 1990-2005: Liberal Democrats.
Looking back at Table 4.1, we can observe that Blair’s victory in 1997 rested 
on a strong mobilisation of Labour’s core constituency, comparable to the 
results in the pre-Thatcher elections. After New Labour’s changed ideo-
logical commitment to the welfare state became visible in daily politics 
(see below), the party lost votes in the 2001 and 2005 elections. However, 
only the Liberal Democrats recovered to the levels seen in the 1980s. As 
demonstrated in Table 4.2, turnout in Britain significantly declined under 
New Labour, perhaps due to a dealignment of Labour’s rank and file. The 
next step is to investigate the welfare state reforms under New Labour 
and discuss the role of party competition during the period under review.
4.3 Welfare state reforms in Britain under New Labour, 1997-2005
Before I turn to the analysis of the labour market reforms under New La-
bour, some introductory remarks on the character of British unemployment 
insurance have to be made. Th e traditional British system of unemployment 
insurance and benefi ts was not predominantly contribution-based, as was 
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common in most other European countries, but mainly fi nanced through 
taxes (Clasen 2005). However, unemployment insurance was partly co-fi -
nanced by National Insurance. Th e benefi ts were a combination of fl at-rate 
and earnings-related benefi ts. Th e contribution requirements to claim un-
employment benefi ts were very lenient and activation was also very weak 
(Clasen 2005: 57ff ). Before 1979, after which the system was reformed by 
both Tory and Labour governments, unemployment insurance had a low 
degree of conditionality. Th e traditional unemployment system was thus 
a hybrid of a needs-based tax-fi nanced system and a contribution-based 
insurance system, predominantly administrated by the state and not by cor-
poratist arrangements, as was common in Continental Europe.
 Having won the elections in 1997, the Labour Party started to imple-
ment the ‘New Deal’ programme aimed at reforming the labour market. 
The programme was generally characterised as a clear break with La-
bour’s social policy commitments in the post-war era, since it represented 
a ‘welfare to work’ strategy with mandatory shifts from welfare benefits to 
labour market programmes (e.g. Hewitt 2002; Annesley & Gamble 2004; 
Clasen 2005: 81f; Rueda 2007: 174ff; Merkel et al. 2008: 49ff ). It left the 
somewhat far-reaching reforms of the previous conservative government 
in place; for instance, it did not reintroduce the Bismarckian status-main-
taining elements of the former unemployment insurance legislation that 
had been abolished by the previous Conservative government. New La-
bour also kept the Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) legislation of the Major 
government as a foundation for the New Deal reforms to come. Moreover, 
Clasen (2005: 83) states that the policy reorientations ‘highlight Labour’s 
acceptance of the need for a flexible and deregulated labour market, and 
its strategy aimed at integration into employment which might be low 
paid and thus requires public subsidy’.
 The New Deal programme changed the British system of unemploy-
ment insurance: welfare entitlements were no longer granted by welfare 
rights but by principles of conditionality, as already foreseeable under the 
Conservative government (e.g. Hewitt 2002; Dwyer 2004; Taylor-Gooby 
et al. 2004; Clasen 2005: chap. 4; Shaw 2007: 145f ). The measures launched 
sanctions on the unemployed who refused to participate in labour market 
programmes, including job-search assistance and training. The eligibility 
periods for benefits were linked to participation in the new programmes 
and work-related conditions were enforced (Hewitt 2002; Dwyer 2004: 
270ff ). In contrast to its traditional universalistic stance, Labour imposed 
compulsory labour market programmes, particularly for groups such as 
the long-term unemployed and jobless young people. Labour left the re-
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forms of the previous Conservative government largely in place, as dem-
onstrated by Clasen (2005) and Clasen & Clegg (2007). Table 4.3 gives 
an overview of the important labour market reforms implemented under 
Conservative and Labour governments during the last three decades.
 New Labour also changed the administration of the unemployment 
system; in particular, the placement of job seekers became more client-
based. The New Deal programme implemented the use of market mecha-
nisms to achieve welfare aims (Taylor-Gooby et al. 2004) by developing 
tax credit schemes and other measures to create employability by reward-
ing people for taking up precarious work.
 To express the changes in quantitative terms, that is, replacement rates, 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show the development of benefit entitlements over 
time. The oecd summary measure presented in Table 4.4 reveals that 
Labour even reduced the low replacement rates inherited from previous 
Conservative governments from 17 to 12 per cent in 2007. The post-re-
form figures mark the lowest values in the oecd time series beginning in 
1961. The figures for net replacement rates for long-term unemployed in 
Table 4.4 should be interpreted with some caution, as the oecd changed 
the definition of this measure between 1997 and 2001. Nevertheless, there 
is some evidence that this type of income maintenance declined after New 
Labour came into office in 1997 and that there has since been no increase.
 In sum, New Labour did engage in policy change, since the reforms 
reveal a clear pattern of increased conditionality and recommodification 
(Hewitt 2002; Rueda 2007: 208ff; Clasen & Clegg 2007; Shaw 2007: 145). 
New Labour did not always actively engage in legislation, but simply pre-
served the labour market policy inherited from the Thatcher and Major 
governments to a considerable degree. This was especially the case for the 
tightened benefit eligibility and entitlement criteria implemented under 
the Tories (Clasen & Clegg 2007: 177). Labour adapted to its Conservative 
opponent by abandoning its original decommodification stance (cf. Hef-
fernan 2001 on Labour’s convergence towards the Conservatives’ social 
and economic policy) and emphasising recommodification, as the results 
in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show. Labour’s changed commitment to the wel-
fare state and the main features of the reforms clearly contradict Esping- 
Andersen’s call for unconditional, permanent and generous benefits to 
secure decommodification (1985, 1990: 47ff ) and, thus, social democratic 
mobilisation. New Labour’s policy change has been characterised as an 
accommodation to the market that reflects a significant departure from 
social democratic tradition (Shaw 2007; Randall & Sloam 2009: 106). 
These reforms imply that Labour risked alienating its social democratic 
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core voters, as discussed in Chapter 2 (cf. also Cressey 1999: 190). How-
ever, we would expect the actual electoral effects to be conditioned by the 
electoral system and party competition, to which we now turn.
Table 4.3 Selected labour market reforms introduced by Conservative and Labour 
governments, 1998-2005




Conservative governments 1979-97 (selected reforms)
1982: Abolition of ERS Earnings related supplement (ERS) to 









1988 Tighter contribution record required for 
unemployment benefi ts
Eligibility R
1996: Introduction of 
Job seekers Allowance 
(JSA) consisting of 
contributory JSA and 
income-related JSA
Maximum duration period of contributory JSA 
reduced from 12 to 6 months
Eligibility R
Reduction of benefi t rates for JSA claimants 
aged 18 to 24 by 20%
Eligibility R
Remaining dependent additions existing under 
UB withdrawn
Eligibility R
Introduction of requirement to sign job seeker’s 





1998: New Deal for 
young people (NDYP) 
& long-term 
unemployed (NDLTU)
Increased conditionality for benefi t receipt, 
mandatory participation in New Deal 





1999: New Deal for 
partners (NDP)
Joint claim for those with partners claiming 







2001: New Deal 25+ Mandatory participation in labour market 
schemes if unemployed for 18 of the last 21 





New Deal for disabled 
people
Voluntary programme for disabled Membership D
2002: New Deal for 
lone parents





New Deal for partners Mandatory participation in interview for JSA 









Sources: Walker & Wiseman (2003); Annesley & Gamble (2004); Taylor-Gooby et al. (2004); Clasen 
(2005); Clasen & Clegg (2007).
Note: the classifi cation of reforms in terms of level of conditionality and direction draws on the 
scheme of Clasen & Clegg (2007); R: recommodifi cation, D: decommodifi cation.
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Table 4.4 OECD replacement rates of unemployment benefi ts for United Kingdom, 
1989-2007
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
OECD summary 
measure
18 18 19 18 18 17 13 13 12 12
1997a 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Net replacement 
rate
50 41 41 41 41 41 40 40
Source: Summary measure: OECD (2010a). Net replacement rate for 1997: OECD (1999), for 
2001-07: OECD (2010b).
Notes: The OECD summary measure is defi ned as the average of the gross unemployment 
benefi t replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family situations and three durations of 
unemployment. The net replacement rate for long-term unemployed is the compensation for a 
long-term unemployed single person with 100 per cent of average wage earner 1997-2007.
a. the 1997 fi gures are not based on the average wage earner, but on the 100 per cent average 
production worker, so the 1997 fi gures are not directly comparable, as the OECD changed the 
defi nition of the net replacement rate. Bold fi gures represent post-reform years.
4.4 Party competition around welfare state reforms, 1997-2005
The United Kingdom has a fptp electoral system with single-member 
constituencies rather than the party lists typically found in pr systems. 
The British case thus allows us to test the proposition that Third Way so-
cial democrats cannot be challenged by the type of dangerous competitor 
outlined in Chapter 2 if the electoral system is fptp. This electoral system 
typically leads to restricted competition between two major parties, or 
between two major parties and a minor third party that is able to survive 
thanks to regional strongholds. Under these circumstances, I expected a 
dealignment of social democratic core constituents who would stay home 
due to the lack of credible alternatives. The following section outlines the 
party competition with which New Labour was confronted after 1997, in 
order to formulate the respective proposition to guide the analysis that 
follows.
 First, some preliminary remarks on Labour’s programmatic realign-
ment when the party was in opposition between 1979 and 1997. Having 
lost the general elections in 1983 and 1987 and given the relative strength 
of the sdp-Liberal Alliance, Labour began to modernise its programme 
under its new leader, Neil Kinnock. The defeat in the 1992 election is seen 
as having accelerated Labour’s programme of change (e.g. Merkel et al. 
2008: 41). The change of leadership from Neil Kinnock to John Smith and 
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Tony Blair went in line with a rightward shift of the party in general, and 
on welfare issues in particular (e.g. Heffernan 2001: chap. 5; Rueda 2007: 
208ff ). Labour also reformed its party organisation and emancipated itself 
from the trade unions. To expand its electoral appeal, the party changed 
its name to New Labour, indicating a symbolic break with Labour’s tradi-
tional commitment to the welfare state and its tax-and-spend image.
 New Labour regained power in the 1997 general election, as the party 
was now able to attract a considerable share of middle-class voters with-
out having lost its working-class core constituency (see Table 4.1 above). 
Even though Labour changed its commitment to the welfare state and 
was responsible for a recommodifying social policy, a serious nationwide 
competitor on welfare grounds did not exist or emerge after New Labour 
came into office. This implies that the configuration of party competition 
in Britain between 1997 and 2005 was rather stable (Bara & Budge 2001 
for the first term; Helms 2006). The Conservative Party remained the 
main opponent on the right and the Liberal Democrats were positioned 
to the left, but with a social liberal stance.3 This will be discussed here to 
hypothesise on the electoral consequences of New Labour’s welfare state 
reforms and the party’s ideological shift.
 Labour’s traditional competitor, the Conservatives, continued to pro-
pose market-liberal policies that did not represent the political preferenc-
es of Labour’s traditional core constituency. The Conservatives’ electoral 
performance during Tony Blair’s first two terms (1997-2005) was rela-
tively poor. The leadership changed several times, but the party did not 
become significantly more ‘welfare-friendly’ and undertook a move to the 
right in the late 1990s (Lynch & Garner 2005: 542). New Labour countered 
Conservative attempts to attract voters on socio-cultural issues such as 
immigration or asylum with tough legislation and populist rhetoric (cf. 
Butler & Kavanagh 2002: 20; Lynch & Garner 2005: 541). Hence, we would 
not expect the Conservatives to be a serious contender for working-class 
and lower white-collar votes under the aegis of New Labour.4
 The Liberal Democrats, the third party on the national level, has pre-
sented itself as a centre-left party, in particular to the left of Labour af-
ter Labour’s ideological realignment (e.g. Bara & Budge 2001; Lynch & 
 Garner 2005; Norris & Wlezien 2005: 671; Kriesi & Frey 2008). Its po-
tential to attract Labour’s core constituency is ambivalent in terms of my 
framework on challenger parties, though. The party has occasionally at-
tacked New Labour on welfare issues and on, for example, the British in-
volvement in the Iraq war, in order to gain protest votes (Lynch & Garner 
2005; Kriesi & Frey 2008; Russell & Cutts 2009). However, the party is 
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strategically constrained in attracting Labour core voters for two reasons. 
First, appealing to Labour core supporters reduces the party’s prospects 
of attracting disillusioned Conservatives or of defending constituencies 
held by the Liberal Democrats against the Conservatives. This marks a 
trade-off for the party in targeting Labour voters, as the Liberal Demo-
crats may fear losing their own heartland and constituencies held with 
narrow majorities. Russell & Cutts (2009: 78) have claimed that the party 
appealed more to Labour core voters by exploiting their dissatisfaction 
with the New Labour project. This would qualify the Liberal Democrats 
as a mainstream challenger that tries to capitalise on the transformation 
of the social democratic party by changing its own strategic appeal.
 A second aspect of the Liberal Democrats’ electoral appeal – its social 
liberal stance – undermines the party’s prospects of attracting working 
class votes on the welfare dimension. As shown in Chapter 2, social demo-
cratic core voters, such as blue-collar workers, tend towards authoritar-
ian views on the libertarian-authoritarian dimension (e.g. Scheuregger & 
Spier 2007; Houtman et al. 2008; Kriesi et al. 2008), whereas the Liberal 
Democrats are on the libertarian side on issues such as immigration or 
law and order (Kriesi & Frey 2008). Moreover, the party turned to the left 
on several non-economic issues, such as the Iraq war and ethnic mino-
rities, in Labour’s second term (Norris & Wlezien 2005: 669). This should 
have hampered the party’s attempts to attract supporters from Labour’s 
rank and file, as the party’s image did not match the attitudes of social 
democratic core supporters on socio-cultural issues. In sum, the Liberal 
Democrats’ potential to win social democratic core voters under New La-
bour seemed ambiguous. Nevertheless, the rising support for the party in 
the period between 1997 and 2005 demands inspection.
 Other parties were not able to attack Labour effectively. The elector-
al system marginalised those parties that I have identified as dangerous 
competitors for reform-minded social democrats. There was no nation-
wide left-socialist party or right-wing authoritarian party to seriously 
challenge New Labour, as the threshold is high and voters are aware of 
the effect of the electoral system in Britain (Dunleavy 2005; Dunleavy 
& Margetts 2005).5 Dunleavy (2005) confirms that the British electoral 
system has a penalising effect on minor parties, showing that they receive 
considerable support in elections held with pr, such as the elections for 
the European Parliament, to the disadvantage of the two major parties.
 Left-socialist and right-wing parties, such as the United Kingdom In-
dependence Party (ukip) or the British National Party (bnp), as well as 
other minor parties, enjoyed some progress after New Labour came into 
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office in 1997 (Webb 2005). This was only translated into parliamentary 
seats for the far-left-wing Respect Party, which won a constituency in 
London in the 2005 general election, mainly on the basis of opposition to 
the Iraq War (cf. Webb 2005: 767ff ). Accordingly, Labour’s transforma-
tion may have opened the flank for some minor parties to attract Labour’s 
core supporters, which the analysis has to control for, even though this is 
hardly expected to produce clear patterns of realignments.6
 As there was no serious contender for Labour after its ideological shift, 
I would expect Labour to face its strongest electoral challenge from absen-
teeism. In terms of the framework on party competition, given the fptp 
electoral system, the British case should reveal a dealignment of social 
democratic core constituents, but no realignment with other competitors. 
After describing the data source, I analyse this proposition empirically.
4.5 Data and variables
The data used for the analyses are the British General Election Studies 
(bes) for the elections in 1992, 1997, 2001 and 2005 (bes 1992, 1997, 2001, 
2005). The 1992 and 1997 studies are only used for descriptive purposes. 
The bes provide the traditional data source for the study of electoral be-
haviour in Britain, as they offer a wide range of variables and items. The 
analysis below consists of a descriptive and statistical part.
 In the descriptive part, I analyse whether the perception of the Labour 
Party as a party looking after the interests of the working class and the 
unemployed changed after 1997. This is a proxy for the evaluation of La-
bour reforms after 1997, as the reforms have been classified as conflict-
ing with the interests of Labour’s core constituency due to their recom-
modifying effects.7 It should capture the attitude towards Labour’s policy 
change quite well given the nature of the reforms, which were against the 
interests of these groups, as spelled out above. Neither the bes nor other 
data sources, such as the ‘British Social Attitudes Surveys’, contain better 
variables that can capture attitudes towards Labour’s social policy over 
time.
 Belonging to Labour’s core constituency is a dummy variable (yes/
no), which was obtained via the variable of the respondents’ social class. 
Workers and lower white-collar employees have been coded as the core 
constituency. Party choice was obtained through the respective variables 
in the bes and consists of five categories (1 ‘Labour’, 2 ‘Conservatives’, 
3 ‘Liberal Democrats’, 4 ‘All other parties’, 5 ‘Non-voting’).8
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 The statistical part examines whether changed perceptions of Labour 
led to an electoral setback for the party and to a dealignment of Labour’s 
core constituency. This was done by applying logistic regression mod-
els with party choice as the dependent variable. For the 2001 election, 
the independent variables consist of two measures, the respondents’ 
voter group and an index for the perception of the Labour Party. The 
voter group variable distinguishes between the non-core constituency, 
a non-aligned part of the core constituency and the aligned part of the 
core constituency. Aligned core constituency means belonging to La-
bour’s core constituency, as defined above, and having voted for Labour 
in 1997.9 The index measures whether Labour is perceived as looking 
after the interests of the working class and the unemployed and was 
constructed through the respective items. It takes a value ‘0’ if Labour 
is seen as representing the interests of both groups well; ‘1’ if a respon-
dent sees Labour as not looking after the interests of either the working 
class or the unemployed; and ‘2’ if Labour is perceived as disregarding 
the inte rests of both groups. The rationale of the index is to measure the 
effect of dissatisfaction with Labour’s policy change after 1997 on party 
choice. For the 2005 election, I used the same dependent and indepen-
dent variables, but the voter group variable consists of a further catego-
ry for abstention in 2001 and belonging to Labour’s core constituency. 
Although we lack panel data for a stricter test, this allows us to assess 
whether the respective voters really defected from Labour after 1997 or 
came back to their ‘natural’ party.
4.6 Results
 Attitudes towards Labour’s policy and voting behaviour after 1997
In this first step of the analysis, I demonstrate that the public perception 
of the Labour Party changed after the party took office in 1997. As men-
tioned, attitudes towards Labour’s policy change and the party’s welfare 
policy after 1997 are operationalised through proxy variables examining 
whether respondents perceive the Labour Party as representing the in-
terests of the working class and the unemployed respectively. These vari-
ables should capture attitudes towards New Labour and its social policy 
record quite well, as Labour has traditionally been seen as the party of the 
working class and the lower social stratum due to its ideological commit-
ment to the welfare state. As Table 4.5 shows, the share of respondents 
that did not perceive Labour to represent the interests of the working 
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class and the unemployed clearly increased from 1997 to 2001, the period 
in which Labour began to implement the New Deal reforms.
Table 4.5 Perception that Labour Party looks after interests of social groups, 1997-2005 
(per cent)
Share of respondents not perceiving Labour to represent working-class interests
1997 2001 2005
Non-core constituency  5.9 33.5 33.4
Core constituency  6.8 37.6 38.4
All respondents  6.3 35.1 35.6
Share of respondents not perceiving Labour to represent the interests of the unemployed
1997 2001 2005
Non-core constituency 12.9 31.8 18.7
Core constituency 14.8 36.1 28.7
All respondents 13.8 33.5 23.1
Source: Own calculations with British Election Studies 1997-2005.
The figures reveal that Labour’s image as a working-class party changed 
dramatically after 1997. In 1997, less than 10 per cent of the respondents 
did not perceive Labour as representing the interests of the working class 
in the uk; in 2001 and 2005, more than one out of three respondents felt 
that way. Similarly, the perception that Labour represents the interests 
of the unemployed changed considerably after 1997, but the change was 
not as pronounced as that for the working class. From 2001 to 2005 these 
shares declined slightly, but remained twice as high as in 1997 among the 
core constituency. This means that it was not the new label that induced 
the changed perception of Labour, as the party still had its old-style work-
ing class image at the 1997 election.
 Rather, the results suggest that it was New Labour’s actual policy that 
affected the attitudes towards the party and not simply the transforma-
tion into New Labour in the mid-1990s. In 2001 and 2005, a sizable share 
of voters no longer perceived Labour to be reflecting the concerns of the 
working class or the unemployed.
 The next step is to look at descriptive statistics on party shares to get 
a first indication of electoral change during the period of Labour’s pro-
grammatic transformation and the welfare reforms. Table 4.6 yields some 
first descriptive evidence for the expected non-voter trade-off for Labour 
after the party’s policy change.
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Table 4.6 Party shares and non-voting among Labour Party’s core constituency, 1992-
2005 (per cent)
Core constituency 1992 1997 2001 2005
Labour 42.5 48.1 37.0 29.3
Conservatives 28.8 14.5 14.0 10.7
Liberal Democrats 11.0 11.6 10.5 11.0
Other parties  2.8  4.3  3.5  5.2
Non-voters 14.7 21.6 35.1 43.8
Non-core constituency 1992 1997 2001 2005
Labour 19.0 33.0 30.4 26.4
Conservatives 49.9 31.3 24.6 29.8
Liberal Democrats 18.5 16.8 16.3 17.4
Other parties  2.4  4.4  3.2  3.0
Non-voters 10.2 14.6 25.7 23.4
Source: British Election Studies 1997-2005. Figures do not always add up to 100 per cent due to 
rounding.
The figures in Table 4.6 demonstrate that Labour lost considerable sup-
port among those classes conceptualised as the social democratic core 
constituency, as the party’s share dropped from 48 to 29 per cent after 
1997. Similarly, the share of non-voters doubled from 1997 to 2005, which 
confirms the non-voter trade-off for New Labour. There is almost a sub-
stitution of the numbers between the respective cells if we compare the 
results for 1997 and for 2005.
 The figures for the other parties show that no competitor was able to 
mobilise among Labour’s core constituency after 1997.10 Comparing those 
figures with the respective results among the non-core constituency dis-
plays a much more moderate decline, as Labour only lost 7 percentage 
points in this group. Accordingly, the non-voter share among these social 
classes only increased by 8 percentage points, and not by 22 percentage 
points, as among the social democratic core constituency. Again, all oth-
er parties show no pattern of realignments among those voters, as their 
shares remain relatively stable.
 These two developments, the changed perception of the Labour Party 
and decreasing support among the party’s core voter base, provide initial 
evidence that Labour’s ideological transformation and the welfare state 
reforms under New Labour after 1997 also had electoral consequences. 
The next step is to model these electoral consequences.
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Electoral eff ects of Labour’s policy change, 1997-2001
As discussed above, I present conditional probabilities obtained from 
multinomial logistic regression models to investigate whether the 
changed image of the Labour Party has led to decreasing support among 
its core voter base and gains for competitor parties.11 As explained above, 
the dependent variable was party choice and the independent variables 
were the respondents’ voter group and an index for the perception of 
the Labour Party. I focus on the aligned core constituency’s vote choice 
in 2001. I always refer to aligned core constituents perceiving Labour to 
represent the interests of the working class and the unemployed as the 
reference group to examine the effects of dissatisfaction with Labour on 
electoral outcomes. Table 4.7 presents the results for the 2001 general 
election.
Table 4.7  Predicted probabilities of vote choice among aligned core constituency by 
perception of Labour, 2001





Looks after interests 




Labour 77.5 62.5* 36.8*
Conservatives 1.8 3.4 4.6
Liberal Democrats 6.7 10.0 17.4!
Other parties 2.3 4.8 11.9!
Non-voting 11.7 19.4 29.3*
Overall  100 100 100
Source: Predicted probabilities obtained from multinomial logistic regression model using 
Clarify. 
Note: The number of simulations to obtain the probabilities was set to 1,000. ! p<.10; * p<.05.
The figures reveal that Labour is still able to attract about eight out of 
ten core constituents as long as the party is regarded as representing the 
interests of both the working class and the unemployed. Other parties 
play no role under these conditions (left-hand column). However, if core 
constituents no longer feel that Labour looks after the interests of these 
social groups, then they significantly defect from New Labour. This is 
especially pronounced among former core voters who perceive Labour to 
be disregarding the interests of both groups. Here, the Liberal Democrats 
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and minor parties make significant gains compared to the control group. 
The Conservatives make no significant gains, in line with expectations.
 What is most striking is the significant turn towards abstention on the 
part of disaffected Labour core voters, which almost triples in the right-
hand column compared to the left-hand column. Summing up the analysis 
for 2001, the analysis of the conditional probabilities confirms the ex-
pected non-voter trade-off for the Labour Party after engaging in welfare 
state reform and an ideological shift. As shown in Table 4.7, turnout in 
the uk dropped in 2001, particularly among disappointed Labour core 
supporters. This can be explained by a changed perception of Labour, as 
the analysis of the conditional probabilities has demonstrated. The next 
question is whether this pattern is confirmed by the 2005 election, and I 
now conduct a similar analysis using the 2005 dataset.
 Electoral eff ects of Labour’s policy change, 2001-05
As for the 2001 election, I obtained the conditional probabilities from a 
multinomial logistic regression model to assess whether the alignment 
to the Labour Party among its core supporters is contingent on the atti-
tude towards the party. The variables used are the same as in the analysis 
above, but I expanded the model with a dummy for voters who belong to 
Labour’s core constituency and abstained in 2001 to assess whether they 
had returned to Labour.12 Table 4.8 presents the results for aligned Labour 
core voters and non-voters from the 2001 election belonging to Labour’s 
core voter base.
 The table’s upper half indicates that Labour lost core supporters in the 
2001 election who did not perceive Labour to be representing the con-
cerns of the two groups. However, no other option differs significantly 
from the control group (the left-hand panel), even though non-voting 
has doubled among disillusioned core voters. As in the 2001 election, the 
Liberal Democrats and minor parties made some advances, as Labour’s 
image had been damaged (the differences are not significant). Again, the 
Conservatives played no role among these voters.
 Th e table’s lower half shows that Labour did not regain core voters who 
had abstained four years previously. Abstention among those respondents 
remained at 70 per cent and above. Surprisingly, this was also true for those 
who perceived Labour to be looking after the interests of the working class 
and the unemployed. Th e Liberal Democrats and minor parties were able 
to attract small shares of former non-voters among the social democratic 
core constituency, but non-voting remained predominant here.
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Table 4.8 Predicted probabilities of vote choice by perception of Labour, 2005
Labour vote in 2001
Labour looks after interests of working class/the unemployed
Estimated party 
choice 2005
Looks after interests 
of both groups
Looks after interests 
of only one of the 
groups
Disregards interests of 
both groups
Labour 67.8 36.9* 31.7*
Conservatives 4.6 9.2 6.0
Liberal Democrats 7.5 15.8 17.4
Other parties 5.1 13.1 15.1
Non-voting 14.9 24.9 29.9
Abstention in 2001
Labour looks after interests of working class/the unemployed
Estimated party 
choice 2005
Looks after interests 
of both groups
Looks after interests 
of only one of the 
groups
Disregards interests of 
both groups
Labour 3.3 1.0 0.8
Conservatives 12.2 14.1 8.2
Liberal Democrats 7.5 9.0 9.1
Other parties 4.0 5.6 6.3
Non-voting 73.0 70.3 75.6
Source: Predicted probabilities obtained from multinomial logistic regression using Clarify. 
Note: The number of simulations to obtain the probabilities was set to 1,000. ! p<.10; * p<.05.
Hence, the results indicate that Labour did not recapture the non-vot-
ers among its core voter base that it had previously lost due to its policy 
change. This confirms the claims about the proposed effect of an fptp 
system for the electoral fortunes of Third Way social democrats among 
their traditional core constituencies. Thanks to the British electoral sys-
tem, Labour did not face a serious competitor that was able to attract dis-
satisfied core voters.
4.7 Conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to test the proposition that an fptp electoral 
system leads to a dealignment of core constituents from Third Way social 
democrats, but not to realignments with other parties, on the grounds 
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that this electoral system effectively prevents the emergence of danger-
ous challengers. This was done by analysing the electoral consequences of 
Labour’s ideological transformation and the welfare state reforms under 
New Labour after 1997. The British Labour Party was traditionally com-
mitted to classic social democratic principles, the decommodification of 
labour being the most important in terms of my theoretical framework. 
This allowed the party to form an alignment with particular social classes 
reflecting the party’s core constituency in the post-war era. After Labour 
changed its commitment to the welfare state in the 1990s and introduced 
some recommodifying welfare state reforms after 1997 (most notably 
the New Deal programmes), the alignment was examined as set out in 
Chapter 2. Given the nature of the party competition as a consequence 
of the British electoral system, I hypothesised that Labour mainly faced 
dealignment of the party’s core supporters thanks to the absence of other 
welfare or leftist parties. The Conservatives were not expected to be a se-
rious competitor due to their market-liberal position, whereas the Liberal 
Democrats were expected to have an ambiguous appeal.
 The results confirmed these expectations: Labour was exposed to a 
dealignment of core constituents into the non-voter camp when New La-
bour was no longer perceived as upholding working-class interests. Ac-
cordingly, many dissatisfied Labour core supporters defected in 2001. 
While they did not return in the 2005 election, Labour maintained its po-
sition as the strongest party after 1997. One reason for this is the absence 
of a systematic realignment of these voters to another party. However, the 
Liberal Democrats were able to benefit from the disaffection with New 
Labour, as the party made some gains among Labour’s core constituency 
that seem to have lasted into the 2005 election. The party also benefited 
indirectly among these voters, as the lower turnout of former Labour core 
voters implies greater weight of the existing Liberal Democrats’ backing 
among the working class at the ballot. However, we should be careful to 
understand this as an outright realignment, as the party is the successor to 
the sdp – a right-wing splinter of Labour – and has always enjoyed some 
backing among Labour’s core voter base. Similarly, the Liberal Democrats 
made gains under the aegis of Tony Blair, but the party was no stronger 
than its predecessors in the 1970s or 1980s. This is true for both the party 
shares and the electoral performance among voters conceptualised as the 
social democratic core constituency.
 Minor parties, especially those on the fringes of the party system, made 
some gains after 1997, but failed to produce any outright electoral change 
in line with the electoral system argument. Nevertheless, given my argu-
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ments on dangerous challengers for Third Way social democrats, there 
are two minor parties whose recent electoral prospects deserve some 
attention. First, the left-socialist Respect Party won the constituency of 
Bethnal Green and Bow against the Labour incumbent in the 2005 elec-
tion. The party mobilised against the Iraq War, but it also opposed the 
economic reforms implemented under previous Tory and Labour gov-
ernments (Webb 2005: 769) and campaigned for their withdrawal. This 
shows that although left-socialist parties are marginalised under an fptp 
system, they may benefit from disaffection with Third Way social democ-
racy under certain favourable context conditions. This was not a lasting 
development, since the party lost the seat with the 2010 election and was 
marginalised due to internal quarrels after 2005.
 Second, the transformation of the Labour Party can be related to the 
rise of a right-wing authoritarian party, the bnp. The bnp fits the type of 
right-wing authoritarian challenger to some extent, although it is clearly 
extremist. While the party was unable to translate this into parliamen-
tary representation, the bnp’s vote shares increased from 0.1 per cent in 
1997 to 2.0 per cent in the 2010 election.13 Labour’s ideological realign-
ment seemed to have fuelled this development, as the bnp’s gains typi-
cally occurred in white working-class constituencies and thus former 
Labour strongholds (Denver & Fisher 2009: 37; Goodwin 2010). It has 
been suggested that this is a consequence of disappointment with New 
Labour. Recent research has identified the bnp as a dangerous competi-
tor in line with my framework when it comes to voting behaviour. The 
social profiles of current bnp voters and traditional Labour supporters 
are remarkably similar, with a large overrepresentation of the working 
class among the bnp vote (Ford & Goodwin 2010; Goodwin et al. 2010). 
This provides some evidence that the transformation of the Labour Party 
can be seen as creating a favourable context for the strengthening of a 
right-wing authoritarian challenger, even under an unfavourable elec-
toral system.
 Summing up, in line with the theoretical expectations, this chapter’s 
main implication is that the Labour Party mainly faced a dealignment of 
the party’s core constituency after having abandoned its traditional social 
democratic principles. No other party was able to foster an outright re-
alignment and no nationwide left-wing competitor emerged, although the 
Liberal Democrats and minor parties such as the bnp made some gains 
among the social democratic core constituency at the expense of New 
Labour. These developments are, of course, determined by the FTPT elec-
toral system, which means that a lesser electoral setback is suffered by the 
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Labour Party if it engages in recommodification than that suffered by its 
social democratic sister parties in other countries.
 Nonetheless, future research should focus on the advance of the Liberal 
Democrats and the bnp among Labour’s traditional voter base. Whereas 
the former party may have a hard time fostering a lasting realignment 
among these voters due to its social-liberal stance and its recent coali-
tion with the Conservatives, the latter may confront Labour with some 
additional trade-offs. If the bnp successfully combines populist appeals 
on welfare issues with its authoritarian stance, the consequence could be 
a weakened Labour Party, even though the bnp gains rarely translate into 
parliamentary representation.
 The next chapter looks at the case of the German spd between 1998 and 
2009, and examines what happens when Third Way social democrats are 





Th is chapter investigates what happens when Th ird Way social democrats 
are confronted with a left-socialist challenger under a pr system. Th e case 
is that of Germany, where the social democrats (spd) engaged in path-
breaking labour market reforms and faced the Left Party as a new competi-
tor due to this policy change. The latter party fits the type of ‘dangerous 
left challenger’, as this chapter will illustrate. We also examine the compe-
tition from a mainstream Christian democratic party, as the spd’s biggest 
competitor. Hence, the chapter examines the electoral consequences of 
the welfare state reforms introduced by social democratic governments in 
Germany from 1998 to 2009.
 As with the Labour Party in Britain, the German spd (Sozialdemo-
kratische Partei Deutschlands) returned to power in the late 1990s with a 
new label that accentuated the party’s move towards the centre, ‘Die Neue 
Mitte’ (the New Centre).1 However, the reform trajectory was different 
from that of New Labour, as the spd-Greens coalition only implemented 
moderate reforms in its first electoral term (1998-2002). The second term 
(2002-05) saw the introduction of the path-breaking Agenda 2010 reform 
package, including the highly controversial Hartz labour market reforms. 
This was a remarkable departure from the spd’s traditional position on 
social policy (e.g. Kemmerling & Bruttel 2006; Fleckenstein 2008; Debus 
2008). The spd was largely consistent in its adherence to its reform agen-
da in the Grand Coalition with the Christian democratic parties (cdu/
csu) from 2005 to 2009, which also was responsible for sweeping pension 
reforms.
 During the first years in government, the spd lacked a left-wing chal-
lenger, as the post-communist Party of Democratic Socialism (pds) was 
relatively marginalised and its electoral importance restricted to the east-
ern part of Germany. This changed after the Hartz reforms and Agenda 
2010, when the pds merged with a couple of spd dissidents to form the 
Left Party. This new party turned into a nationwide left-wing challenger 
to the spd: the party easily surpassed the 5 per cent threshold in the 2005 
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election, which was called after the implementation of the Hartz reforms. 
There was no competitive authoritarian right-wing party during the pe-
riod of investigation, as outlined in Chapter 2. The case of Germany thus 
allows me to investigate the proposed electoral danger of left-socialist 
parties for Third Way social democrats.
5.1 The social policy of German social democracy
As discussed in Chapter 2, social democratic parties tie their core con-
stituencies by advocating particular political goals and aspirations, de-
commodification of labour being the most important of these. Drawing 
on this conception of the alignment of the social democratic core con-
stituency, this section briefly illustrates the spd’s traditional social policy 
aspirations and its ideological commitment to the welfare state. The Ger-
man spd introduced two party manifestos after 1945: the ‘Godesberger 
Programm’ in 1959 and the ‘Berliner Programm’ in 1989. Even though 
the manifestos originate from different historical contexts, they indicate 
commitments to a particular social policy and to the welfare state, in line 
with Esping-Andersen’s approach. The party committed itself to gener-
ous and institutionalised income maintenance in case of unemployment, 
sickness or old age (spd 1959, 1989). Moreover, both manifestos pointed 
to income redistribution and wage compression as a means to improve 
the living standards of the less well-off , by alleviating the eff ects of pure 
market allocation. Collective action and institutionalised wage bargaining 
were seen as the means to realise this objective. Th e ties to the trade unions 
and their importance were emphasised in both programmes, and the spd’s 
traditional programmatic commitment referred to the realisation of de-
commodifi cation and its various aspects outlined above. Furthermore, 
both manifestos appealed to the traditional social democratic principles of 
egalitarianism and solidarity, as emphasised by Huo (2009: chap. 2).
 In the political praxis, the spd was – together with the cdu/csu – 
the driving force in the expansion of the German welfare state after the 
Second World War (e.g. Huber & Stephens 2001: 146ff; Schmidt 2006; 
Wehler 2008: 257ff ). Before the party participated in government for the 
first time in 1966, the spd often supported the Christian democrats’ pro-
posals to expand the welfare state, in particular pensions. Moreover, the 
social democratic proposals went beyond those of the Christian demo-
cratic competitor in terms of generosity and universality. For instance, in 
the first Grand Coalition with the cdu/csu (1966-69), the spd managed 
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to raise replacement rates for sickness insurance to 100 per cent (Huber 
& Stephens 2001: 151). Until the mid-1970s, the social-liberal coalition 
(1969-82), consisting of the spd and the liberal party (fdp), expanded the 
welfare state in a faster and broader manner than any previous govern-
ment (Schmidt 2006: 142f; Wehler 2008: 264ff ). New groups were now in-
tegrated into the social security system, making it more universal. More-
over, social security benefits and the replacement rates of various social 
programmes were increased and an encompassing pension reform was 
implemented. This went in line with rising white-collar support for the 
party, which had begun in the 1960s.
 After the spd returned to opposition in 1982, the party criticised the 
welfare politics of the centre-right cdu/csu and fdp government for en-
gaging in retrenchment policies, even though the Kohl government only 
introduced minor cutbacks and incremental changes aiming at budget con-
solidation (cf. Schmidt 2003: 241).2 Th e political discussion intensifi ed after 
German unifi cation in 1990 as a result of the escalating fi nancial pressure, 
high unemployment rates and the increasingly divergent political positions 
of the two major parties. In its last electoral term (1994-98), the Kohl gov-
ernment introduced several welfare state reforms aimed at fi scal consolida-
tion and adapting the welfare state to the new economic and societal con-
text. Th e spd ran its 1998 election campaign against these reforms, claiming 
that they would cause social hardships and promising to withdraw them 
(e.g. von Alemann 1999: 40f; Feist & Hofmann 1999; Picot 2009: 172).
 This brief summary of the spd’s policy paradigms and its actual social 
policy record in the period 1949-98 reveals that the party’s policy was in 
line with the theoretical framework on the alignments of social demo-
cratic parties with respect to social policy. The German spd advocated 
decommodification, egalitarianism and solidarity as its basic program-
matic commitments and implemented these policies when it was in office. 
Hence, the spd should have appealed to particular social classes repre-
senting the party’s core constituency during this period. The next section 
describes the spd’s electoral performance among its core constituency 
over time.
5.2 Alignment of the social democratic core constituency in Germany
Table 5.1 reports the party shares of the spd and its main competitors 
on welfare, the Christian Democrats and the pds/Left Party, in classes 
identified as the social democratic core constituency prior to the reforms 
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introduced by the red-green government.3 To demonstrate electoral per-
formance over time, the tables also show the parties’ overall share of votes 
in federal elections since 1965.
Table 5.1 Party choice by selected social classes, Germany 1969-98
1969 1972 1976 1980 1983 1987 1990 1994 1998
SPD RNM 50 61 78 50 48 41 40 55 60
Skilled 63 68 57 62 46 55 39 44 53
Unskilled 52 62 61 56 49 42 48 41 39
CDU/CSU RNM 39 33 16 35 42 46 46 31 30
Skilled 34 24 39 28 48 37 43 42 29
Unskilled 45 33 38 30 45 46 41 47 51
PDS/Left RNM - - - - - - - 2 3
Skilled - - - - - - - 6 7
Unskilled - - - - - - - 6 2
Sources: German National Election Studies 1969-98.
Notes: Figures for 1969 to 1990 refer to Western Germany, 1994 and 1998 refer to unifi ed 
Germany. RNM: Routine non-manual employees.
Table 5.1 illustrates that the spd was indeed able to form an alignment 
with classes conceptualised as the social democratic core constituency 
in Western Germany, and later in unified Germany. Originally predomi-
nantly a workers’ party, the spd also targeted lower-white collar em-
ployees with the Godesberg Programme from 1959. In this vein, the align-
ment of routine non-manual employees with the spd materialised after 
1965 and peaked in the 1970s. The strength of the alignment of the classes 
considered to be the social democratic core constituency has fluctuated 
over time, however, at least to some extent due to the general political 
context in Germany. The results until 1983 must be seen in the context of 
the two-and-a-half-party system, with two clearly dominant parties and 
a minor third party, before the Greens gained parliamentary represen-
tation and the party system became more factionalised. However, it has 
been maintained that this did not increase polarisation on welfare issues, 
as the centripetal competition on this issue prevailed (Zohlnhöfer 2001; 
Padgett 2005; Picot 2009).4 During the Kohl era (1982-1998), both large 
parties wooed the social democratic core constituency and the differences 
between them decreased somewhat.
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 In the new Länder, the cdu/csu mobilised working class votes in the 
years between 1990 and 94, something that was attributed to the unifi ca-
tion (Dalton & Bürklin 1995), whereas the spd was able to attract lower 
white-collar employees. Support for the spd among workers grew until 
1998, though, which at least indicates that the voting patterns conformed 
to the western patterns as the eff ects of unifi cation became weaker.5
 The spd victory in 1998 reflected a stronger alignment of the social 
democ ratic core constituency, as shown by the respective vote shares for both 
parts of Germany. Th e party’s 1998 electoral winning formula was based on 
Schröder’s ability to mobilise swing and middle-class votes by his electoral 
appeal on the one hand, and spd chairman Oskar Lafontaine’s ability to mo-
bilise the social democratic core constituency with a more orthodox appeal 
on the other hand (von Alemann 1999; Feist & Hofmann 1999; Niedermayer 
2002, 2006: 121). Th e striking feature is that the spd experienced a steady 
decline among the electorate after the party came into government in 1998 
with a pronounced Th ird Way agenda, labelled ‘Die Neue Mitte’. Th e decline 
was moderate in the fi rst electoral term and seemed to benefi t the Chris-
tian democrats. Table 5.2 shows the vote shares of the parties that gained 
parliamentary representation after the unifi cation.
Table 5.2 Vote shares for federal elections, Germany 1965-2009
1965 1969 1972 1976 1980 1983 1987 1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 2009
SPD 39.3 42.7 45.8 42.6 42.9 38.2 37.0 33.5 36.4 40.9 38.5 34.2 23.0
CDU/CSU 47.6 46.1 44.9 48.6 44.5 48.8 44.3 43.8 41.5 35.1 38.5 35.2 33.8
FDP  9.5  5.8  8.4  7.9 10.6  7.0  9.1 11.0  6.9  6.2  7.4  9.8 14.6
Greens - - - -  1.5  5.6  8.3  5.0a  7.3  6.7  8.6  8.1 10.7
PDS/Left - - - - - - -  2.4  4.4  5.1  4.0  8.7 11.9
Others  3.6  5.4  1.0  0.9  0.4  0.4  1.5  4.2  3.5  5.7  2.8  3.8  6.0
Turnout 86.8 86.7 91.1 90.7 88.6 89.1 84.3 77.8 79.0 82.2 79.1 77.7 70.8
Source: http://www.Bundeswahlleiter.de.
Note: 1965-87 Western Germany; 1990-2009 unifi ed Germany.
a. The fi gures report the joint result of the Green Party and Alliance90/the Greens, which later 
merged. In 1990, only the East German Alliance passed the threshold in the eastern Länder; the 
threshold was applied separately for the two regions in the 1990 election.
After the social democrats engaged in comprehensive welfare state re-
forms in their second electoral term, support for the party declined con-
siderably. This trend continued under the 2005-09 Grand Coalition, with 
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the party receiving fewer than one out of four votes in the federal election 
in 2009. By contrast, the vote shares for the Left Party clearly increased 
during this period. For the first time since unification, the spd’s left-wing 
challenger easily passed the threshold for parliamentary representation; 
former election nights had been nail-biters for the party. The party’s pre-
decessor, the pds, had been electorally marginalised, struggling to pass 
the 5 per cent threshold and never gaining a foothold among the western 
electorate or on the national level.6 This puzzle has to be seen in light of 
the substance of the welfare state reforms. The following sections exam-
ine the reforms of the red-green government with respect to the decom-
modification framework and outline the party competition in this period.
5.3 Welfare state reforms in Germany and their political context, 1998-
2009
The German welfare state is typically seen as the archetype of the Bis-
marckian welfare state. The welfare state’s core schemes are financed by 
social insurance rates, benefits are earnings-related and eligibility is cou-
pled to a sufficient employment record. Unemployment insurance origi-
nally consisted of two tiers. The first tier was the contribution-financed 
Arbeitslosengeld, which had a replacement rate of around 67 per cent and 
was paid for up to 32 months. The second tier was the tax-financed and 
means-tested Arbeitslosenhilfe, which had a replacement rate of about 58 
per cent (Clasen 2005). In principle it was possible to claim Arbeitslosen-
hilfe for an unlimited amount of time as long as certain income criteria 
were fulfilled. Unemployment insurance and the German welfare state 
in general were not as universal as the social democratic welfare regime, 
but did secure a relatively high degree of decommodification for the core 
work force due to the status maintenance principle. As described in Sec-
tion 5.1, both of the welfare parties, the cdu and the spd, incorporated 
these principles ideologically and implemented them in the political prax-
is during the formative phase of the German welfare state.
 Before the red-green government took over, the so-called ‘Reformstau’ 
debate was raging in Germany. Reformstau means reform gridlock; that is, 
the failure to adjust the German welfare state to changed socio-economic 
circumstances. This, in turn, causes economic problems and fiscal auster-
ity, and has been identified as the major cause of the high unemployment 
rates in the 1990s (cf. Cox 2001; Harlen 2002; Zohlnhöfer 2004). In the 
1994-98 electoral term Chancellor Kohl tried to initiate reforms of the la-
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bour market, the social insurance systems and fiscal policy (Harlen 2002; 
Zohlnhöfer 2001, 2004). However, not all of the reforms were passed and 
the unemployment rate remained high. Accordingly, the oppositional spd 
with chancellor candidate Schröder launched its electoral campaign for 
the federal elections in 1998 on these issues, promising to withdraw the 
Kohl government’s reforms, as they were regarded as having adverse so-
cial effects. The spd’s victory and the change to a red-green coalition gov-
ernment were credited to the election campaign on social issues and high 
unemployment (e.g. von Alemann 1999; Feist & Hofmann 1999).
 As promised, the Schröder government suspended Kohl’s reforms and 
introduced minor labour market reforms that were more or less in line 
with traditional German labour market policies. Moreover, some reforms 
at the beginning of the electoral term served the demands of the spd’s 
core clientele and the trade unions (cf. Blancke & Schmid 2003; Schmidt 
2003, 2006; Streeck & Trampusch 2005). Until 2001, the labour market 
policy was characterised as ‘Politik der ruhigen Hand’ (literally: policy 
of the steady hand), as the Schröder government abstained from con-
troversial labour market reform proposals between 1991 and 2001 (e.g. 
Blancke & Schmid 2003: 225). In general, the literature argues that there 
were moderate welfare reforms during the 1998-2002 election term, but 
they failed to produce any effects and were largely tailored to the red-
green government’s re-election in the 2002 federal election (cf. Blancke 
& Schmid 2003; Schmidt 2003; Camerra-Rowe 2004; Zohlnhöfer 2004; 
Streeck & Trampusch 2005). The only notable exceptions were the Job-
aqtiv legislation and the Riester pension reform.7
 The Job-aqtiv legislation was proposed by the Schröder government 
in 2001 and came into effect on 1 January 2002 (Blancke & Schmid 2003: 
219). The package reformed the almps by extending qualification and 
training programmes. For instance, the law introduced wage subsidies for 
employers who let employees participate in qualification programmes. 
However, the Job-aqtiv package was not seen as an outright break with 
the spd’s social policy principles, as it did not tighten eligibility criteria or 
entitlements for the workforce, nor did it imply any benefit cuts (Blancke 
& Schmid 2003: 226).
 The second important reform of Schröder’s first cabinet was the intro-
duction of a voluntarily-funded private old-age provision scheme (Ries-
ter-Rente). Aimed at stabilising non-wage labour costs, the Riester-Rente 
decreased the future lower replacement rate of the ordinary state pension 
(from 70 to 64 per cent in 2030), but compensated this with a heavily 
state-subsidised, funded top-up on the ordinary pension to be built up 
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separately from the old age pension insurance (see Leibfried & Obinger 
2003: 212f; Schmidt 2003: 247ff for descriptions of this reform). This was 
seen as being at odds with the spd’s traditional social policy aspirations, 
as well as the existing pension policies in Germany, since the state pension 
was at least partly replaced by a private and capital-funded pension top-
up, violating the principle of equal contribution rates for employers and 
employees (Schmidt 2003: 247ff, 2006: 145; Clasen 2005: 114).8
 Summing up the first term of the red-green coalition, in terms of social 
policy, the Riester-Rente was the only break with the decommodification 
principle or other traditional social democratic principles. The govern-
ment’s social policy between 1998 and 2002 is regarded as having ben-
efited the spd’s core constituency (Schmidt 2003: 254ff ).9
 After its re-election, the spd was still facing deteriorating economic 
growth, high unemployment rates, the welfare state’s growing fiscal bur-
den and a scandal concerning the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (Federal Em-
ployment Office), leading to defeats in two state elections.10 This was the 
trigger for Agenda 2010, a highly controversial reform programme pre-
sented on 14 March 2003 in the Bundestag by Chancellor Schröder.
 Agenda 2010 represented a clear policy change, as it announced sev-
eral significant welfare reforms, especially of the labour market (Camer-
ra-Rowe 2004; Zohlnhöfer 2004; Clasen 2005; Streeck & Trampusch 
2005; Debus 2008). Consequently, welfare issues and attitudes towards 
reforms increasingly polarised the German electorate in general and tra-
ditional spd voters in particular (e.g. Padgett 2005; Schäfer 2007; Picot 
2009). In the heated public debate, the reforms were accused of having 
a negative social impact and producing bitter hardships for the persons 
concerned (Fleckenstein 2008). The labour market reforms were called 
Hartz reforms after the former Volkswagen manager Peter Hartz, who 
advised Chancellor Schröder on labour market issues. The reforms were 
introduced in four acts (i-iv).
 The Hartz i and ii reform acts came into effect in January 2003. They 
introduced temporary work agencies, training vouchers and some new 
options for business start-ups. In particular, they tightened the defini-
tion for suitable work, which meant that the unemployed had to accept 
job offers that did not match their qualification levels. This implied lower 
future remunerations. The Hartz iii act concerned an internal organisa-
tional reform of the federal employment office that does not concern the 
purposes of the chapter.
 The most encompassing and controversial component of Agenda 2010 
was the ‘Hartz iv’ labour market reform. This act was characterised as a 
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departure from Germany’s approach to unemployment insurance, as well 
as from traditional social democratic labour market policy (Kemmerling 
& Bruttel 2006; Fleckenstein 2008). The unemployment benefit system 
was reformed since the benefits for the long-term unemployed were no 
longer dependent on former income, as in the Bismarckian insurance 
principle (Kemmerling & Bruttel 2006: 93). The new scheme for the long-
term unemployed (Arbeitslosengeld ii) consisted of means-tested social 
assistance with flat-rate benefits.11 Compared to previous legislation, this 
meant lower benefits for most of the former Arbeitslosenhilfe claimants, 
as the replacement rates decline (Clasen 2005: 75). The eligibility period 
for short-term unemployed benefits was also limited to one year (previ-
ously up to 32 months).12
 The reform also increased the conditionality of the unemployment 
benefits significantly. Job suitability criteria were further tightened for 
alg ii-claimants who de facto had to accept any legal job offered, regard-
less of the wage-level (ibid). This was accompanied by harsher obliga-
tions to participate in job-search activities and training programmes, an 
approach that especially targeted those unemployed who were under 25 
years of age. The Hartz reforms in general also implemented more intense 
activation measures to increase the effective labour market supply (Kem-
merling & Bruttel 2006). Moreover, market mechanisms and contracting-
out were used as instruments to enhance job-seeking activities. Table 5.3 
summarises the effect of the labour market reforms on the decommodifi-
cation of labour using Clasen & Clegg’s framework.
 The social policy of the Grand Coalition also needs some attention, 
particularly with respect to the Hartz reforms and the electoral prospects 
of the spd and the Left Party. The 2005 federal election saw the replace-
ment of the red-green coalition with a Grand Coalition consisting of the 
cdu/csu and the spd. Essentially, the Grand Coalition adhered to the 
red-green government’s labour market reforms, with some minor chang-
es (Dümig 2010, Menz 2010). Some aspects of the reforms, such as the 
merger of the Arbeitslosenhilfe and the Sozialhilfe, now unfolded their 
effects. Persons with longer spells of unemployment were now increas-
ingly affected by the Hartz-iv-reform that was passed one and half years 
before the early elections in 2005. By 2005, the 12- to 18-month period 
of income-related alg i had passed for those persons concerned, and 
they were transferred to the flat-rate alg ii. During the incumbency of 
the Grand Coalition, a sizable number of unemployed thus experienced 
a loss of income, since their benefits had been decoupled from former 
earnings.
 GERMANY
Moreover, the Grand Coalition implemented a pension reform programme 
that increased the statutory retirement age from 65 to 67 (see Schmidt 
2010: 310ff ). This reform was highly unpopular and was said to imply a 
lower pension for many wage-earners, as they could not be expected to 
reach 67 years effectively to qualify for the full pension amount in the 
statutory pension scheme. Accordingly, while still mobilising against the 
labour market reforms, the Left Party used the pension reform to attack 
the spd and to mobilise new voters.
 The overview in Table 5.3 demonstrates that the reforms introduced 
tighter eligibility criteria, which is not in line with Esping-Andersen’s
Table 5.3 Classifi cation of labour market reforms introduced by red-green government, 
1998-2005




2000: Abolition of 
Originäre Arbeits-
losenhilfe
Abolishment of Arbeitslosenhilfe for 
unemployed without prior receipt of 
Arbeitslosengeld (originäre Arbeitslosenhilfe 
was a special assistance scheme for 





More emphasis on activation; mandatory 
contract for unemployed on labour market 




2003: Hartz I & II Tighter suitably criteria for young unemployed; 
new options for business start-ups; temporary 





2004/05: Hartz III & IV, 
Introduction of ALG II
Eligibility period for ALG I reduced to 12 
months (previously Arbeitslosengeld up to 32 
months)
Membership R
Eligibility period for ALG I reduced to 18 
months for claimants aged 55 and older 
(previously Arbeitslosengeld up to 32 months)
Eligibility R
Merger of ALH and social assistance into 
means-tested ALG II scheme (two schemes 
previously: ALH for labour market participants; 
social assistance for non-labour market 
participants)
Membership D
Redefi nition of unemployed and stricter means 
test for fl at-rate ALG II benefi ts (previously ALH 
also means-tested, but 53 to 57 per cent of last 
earned net income)
Eligibility R
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Tighter job suitability criteria for ALG II 
claimants as unemployed are obliged to take a 
job despite reduced wage level (net earnings 




Tighter eligibility criteria for unemployed under 
25, eligibility de facto contingent on claimants’ 
willingness to accept any job or to participate 





Sources: Clasen (2005); Streeck & Trampusch (2005); Kemmerling & Bruttel (2006); Clasen & 
Clegg (2007); Fleckenstein (2008).
Notes: the classifi cation of reforms in terms of level of conditionality and direction draws on the 
scheme of Clasen & Clegg (2007); R: recommodifi cation, D: decommodifi cation..
claims for universal and unconditional benefits. This is especially true 
for the reforms implemented after 2002 under the Agenda 2010 label. 
Similarly, the activation policies are path-breaking, as passive behav-
iour is now sanctioned. The unemployed are obliged to accept jobs 
that do not match their skill levels, and are remunerated below average 
wages and below their previous level of income. Agenda 2010 reforms 
thus clearly emphasised conditionality in German social policy, since 
receiving benefits was no longer independent of market exchange, but 
contingent on a person’s willingness to start work or job-training as 
soon as possible.
 Esping-Andersen points to income replacement in benefit schemes as 
a critical feature of decommodification (1990: 47; see also Lindbom 2001; 
Scruggs & Allan 2006). Table 5.4 reports the reforms’ consequences on 
the benefit levels, using the oecd gross employment benefit rate and one 
indicator for net replacement rates. The oecd data are used, as Scruggs’ 
data series stops in 2003 and thus does not incorporate the effects of the 
Hartz reforms. Both measures indicate lower replacement rates as a con-
sequence of the reforms. The figures for 2005 and 2007 in Table 5.4 mark 
the lowest rate for the oecd measure of benefit entitlements beginning 
in 1961. Table 5.5 demonstrates how much the labour market reforms re-
duced the replacement rate for the long-term unemployed, as the rate 
decreased by about 20 percentage points (using a single person with an 
average wage as an example). Hence, the reforms were responsible for 
lower replacement rates.
 In sum, the reforms tightened eligibility for benefits, introduced less 
generous benefits accompanied by lower replacement rates, and active 
labour market polices conditioned access to unemployment benefits by
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Table 5.4 OECD replacement rates of unemployment benefi ts for Germany, 1989-2007
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
OECD summary 
measure
28 29 28 26 26 27 29 29 24 24
1997a 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Net replacement 
rate
54 54 54 54 54 36 35 34
Source: Summary measure: OECD (2010a). Net replacement rate for 1997: OECD (1999), for 
2001-07: OECD (2010b).
Notes: The OECD summary measure is defi ned as the average of the gross unemployment 
benefi t replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family situations and three durations of 
unemployment. The net replacement rate for the long-term unemployed is the compensation 
for a long-term unemployed single person with 100 per cent of an average wage earner 1997-
2007.
a. The 1997 fi gures are not based on the average wage earner, but on the 100 per cent average 
production worker. The 1997 fi gures are thus not directly comparable, as the OECD changed 
the defi nition of the net replacement rate. Bold fi gures represent post-reform years.
compulsory participation. Th us, the qualitative and the quantitative meas-
ures provide strong evidence that the reforms of the spd-led government 
mark a departure from the social democratic policy goals that tradition-
ally tied it to its core constituency. The labour market reforms substi-
tuted decommodification policies for conditionality principles, violating 
Esping-Andersen’s argument about unconditional eligibility for benefits 
with a high replacement rate (1990: 47). As argued above, this threw the 
party’s alignment with its core constituency into question. However, as 
claimed in Chapter 2, the actual effects of the reforms were contingent 
on the party system and the presence of particular competitors, to which 
I now turn.
5.4 Party competition on welfare state reforms in Germany, 1998-2009
After the red-green government came into office in 1998, the German 
party system consisted of four parties on the national level (spd, cdu/csu, 
Greens and fdp). With the pds, a regional party representing Eastern 
Germany,13 it has been portrayed as a ‘fluid five party system’ (Nieder-
mayer 2002, 2003, 2006). Five parties were represented in the Bundestag, 
but the competition differed by region, as the pds only gained parliamen-
tary representation thanks to its post-communist strongholds in Eastern 
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Germany. By contrast, the fdp and the Greens had their strongholds in 
Western Germany (cf. also Wessels 2004: 58ff ). This implied that not each 
of the three smaller parties (fdp, Greens, pds) was competitive in a par-
ticular region, leading to three- or four-party systems on the regional lev-
el and a five-party system in the Bundestag between 1990 and 2002. Con-
cerning the framework on challenger parties for the reform-minded spd 
after 1998, two parties should be discussed as competitors, as outlined in 
Chapter 2: the Christian Democrats (cdu/csu) and the left-socialist pds, 
which later became the Left Party. Party competition in general had been 
predominantly structured around the socio-economic dimension, espe-
cially after the spd’s policy change in the aftermath of the 2002 federal 
election (Wessels 2004; Schäfer 2007). In contrast to many neighbouring 
countries, there was no party of the far or new right that constituted a 
nationwide and dangerous challenger for the spd at that time (Dolezal 
2008).
 The cdu/csu is traditionally Germany’s second big welfare-state party 
and has accordingly been a credible defender of the welfare state (van 
Kersbergen 1995; Schmidt 2006). In principle, the cdu/csu represents 
the type of mainstream party that I have identified as a possible winner 
from Third Way reforms, if the party moves towards the political prefer-
ences of social democratic core constituents. However, the policy of the 
Christian democrats during the period under review requires some dis-
cussion. As mentioned, the cdu/csu was replaced by the spd as the main 
government party in 1998, due to dissatisfaction, amongst other things, 
with some retrenchment measures implemented in 1996-97. In opposi-
tion, the party increasingly developed a market-liberal agenda, especially 
during the second term of the spd-led government (2002-05) (e.g. Korne-
lius & Roth 2007).
 In contrast to this ideological repositioning, the cdu/csu tried to ex-
ploit the deteriorating economic situation during Schröder’s first term, 
particularly the high unemployment rates, and criticised the erratic pol-
icy of the government. This benefited the Christian democrats, who won 
several state elections after 1998. However, the credibility of the cdu/csu 
in terms of attracting spd’s rank and file could be expected to be limited in 
the long run. Moreover, during the election campaign that followed their 
own welfare state reforms, beginning in 2004, the spd used the expecta-
tion that a cdu/csu-led government would undertake even more radical 
reforms as a threat to avoid losses to their Christian democratic opponent 
(cf. Jesse 2006: 24).14 The cdu/csu also had dirty hands in social policy, as 
the party cooperated with the red-green government to implement parts 
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of the Hartz reforms, the spd and the Greens having lost their majority in 
the Bundesrat in 1999. Hence, I would not expect the Christian democrats 
to make lasting inroads into the social democratic core constituency as a 
consequence of the spd’s policy change. One effect might be temporary 
gains for the party in 2002, but, like the spd, the cdu/csu had a reform 
agenda and dirty hands in social policy.
 The real challenge for the spd after the reforms should be the pres-
ence of a nationwide left-socialist party, the Left Party. During the first 
term and the beginning of the second term, the spd was only challenged 
by the pds in the eastern Länder, but not at the national level. The left-
wing pds did not gain a foothold in the western part of Germany and was 
dependent on its electoral success in the new Länder to gain seats and a 
parliamentary group in the Bundestag (e.g. Wessels 2004; Patton 2006; 
Olsen 2007; Picot 2009). In the 2002 federal election, the pds did not pass 
the 5 per cent threshold and only won two constituencies in the eastern 
part of Germany, and thus failed to enter parliament with a parliamentary 
group. The party was completely marginalised, with only two seats in the 
Bundestag gained in constituencies in Berlin and no parliamentary repre-
sentation in western states.15
 Th e challenge for the spd from the left became serious after Agenda 
2010. Th e pds began to mobilise against the reforms to attract dissatisfi ed 
voters in the new Länder, as the reforms were said to harm East Germans 
in particular. In the western part, one particular consequence was the for-
mation of the wasg (Wahlalternative Arbeit und Soziale Gerechtigkeit), a 
political group consisting of spd dissidents and union members opposing 
the reforms. After having run its own party list in the state election in 
North Rhine Westphalia but failing to pass the 5 per cent threshold, the 
wasg decided to join forces with the pds in view of the early Bundestag-
swahl in September 2005.16 Th is led to the formation of the Linkspartei 
(Left Party), a party presenting itself as the ‘real’ anti-reform welfare party 
and the clear left-wing alternative (Patton 2006; Olsen 2007). Moreover, 
former spd chairman Oskar Lafontaine joined the new party and became 
one of its chairmen. Th e Left Party now tried to take advantage of the 
reforms; it portrayed itself as a defender of the welfare state and fi ercely 
attacked the spd for its path-breaking reforms, as well as accusing all four 
other parties of being ‘parties of social coldness’ (Der Spiegel, 17 July 2005). 
Th e party did not have dirty hands, as its previous marginalisation had 
kept it out of social policy legislation at the federal level. Th e pds is a good 
example of the type of left-socialist challenger identifi ed in Chapter 2. I 
would expect a realignment of social democratic core constituents with 
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the Left Party in 2005, since this party was a credible competitor refl ecting 
the social policy preferences of social democratic core voters. I would also 
expect a corroboration of the realignment with the 2009 election, since the 
spd adhered to its reforms in the Grand Coalition (2005-2009) and was the 
driving force for the pension reforms in 2007, which raised the statutory 
pension age to 67 (see Schmidt 2010: 310ff ). Th is should have further ben-
efi ted the Left Party, which was the only party that seriously attacked this 
reform and the unfolding of the Hartz reforms during this period.
 I would not expect other parties to benefit from the spd’s policy change 
in terms of votes from the social democratic core constituency. The fdp 
held distinct market liberal views during the period under review and 
demanded far-reaching reforms to the German welfare state. The Greens 
held libertarian views on socio-cultural issues, against the respective pref-
erences of social democratic core constituents (Schäfer 2007). Although 
the party is generally placed on the left, it had dirty hands due to its in-
volvement in the implementation of Agenda 2010 and the Hartz reforms 
in the red-green coalition. Furthermore, as argued in Chapter 2, there was 
no challenge from the right in Germany. Authoritarian right-wing parties 
were marginalised throughout the period under review, and none came 
even close to the 5 per cent threshold in the elections after 1994.17 There 
had been occasional gains for the extremist dvu and npd in state elections, 
but due to the parties’ ambivalent relationship with the national socialist 
legacy and their suspected anti-constitutional programmatic stance, they 
did not present a serious challenge to the spd or other established parties 
in elections for the Bundestag. The npd was even threatened with a ban 
by the Federal Court of Justice in 2001, on the grounds that the party’s 
programme and behaviour were said to be anti-constitutional.
 In sum, my expectation for the case of Germany would be a realign-
ment of social democratic core constituents with the Left Party after the 
path-breaking social policy reforms implemented by the spd under Agen-
da 2010. I would not expect other competitors to make systematic gains 
among the spd’s rank and file.
5.5 Data and variables
The data for the analysis of the 2002 and 2005 elections stem from the 
German National Elections studies and the Politbarometer surveys. The 
election studies are only used for the descriptive analysis to calculate 
party shares, whereas the Politbarometer is used in both the descrip-
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tive and the statistical analysis, as it consists of several items measuring 
public attitudes towards the reforms quite intuitively after 2002. One 
item asks the respondents directly about their feelings towards the wel-
fare state reforms implemented under the Schröder government, and 
is thus preferable to recent German election studies with inferior vari-
ables.
 In the descriptive part, I used two items from the Politbarometer cap-
turing the respondents’ attitudes towards proposed reforms, that is, the 
reforms announced by Schröder in 2003 under Agenda 2010. One is a 
general assessment of the reforms, the other concerns the cuts in em-
ployment benefits as a more concrete proposal. I also used three items 
from the 2005 Politbarometer survey asking people about their feelings 
regarding the reforms implemented after 2003. Again, one item taps into 
the general attitude towards the reforms (right or wrong); the second 
item asks about the assessment of the cuts to unemployment benefits as 
a consequence of the Hartz reforms; the third item measures opinions on 
tighter job suitability criteria, another effect of the labour market reforms 
as outlined in Section 5.3.18
 The German Longitudinal Election Study was used for the analysis of 
the 2009 election. This study consists of three items asking the respond-
ents whether the Hartz reforms, social policy and social justice issues had 
been the reason for the respondent’s vote choice in 2009. The three items 
were merged into one index measuring whether these matters influenced 
the voters’ decision. This allowed me to examine whether the spd has lost 
further voters to the Left Party due to social policy and labour market 
reforms, and whether voters from the social democratic core constitu-
ency stuck to the Left Party in 2009. In this respect, the investigation of 
the 2009 election taps into the problem of whether the 2005 realignment 
of spd voters has been consolidated, and whether there have been further 
electoral repercussions of the reforms under social democratic govern-
ments.
 The statistical analysis uses vote intention rather than party choice 
in the last election, as the survey consisting of the respective items on 
the assessment of the performance of the Schröder government and 
attitudes towards the welfare state reforms was conducted prior to 
the 2002 and 2005 elections. The categories are 1 ‘spd’, 2 ‘CD/CSU’, 3 
‘Greens’, 4 ‘fdp’, 5 ‘pds resp. Left Party’ and 6 ‘Non-voting’ (7 for ‘minor 
parties’ if applicable). The variables on voter groups are operationalised 
according to the principles set out in the previous two chapters.
RESULTS
5.6 Results
 Attitudes towards reform proposals and actual reforms
I first analyse the public perception of the labour market reforms to be 
implemented by Schröder’s government in its second term. The 2003 and 
2005 Politbarometer surveys asked respondents about their feelings re-
garding the reform proposals announced by Schröder under Agenda 2010, 
and their attitudes towards the actual reforms and some of the measures 
implemented. The items capture attitudes before the reforms were imple-
mented and after they became effective.
 Table 5.5 shows that the proposals (2003) as well as the actual reforms 
(2005) were met with approval among the non-core constituency, whereas 
social democratic core voters were much more sceptical about these poli-
cies. A plurality of core constituents found the proposals too far-reaching 
and assessed the reforms as negative, whereas the opposite was true for 
the other voters on the first and third item in Table 5.5. In a similar fash-
ion, lower unemployment benefits were met with significantly more ap-
proval among the non-core constituency than in the core constituency. 
The same was true for tighter job suitability criteria, even though both 
groups generally had a more positive attitude here. Keeping in mind from 
Section 5.3 that these reforms tightened eligibility criteria, emphasised 
conditionality and reduced benefits, the attitudes reported in Table 5.5 
correspond to the theoretical expectation that the social democratic core 
constituency would oppose recommodification. Given the negative feel-
ings among its core constituency and the fact that the spd implemented 
these reforms after 2003, one would expect the party to face a consider-
able electoral risk.
 Table 5.6 reports the party shares for the core and non-core constitu-
ency when the spd was in government between 1998 and 2009. The spd’s 
share among its core voters drops by 10 percentage points between 1998 
and 2005. Surprisingly, the decline is larger between 1998 and 2002 than 
four years later. One reason could be that the two election studies used for 
2002 and 2005 generally do not match the actual election results when it 
comes to the shares of the two larger parties. However, taking the result 
for the recent 2009 federal election, it becomes clear that the spd lost a 
considerable share of its core constituency after the party gained office 
with a Third Way agenda. The vote shares of the spd were halved between 
Schröder gaining office in 1998 and 2009.
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Table 5.5 Attitudes towards labour market reform proposals by voter group, 
percentage points
Attitude towards Schröder’s reform proposals (AGENDA 2010), 
2003 [V192]
Voter group Too far-reaching Fair Not suffi  cient Total
Non-core constituency 28.8 23.3 48.0 100
Core constituency 42.8 22.4 34.8 100
N=3,657 Chi2: 86.1 P<.000
Attitude towards present reforms, 2005 [V236]
Right Wrong Total
Non-core constituency 55.7 44.3 100
Core constituency 37.1 62.9 100
N=2,753 Chi2: 91.4 P<.000
Assessment of reduction of unemployment benefi ts 
(Arbeitslosengeld II), 2005 [V239]
Right Wrong Total
Non-core constituency 60.4 39.6 100
Core constituency 49.4 50.6 100
N=1,377 Chi2: 16.0 P<.00
Assessment of tighter job suitability criteria for long-term 
unemployed, 2005 [V240]
Right Wrong Total
Non-core constituency 77.6 22.4 100
Core constituency 65.3 34.7 100
N=1,460 Chi2: 26.9 P<.000
Source: Own calculations based on Politbarometer 2003 and 2005.
Th e pds received about 4 per cent of the votes among the social democratic 
core constituency before 2005 and its successor Left Party increased its 
share to 12 per cent, which is in line with the expected direction of electoral 
change for this left-wing challenger. Th e 2009 election also corroborates the 
realignment of the 2005 election, where former spd core voters shifted to the 
left competitor. Th e Christian democrats seemed to benefi t in 2002 among 
this voter segment, but fell below their 1998 share in the 2005 and 2009 elec-
tions. Th is resembles the expected lack of credibility due to the Christian 
democrats’ reform agenda after 2002. To match the reported shares from the 
election studies with the data used for the analysis, I calculated the support 
for the spd among its core constituency with the Politbarometer surveys.
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Table 5.6 Party shares and non-voting among the SPD’s core constituency, 1998-2009 
(per cent)
Core constituency 1998 2002 2005 2009
SPD 45.9 39.5 36.1 20.0
CDU/CSU 39.5 33.9 24.9 21.0
Liberals 1.4 6.2 6.4 10.9
Greens 3.1 4.4 7.6 8.8
PDS/Left Party 4.4 3.6 8.5 12.1
Non-voters 12.0 10.5 12.5 25.0
Non-core constituency
SPD 38.4 33.4 32.1 17.3
CDU/CSU 35.0 41.0 27.2 25.2
Liberals 6.6 7.2 10.8 17.6
Greens 8.7 11.2 11.8 15.5
PDS/Left Party 4.5 3.5 8.9 9.1
Non-voters 4.4 2.0 7.3 13.5
Source: German Election Studies 1997-2005 and German Longitudinal Election Study 2009. 
Figures do not always add up to 100 per cent due to rounding and omission of minor parties.
Figure 5.1 shows the vote intention for the spd from 1998 to 2007. It be-
comes obvious that Schröder’s election victory in 1998 rested upon a 
strong backing among the core constituency, as mentioned in Section 
5.2. The party’s share stayed at around 40 per cent before the 2002 elec-
tion, when it showed the first signs of decline. The Agenda 2010 was pro-
posed shortly after the 2002 election, also a time of strong decline for the 
spd. After implementing the reforms in 2003 and 2004, the party hit the 
bottom as their core constituency support fell below 30 per cent. In late 
2004 and up to the 2005 election, the party regained some strength, but 
never recovered to previous levels of support. Briefly stated, the spd’s 
share among its rank and file always exceeded 35 per cent until the 2002 
election, but dropped below this benchmark with the announcement of 
Agenda 2010 and the implementation of the reforms in the following 
months. Thus, although the election studies do report a different pattern 
of decline, the support in the polls clearly suggests permanently weakened 
backing for the spd among its core constituency due to the party’s reform-
ist agenda after the 2002 election.19 The next step is to model the antici-
pated losses of the spd and the expected realignment of social democratic 
core constituents with the Left Party in 2005.
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Figure 5.1 Support for SPD among core constituency, 1998-2007
Source: Politbarometer 1998-2007, own calculation, line smoothed.
 First red-green cabinet, 1998-2002
As discussed above, with the exception of the Job-aqtiv legislation and 
the Riester reform, the spd refrained from implementing major reforms 
during the first term of the red-green government. However, the Schröder 
government was dealing with high unemployment and a deteriorating eco-
nomic situation, and consequently faced public dissatisfaction. As neither 
data set includes a variable that taps into social policy attitudes, I had to 
use a variable measuring satisfaction with the government’s performance.
 Table 5.7 reports predicted probabilities obtained from a multinomial 
logistic regression model. The figures demonstrate that dissatisfaction 
with the spd’s performance led to a significantly weaker result among the 
party’s core constituency in 2002. Here the two centre-right opposition 
parties, the cdu/csu and the fdp, gained significantly compared to the 
group of satisfied core constituents. The same held true for minor parties 
and non-voting, although non-voting was not as pronounced as in the 
case of Britain. It was the largest competitor, the Christian Democrats, 
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Table 5.7 Predicted probabilities of vote choice among aligned core constituency by 
perception of SPD, 2002
Satisfi ed with performance of government






Other parties 1.0 5.0*
Non-voting 3.6 12.7*
Overall 100 100
Source: Predicted probabilities obtained from multinomial logistic regression model using 
Clarify.
Notes: The number of simulations to obtain the probabilities was set to 1,000. ! p<.10; * p<.05.
that attracted most disappointed social democratic core voters after the 
first term of the red-green coalition. The spd’s left-wing challenger pds 
did not significantly benefit from the dissatisfaction with the government, 
which is a sign that the realignment was not produced in 2002 given the 
lack of encompassing reforms leading to recommodification. This elec-
tion was also a disaster for the pds, which failed to pass the electoral 
threshold or to win even three single member constituencies, as it had 
done in 1998. Keep in mind, however, that the social democrats survived 
the election with a minor loss among both the electorate and their con-
stituency. Moreover, the measure used is a more general item capturing 
the assessment of the government rather than social policy attitudes. The 
next step is to look at the electoral effects of the spd’s engagement in a 
significant policy change after this election, where one would expect ma-
jor electoral change.
 Second red-green cabinet 2002-05
We would expect the analysis of the 2005 election to show the realign-
ment of social democratic core constituents with the Left Party, follow-
ing the spd’s engagement in path-breaking labour market reforms in the 
second term of the red-green cabinet. The Politbarometer 2005 survey 
includes an item that directly asks the respondents to assess the reforms 
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(already used in Table 5.5). Unfortunately, this question was posed to the 
respondents before the 2005 election, so I had to use vote intention rather 
than vote decision. This shortcoming is tolerated on the basis that the 
item on people’s feelings about the reforms is by far the best available 
measure, given the purposes of this chapter. Table 5.8 shows the predicted 
probabilities for vote intention of social democratic core constituents, 
contingent on their assessment of the reforms.
Table 5.8 Predicted probabilities of vote choice among voter groups by attitudes 
towards reforms, 2005
Assessment of welfare state reforms: core constituency
Estimated vote intention 2005     Good      Bad
SPD 71.7 45.5 *
CDU/CSU 10.0 16.3
Greens 4.2 2.9
Liberals 1.7 2.0 
Left Party 6.0 16.2 *
Non-voting 5.7 17.0 *
Overall 100 100
Assessment of welfare state reforms: non-core 
constituency
Estimated vote intention 2005    Good      Bad
SPD 33.8 17.0 *
CDU/CSU 36.9 48.0 *
Greens 12.5 6.8 *
Liberals 6.6 5.8 
Left Party 4.4 8.6 *
Non-voting 5.7 13.6 *
Overall 100 100
Source: Predicted probabilities obtained from multinomial logistic regression model using 
Clarify.
Notes: The number of simulations to obtain the probabilities was set to 1,000. ! p<.10; * p<.05.
The results correspond with the theoretical expectations and the con-
textual conditions mentioned above. The spd lost significantly among 
aligned core constituents who were dissatisfied with the reforms imple-
mented after 2002; the party was not even able to mobilise every second 
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voter from this segment in 2005. There were only two clear alternatives 
to the groups approving the reforms and those opposing the reforms: 
switching to the Left Party or abstention. The Christian democrats were 
not able to mobilise former social democratic core constituents; the dif-
ferences were not significant, which fits the claims made above. The cdu/
csu did not present a credible alternative, given its own reform agenda 
and involvement in the Hartz reforms. The same was true for the Liberals 
and the spd’s coalition partner, the Greens.
 As hypothesised, the Left Party benefited significantly from the core 
constituency’s opposition to the reforms. The share among reform-mind-
ed core constituents equalled the share for the 2002 election. However, 
the party won reform-averse core voters from the social democrats in the 
2005 election. This confirms the expected logic of electoral change under 
the red-green cabinet and the electoral threat of a left-wing challenger for 
reform-minded social democrats.
 By contrast, disaffected core voters abstained from voting for the spd 
in 2005 and dealigned into the non-voter camp. The difference is smaller 
than that in the British case discussed in the previous chapter, but none-
theless significant. On the other hand, German voters had a left-wing al-
ternative to reform-minded social democrats. The differences in party 
shares between reform-minded and reform-averse for the non-core con-
stituency are generally small, confirming the claim that the reforms con-
cerned the social democratic core constituency in particular. Nonethe-
less, there are significant differences for all options except the Liberals. 
Both coalition partners lost significantly, whereas the Left Party made 
some gains, though much smaller than in the upper half of the table. The 
party might appeal to reform-averse voters outside the working class 
constituency. The Left Party also accused the Greens of departing from 
its distinct left positions in social policies under the red-green coalition 
(FAZ, 3 July 2005). It is striking that the shares of the spd and the Greens 
halved, whereas the Left Party doubled it share. The turn to abstention in 
this voter group was less pronounced than in the aligned core constitu-
ency.
 The SPD in the Grand Coalition, 2005-09
The analysis of the 2009 election illustrates the spd’s further decline after 
the party formed a Grand Coalition with the Christian Democrats, un-
der which the Hartz reforms came into full effect and a pension reform 
package was passed. The respective items from the German Longitudi-
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nal Election Study 2009 asked the respondents why they had voted for 
a particular party. Using the respective social policy items as outlined in 
Section 5.5 above, the analysis for 2009 has two objectives. First, I exam-
ine whether the spd lost further votes due to its social and labour market 
policy. Second, we can control for whether Left Party voters from 2009 
stuck to the party and whether social policy played a role in the suspected 
corroboration of the Left Party realignment. Table 5.9 shows the predict-
ed probabilities from the respective logistic regression models.
 The table’s upper half shows that the spd lost further votes to the Left 
Party in 2009 due to the labour market reforms and social policy issue, 
as the figures can be significantly distinguished. The Left Party was the 
only party that would benefit if core voters were to shift away from the 
spd in the 2009 federal election due to social and labour market policies. 
Thus, the expected dealignment of spd core voters was lasting and the 
Left Party not only consolidated the 2005 realignment, but also won even 
more social democratic core votes due to the welfare state reforms.
 The table’s lower half illustrates that the Left Party kept social demo-
cratic core voters concerned about these issues, even though, surprising-
ly, there is no significant distinction between the left-hand and right-hand 
column here. The spd was only able to recapture a few core voters from 
its left-wing opponent. Nine out of ten Left Party voters from the social 
democratic core constituency stuck to the party if their vote decision was 
based on social policy issues. This effect is quite remarkable, since it has 
traditionally been the spd that has mobilised German voters on social 
policy grounds.
Table 5.9 Predicted probabilities of vote choice among voter groups by attitudes 
towards reforms, 2009
Social policy and labour market reforms reason for vote 
choice: aligned core constituency
Estimated vote choice 2009 Not named Named
SPD 49.2 56.8
CDU/CSU 7.6 0.2 *
Greens 6.7 2.7
Liberals 4.5 0.9




Social policy and labour market reforms reason for vote 
choice: core constituency with choice Left Party in 2005
Estimated vote choice 2009 Not named Named
SPD 13.4 9.3
CDU/CSU 24.4 0.3 *
Greens 0.0 0.0
Liberals 0.0 0.0
Left Party 56.0 90.4
Non-voting 6.3 0.0a
Overall 100 100
Source: Predicted probabilities obtained from multinomial logistic regression model using 
Clarify.
Notes: The number of simulations to obtain the probabilities was set to 1,000. ! p<.10; * p<.05.
a: The dataset’s respective items only gave the option of marking a party but not abstention if 
one named a particular reason for his/her vote choice. This explains the probability of zero for 
abstention in the right-hand side of the table.
In sum, this last empirical section corroborated the chapter’s main find-
ing of a realignment of spd core constituents towards the Left Party. 
Moreover, four years later, the spd’s adherence to the Hartz reforms under 
the Grand Coalition and the pension reform programme as another likely 
catalyst not only consolidated the realignment, but also even strength-
ened it. The reforms’ electoral consequences were thus lasting: the spd 
did not recover after the 2005 federal election and the Left Party indeed 
forged a realignment of social democratic core voters in the same elec-
tion. Another development was the abstention of many spd core voters in 
2009, in addition to the losses to the Left Party. This resembles some of 
the findings from the British case, where we saw a dealignment of social 
democratic core voters as a consequence of path-breaking welfare state 
reforms.
5.7 Conclusion
The chapter set out to investigate what happens when Third Way social 
democrats are challenged by a pro-welfare left-socialist party, and thus 
risk a realignment of their core constituency with the left competitor. This 
was achieved by analysing the electoral consequences of the welfare state 
reforms of the red-green government in Germany after 1998. In accord-
ance with the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2, the spd has 
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traditionally been able to draw upon the support of a core constituency 
of workers and lower white collar-employees. In recent decades, the party 
was committed to decommodifying welfare policies reflecting the core 
constituency’s political preferences. After the spd reformed the German 
welfare state, this alignment was thrown into question, as the reforms 
were characterised as a form of recommodification.
 The Left Party emerged as a nationwide left challenger to the spd as 
a consequence of the welfare state reforms of the 1998-2005 red-green 
coalition and the spd’s participation in the Grand Coalition in the follow-
ing four years. Drawing on the party system framework, I hypothesised 
a realignment of social democratic core voters to the Left Party, which 
represented the ‘dangerous left competitor’ conceptualised in Chapter 2. 
No other systematic patterns of realignment from or to other parties were 
expected, as the spd’s traditional competitor on welfare, the mainstream 
cdu/csu, had its own reform agenda, and no right-wing social protec-
tionist party played a role in Germany during the period under review.
 The results reveal that the Left Party was indeed able to foster a realign-
ment of social democratic core voters in the 2005 federal election, after 
the spd had reformed the welfare state with Agenda 2010 and the Hartz 
reforms. This was a lasting development: the Left Party maintained its 
strength among the social democratic core voter base and even increased 
its vote share in the following election in 2009. The Left Party appeared 
as a new competitor with clean hands in social policy, as the party (like its 
predecessor, the pds) had not been involved in the welfare reform legisla-
tion after 2002. The party could thus present itself as a credible alterna-
tive to reform-averse voters.20 Hence, the presence of the Left Party after 
2004 and the realignment of social democratic core constituents with this 
party confirm that after implementing recommodifying reforms, Third 
Way social democrats face electoral hazards in the form of competition 
from the hard left.21
 Despite its traditional welfare party image, the mainstream cdu/csu 
was unable to make lasting gains in the social democratic core constitu-
ency, given its own reform agenda and the fact that the party had coop-
erated with the spd in the Hartz reforms legislation. The party did not 
make a strategic move to win traditional social democratic voters after 
their own party had abandoned its social policy agenda. The cdu/csu 
benefited from the general dissatisfaction with the Schröder government 
in 2002, but was unable to capitalise on Schröder’s reform agenda later 
on. This confirms the claim that challengers need to present a credible 
alternative to mobilise social democratic core constituents. On that ac-
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count, Schröder was even able to use the anticipated reform agenda of a 
centre-right government as blame-avoid ance in the election campaigns in 
2002 and 2005 (Jesse 2006: 24). Especially in the latter case, Chancellor 
Schröder managed to avoid the great disaster predicted by opinion polls 
in the run-up to the election (Niedermayer 2006: 124; Kornelius & Roth 
2007: 38).
 The spd had no challengers from the far right: only in a couple of state 
elections were parties on the far right able to pass the electoral thresholds 
(the dvu in Brandenburg 2004; the npd in Saxony 2004 and Mecklen-
burg-West Pomerania 2006) or come close to parliamentary representa-
tion (the npd in Saarland 2004 and Berlin 2006). These parties capitalised 
on the dissatisfaction with the Hartz reforms, especially Hartz IV, and 
used social protectionist rhetoric, even though the dvu and npd are anti-
system parties rather than new right parties, as commonly claimed in the 
literature.
 After 2002, the spd also faced a dealignment of core constituents who 
longer turned out to vote. As in the British case, the abstention of social 
democratic core voters practically doubled if we compare the figures for 
1998 and 2009 (Table 5.6). However, the dealignment was less pronounced 
than that which the Labour Party experienced, since turnout remained 
higher in Germany and the spd’s major problem after the reforms were 
the lasting losses to the Left Party. Nevertheless, increasing abstention 
was another sign of the alienating effect of Third Way agendas on ties with 
the core constituency. Elff ’s recent analysis (2010) reveals that this po-
litical alienation especially concerned social classes that had traditionally 
been affiliated with the spd, but that had become disillusioned over the 
past decade. The result has been lower turnouts and higher vote shares 
for the Left Party in recent years.
 One reason why, after four years of the Grand Coalition, the spd faced 
a dealignment of core constituents in 2009, can be found in the party’s 
electoral strategy. Even in view of poor opinion polls, the party and its 
then candidate for the chancellorship, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, ruled out 
any coalition or even parliamentary cooperation with the Left Party after 
the 2009 federal election. This made an spd-led government, or even any 
majority left-of-centre government, highly unlikely. Moreover, a suffi  cient 
number of spd sympathisers have been aware of the ineff ective strategy 
of the social democrats that increased the incentives to abstain (Blätte 
2010; Egle 2010; Raschke 2010). Moreover, the cdu/csu based its strat-
egy on this strategic dilemma for the social democrats and tried to avoid 
any strong polarisation around issues that would benefi t the spd or the 
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Left Party; so-called asymmetric demobilisation where a ‘boring’ electoral 
campaign would discourage more potential spd voters than voters prefer-
ring a centre-right coalition of the Union and the fdp (Blätte 2010; Jung et 
al. 2010: 37). Th us, the strategies of the two major parties in 2009 are one 
likely reason for the dealignment of spd core voters, who faced no realis-
tic governmental alternative that would match their (social policy) prefer-
ences (see Raschke 2010 and Egle 2010 for more extensive discussions).
 Another possible reason why not all reform-averse social democratic 
core constituents turned to the Left Party is this party’s ambiguous stance 
on socio-cultural issues. While it consists of both libertarian and au-
thoritarian politicians, this issue did not play a major role in the election 
campaigns given the dominance of the socio-cultural dimension. Further-
more, the party still has an ambiguous relationship with the gdr heritage. 
For some former spd supporters, the party is unelectable due to the de 
facto liquidation of the spd in 1946 in the gdr.
 At the time of writing, the partisan realignment and the five-party 
system have been consolidated, as the results of the 2009 federal elec-
tion demonstrated. The Left Party has fostered a realignment of social 
democratic core supporters as a consequence of the welfare state reforms 
implemented by the spd. The Left Party is now an established party at the 
national level, to the left of the spd. It has won seats in almost all Länder, 
something that its predecessor the pds never managed. This remained the 
case even after the popular chairman and former spd chairman, Oskar 
Lafontaine, left federal politics for personal reasons. The Left Party has 
stabilised at around 10 per cent in the polls, indicating that a pure leader-
ship effect can be ruled out.
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This chapter examines what happens when Third Way social democrats 
are confronted with a serious challenger on the authoritarian right. 
Moreover, the chapter analyses the credibility considerations for com-
petitor parties, as mentioned in the theoretical chapter. This will be done 
by examining the electoral consequences for Danish social democracy 
(Socialdemokratiet i Danmark, sd) since the mid-1990s. Replacing a 
centre-right government in 1993, Danish social democracy engaged in 
path-break ing labour market reforms under a Third Way agenda. The 
sd has traditionally faced a competitor on the Left, the Socialist People’s 
Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti, sf). In addition, it has been challenged by 
the right-wing Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, df) since the 
mid-1990s. The sd’s biggest challenger, the mainstream Liberal Party 
 (Venstre), also deserves some attention, as the party has transformed 
ideologically since 1993.
 The sd was one of the early parties to transform itself under a Third 
Way agenda in terms of both ideology and policy, after the party regained 
office in 1993 (Green-Pedersen et al. 2001). It was responsible for three 
rounds of labour market reforms between 1993 and 2001, reforms that 
have been identified as path-breaking (Goul Andersen 2002, 2003a). 
These reforms broke with the decommodification principle, as social se-
curity became more conditional and entitlements were tightened under 
the social democratic government.
 After the sd changed its policy under the new leader and then Prime 
Minister, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, the party lost votes in the period be-
tween 1993 and 2001. It was overtaken by the Liberals in the 2001 election, 
for the first time in decades. In the same election, the Danish People’s 
Party emerged as a serious right-wing competitor, gaining about one out 
of eight votes. The case of Denmark makes it possible to examine (1) the 
potential of a right-wing challenger to foster realignment after recom-
modifying welfare state reforms and (2) the strategic dilemmas of left-
wing competitors. The following expectations will guide the remainder of 
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this chapter. First, with the 2001 election, we would expect the right-wing 
Danish People’s Party to foster a realignment of social democratic core 
constituents, as Danish social democracy had alienated its core constitu-
ents with its welfare policy in the 1990s. Second, we would not expect the 
Socialist People’s Party to be able to capitalise on the social democrats’ 
policy change, as it formed a legislative coalition with the social demo-
cratic minority government. Third, the role of the Liberal Party deserves 
attention, as the party tried to attract social democratic core voters during 
the 1990s.
6.1 The social policy of social democracy in Denmark1
In the post-war era, the Danish social democratic party (sd) introduced 
three party constitutions (sd 1961, 1977, 1992). The party constitutions 
from 1961 and 1977 contain traditional social democratic commitments to 
social policy and the welfare state, in line with the theoretical arguments 
in Chapter 2. At various points, the 1961 and 1977 party constitutions criti-
cise the effects of the pure market allocation of goods and labour. More 
concretely, they argue that income maintenance in case of accidents, sick-
ness, old age and unemployment ought to be secured through universal 
social security schemes and should be formulated as a social right (sd 
1961, 1977).2 Furthermore, both manifestos are committed to solidarity 
and egalitarianism, to be realised through taxation and wage policy im-
proving the living standards of the less well-off. The 1992 manifesto is still 
committed to universal social rights, egalitarianism and solidarity, but 
it departs from the earlier manifesto in that it emphasises individual re-
sponsibility and individual duties in the provision of welfare as the party’s 
principles, and thus indicates the sd’s shift towards a Third Way agenda 
(Petersen 2001: 45; cf. also Christiansen 1994: 97f ). In sum, Danish social 
democracy’s programmatic commitments represent Esping-Andersen’s 
argument about decommodifying welfare policies and Huo’s conception 
of traditional social democratic core values. However, the sd’s transfor-
mation into a Third Way party was already foreshadowed in the 1992 party 
constitution.
 Danish social democracy’s social policy record reveals that the party 
has translated its standpoints on the welfare state into political praxis 
to a remarkable degree. Danish social democrats were forerunners in 
establishing a universalistic welfare state with generous social benefits 
aimed at decommodifying the wage-earner, although in contrast to its 
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Swedish and Norwegian sister parties, the sd never had an overall ma-
jority. This implied a more pragmatic approach in daily politics, includ-
ing compromises with other parties in the development of the Dan-
ish welfare state (for a critical assessment, see Esping-Andersen 1985: 
90ff ).
 In the post-war era, the party came to power in 1953 and formed a 
minority government that, in 1957, realised one of the most important so-
cial policy innovations in the Danish welfare state’s history, the universal 
people’s pension (Folkepension). This new tax-financed pension scheme 
introduced guaranteed minimum benefits to all citizens, as well as higher 
basic amounts compared to the previous legislation. This is also seen as a 
first step in the institutionalisation of universal social rights in Denmark 
(Christensen 1998: 66).
 In the 1960s, the social democrats participated in a reform of the health 
insurance system. Income maintenance in case of sickness was expanded 
to all wage-earners, general flat-rate sickness allowances were introduced 
and eligibility criteria for membership in the health insurance system 
were abolished (Christensen 1998 chap. 5; Petersen 1998: 230ff ). Further 
reforms extended the people’s pension with an early retirement scheme, 
an earnings-related supplement (atp) and more generous benefits. For 
instance, the replacement rate of unemployment benefits was raised to 80 
per cent, and waiting days were abolished.
 After the sd lost its majority in 1968, a centre-right government con-
sisting of the Social Liberals, the Conservatives and the Liberals took 
over. This government replaced private health insurance funds with uni-
versal public health insurance financed by taxes and administered by the 
municipalities (Strukturreform); it went into effect in 1973 (Christensen 
1998: chap. 9, 10; Petersen 1998: 292ff; Plovsing 2007: 59f ). The shift to 
universal public health insurance was largely supported by the social 
democrats.3
 Returning to power in 1971, the social democrats raised the replace-
ment rates of health insurance and unemployment benefits from 80 
to 90 per cent. The maximum benefits were also increased and re-
strictions concerning the eligibility period, as well as waiting days for 
manual workers, were abolished (Christensen 1998: chap. 10; Petersen 
1998: 301f; Plovsing 2007: 59f ). However, due to Denmark’s deterio-
rating economic situation after the first oil crisis in 1973 and the dif-
ficult political situation after the earthquake election in the same year, 
no major social policy innovations took place in the remainder of the 
1970s. The only notable exception was the introduction of the early re-
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tirement pension scheme (Efterlønnen) under a grand coalition in 1979 
(Green-Pedersen 2002b: 69). Social democratic minority governments 
remained in power until 1982, when a centre-right coalition govern-
ment took over.
 The new government tried to impose austerity measures, including a 
freeze on social security benefits. It was fiercely criticised by the sd (see 
Green-Pedersen 2002a: 115), and the party regained strength among its 
core supporters (Christiansen 1994: 97f ). Despite its criticism of the cuts 
and the party’s clear opposition profile in the 1980s, it took the social 
democrats until 1993 to regain power, in coalition with the Social Liberals, 
but with a new stance on welfare, to be discussed below.
 Summing up, the sd’s ideological commitment to the welfare state and 
its social policy record match the theoretical arguments on social democ-
racy discussed above. The Danish social democratic party had a strong 
commitment to decommodifying welfare policies and put this into politi-
cal praxis to a considerable degree in the period after 1950.4 Even though 
the party was challenged by the sf early on, it pioneered the institution-
alisation of universal social rights in the Danish welfare state and was 
responsible for very generous levels of income maintenance in case of old 
age, sickness and unemployment.5 Since this is in line with Esping-Ander-
sen’s decommodification thesis, we would expect the sd to have drawn on 
the support of particular social classes as the party’s core constituency in 
the second half of the 20th century.
6.2 The traditional core constituency of Danish social democracy
In line with the theoretical propositions outlined in Chapter 2, we can as-
sume that the sd aligned with particular social strata as the party’s core 
constituency. Table 6.1 shows the vote choices among classes conceptual-
ised as the social democratic core constituency after 1973. The table large-
ly confirms the theoretical expectations regarding the core constituents 
of social democratic parties, as well as the electoral implications of the 
sd’s social policy record presented above. Even though the sd (like other 
established parties) experienced a crisis with and after the earthquake 
election in 1973, the party has traditionally enjoyed considerable support 
among particular voter groups forming the party’s core constituency of 
workers and lower white-collar employees.
 Th e party’s support among lower-white collar employees was not as pro-
nounced as among the working class, but the sd could nevertheless draw
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Table 6.1  Party shares for selected parties by selected social classes, Denmark 1973-
2005
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1990 1994 1998 2001 2005
SD RNM n.a. 32 39 38 25 25 24 29 36 34 34 27 33
Skilled 41 51 59 46 37 45 34 40 55 44 37 34 27
Unskilled 57 45 57 56 59 47 44 44 57 45 44 33 34
Venstre RNM n.a. 20  7 10 12 11  7 10 13 23 21 38 29
Skilled 15 13  4  5  7  6  5  5  5 21 24 19 27
Unskilled  1 15  4  6 10  7  8  8  8 18 20 31 23
SF RNM n.a.  5  9  7 11 22 26 22 13 11 13  7  5
Skilled 11  2 12 12 18 23 23 20  2  5  2  5  4
Unskilled  6  3  3  4  8 13 20 19  9  8 10  3  3
DF RNM - - - - - - - - - -  5 10 14
Skilled - - - - - - - - - - 13 24 21
Unskilled - - - - - - - - - -  6 19 21
Source: Own calculations based on Danish election studies 1973-2005.
Notes: RNM: Routine non-manual, Skilled: skilled workers, Unskilled: unskilled workers, n.a.: 
information not available.
on the most support from this class until 1998. As already pointed out by 
Esping-Andersen (1985), Danish social democracy failed to attract parts 
of the white-collar electorate due to its pragmatic policymaking style and 
the presence and electoral appeal of the sf, which attracted parts of the 
new middle class.
 In the mid-1980s, the sf also managed to attract some working-class 
votes, when both major left parties had been in opposition to the centre-
right government and mobilised on welfare issues. Afterwards, the sf 
developed into a more pronounced left-libertarian party mobilising on 
issues such as minority rights, equal rights and environmental protection, 
even though the party retained its pro-welfare stance (Arter 2003; Spier 
& Wirries 2007).
 The sd continued to recover its previous levels of electoral support 
among the working class until the early 1990s, whereas the sf did not 
maintain its former level of support (and even lost ground after tolerating 
the minority government coalition led by the social democrats in the mid-
1990s and after wards). Similar tendencies can be observed for vote shares 
in general.
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 Table 6.2 reveals that the sd typically achieved at least 30 per cent of 
the votes after the 1973 election and also recovered from a low during 
the 1980s. However, the striking feature is the decline after 1998, as the 
party failed to reach the 30 per cent mark in three consecutive elections. 
It also lost its position as the strongest party to the Liberals for the first 
time since 1920. The sf, the sd’s main left-wing challenger, was not able 
to benefit from the Nyrup government’s reforms, but gained considerably 
in the 2007 election under a bourgeois coalition government, something 
that will be discussed further in the conclusion. The right-wing Danish 
People’s Party emerged with the 1998 election and made its breakthrough 
in 2001, after the social democratic government had implemented all 
three rounds of labour market reforms. This development and the elec-
toral change after 1993 must be seen in the general light of the welfare 
state reforms to be described in the next section.
Table 6.2 Vote shares in Danish general elections, 1973-2007
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1990 1994 1998 2001 2005 2007
SD 25.6 29.9 37.0 38.3 32.9 31.6 29.3 29.8 37.4 34.6 35.9 29.1 25.8 25.5
Venstre 12.3 23.3 12.0 12.5 11.3 12.1 10.5 11.8 15.8 23.3 24.0 31.3 29.0 26.2
KF 9.2 5.5 8.5 12.5 14.5 23.4 20.8 19.3 16.0 15.0 8.9 9.1 10.3 10.4
RV 11.2 7.1 3.6 5.4 5.1 5.5 6.2 5.6 3.5 4.6 3.9 5.2 9.2 5.1
SF 6.0 5.0 3.9 5.9 11.3 11.5 14.6 13.0 8.3 7.3 7.6 6.4 6.0 13.0
FrP 15.9 13.6 14.6 11.0 8.9 3.6 4.8 9.0 6.4 6.4 2.4 0.6 - -
CD 7.8 2.2 6.4 3.2 8.3 4.6 4.8 4.7 5.1 2.8 4.3 1.8 1.0 -
KrF/KD 4.0 5.3 3.4 2.6 2.3 2.7 2.4 2.0 2.3 1.9 2.5 2.3 1.7 0.9
DF - - - - - - - - - - 7.4 12.0 13.3 13.9
EL - - - - - - - - 1.7 3.1 2.7 2.4 3.4 2.2
Turnout 88.7 88.2 88.7 85.6 83.2 88.4 86.7 85.7 82.8 84.3 86.0 87.1 84.5 86.6
Source: www.folketinget.dk.
Note: Party shares do not always add up to 100 per cent, as minor parties are omitted.
6.3 The labour market reforms under social democratic governments, 
1993-2001
As indicated above, the sd began its transformation when the party was 
in opposition with the programme ‘The New Century’ (Det Nye Århun-
drede) in 1992, and further working programmes and electoral manifes-
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tos that emphasised almp. After having failed to obtain a parliamentary 
majority with other parties via coalition or toleration agreements in the 
elections until 1990, due to its pronounced left-wing stance, the sd also 
changed its strategy in daily politics. The party began to present itself as 
a responsible party in terms of economic and fiscal policy. Still in oppo-
sition after the 1990 election, the sd cooperated with the Conservative-
Liberal government on the 1992 and 1993 budgets to attract future sup-
port from the small centre parties (Green-Pedersen 2002a: 121ff ). The 
strategy proved successful in 1993, when the centre-right government 
stepped down after a scandal and the sd was able to form a majority 
government with three small centre parties (rv, cd, krf), headed by the 
new party leader Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (ibid; Green-Pedersen & van 
Kersbergen 2002: 516).
 Before I describe the social democratic government’s labour market re-
forms after 1993, some explanatory remarks on the Danish unemployment 
benefit system are needed. The Danish unemployment benefit system is a 
voluntary insurance scheme administered by unemployment funds with 
close ties to the trade unions (Green-Pedersen 2002a: 70). The scheme is 
mainly financed through general taxation, but also through employer and 
member contributions. The nominal replacement rate is 90 per cent and 
hence very generous, but due to the existence of a maximum amount, only 
wage earners with lower incomes have an actual replacement rate cor-
responding to this. Actual replacement rates are also contingent on the 
indexation rule used for the calculation of benefits, where coupling to real 
wage development is the rule.
 The sd’s transformation became increasingly visible in terms of practi-
cal policies. The government implemented tax and labour market reforms 
in 1993.6 The labour market reform reflected the sd’s new stance: it em-
phasised activation and employability principles, and eligibility criteria 
for unemployment benefits were tightened, as was the conditionality for 
benefit reception when participation in activation programmes became 
mandatory after two years of benefits. At the election in 1994 the sd lost 
both votes and its parliamentary majority, as one of its coalition partners, 
the Christian Democrats, failed to pass the 2 per cent threshold. Never-
theless, the sd survived and stayed in power, now as a minority govern-
ment (together with the rv and cd).
 Between 1995 and 1997, the activation principle was reinforced as the 
young and old unemployed, as well as previous recipients of social as-
sistance, became subject to activation programmes. The latter also be-
came subject to compulsory activation (e.g. Goul Andersen 2002; Green-
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Pedersen 2002b: 74ff; Merkel et al. 2008: 201; Goul Andersen & Carstensen 
2009: 77ff ). This also implied a retrenchment of unemployment benefits 
for the persons concerned (cf. Green-Pedersen et al. 2001: 315). The elec-
tions in 1998 allowed the sd to continue in power with the Social Liberals.7
 After the 1998 election, the sd launched a third round of labour market 
reforms. Once more, the eligibility period for unemployment benefits was 
curtailed, to four years now, making activation mandatory after one year 
on benefits. Further measures concerned activation of the unemployed 
above the age of 60, earlier activation of unemployed young people, and 
a broader definition of suitable work. Breaking with former promises, the 
social democrats implemented a reform of the early retirement scheme 
(efterlønsreformen). This implied a moderate reduction of benefits and 
somewhat tighter eligibility criteria to increase incentives to remain in the 
labour market (Goul Andersen 2002: 71).8 Table 6.3 provides an overview 
of the labour market reforms implemented by social democratic-led gov-
ernments between 1993 and 2001.
 Th e summary of labour market reforms in Denmark under social democ-
ratic governments after 1993 clearly illustrates tightened eligibility crite-
ria. The main focus was the activation of benefit recipients, as benefits 
became more and more conditional on participating in activation and 
employability programmes. Similarly, suitability criteria were sharpened 
and sanctions were introduced for people failing to take part in these 
measures. Another important element is the fact that older unemployed 
people also became subject to those principles. Th e unpopular reform of 
the early retirement scheme is one example of the strengthening of em-
ployability principles to increase incentives to remain in the labour mar-
ket, including for older people. Th us, by strengthening conditionality and 
limiting eligibility for benefi ts, the sd’s labour market policy between 1993 
and 2001 showed clear signs of recommodifi cation, contrary to traditional 
social democratic principles (cf. Goul Andersen 2002: 76). Access to ben-
efi ts was no longer guaranteed through rights and universal schemes, but 
depended on settlements of claims and was accompanied by an individual 
obligation to re-enter the labour market as quickly as possible.
 Expressing the effects of the labour market reforms in quantitative 
terms requires some qualifications, due to the nature of the reforms and 
data limitations. First, we have to rely on data reporting summary meas-
ures of replacement rates, that is, Scruggs (2006) and the oecd’s sum-
mary measure (oecd 2010a). The latter includes a break in the time series, 
which does not allow comparison of replacement rates under the previous 
centre-right and the social democratic government. Nor is it possible to 
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Table 6.3  Classifi cation of labour market reforms introduced by SD-led governments, 
1993-2001




1993/4: Labour Market 
Reform I 
Eligibility period for unemployment benefi ts 
shortened to 7 years; mandatory activation 




Tighter criteria to requalify for benefi ts 
by taking part in activation or through 
subsidised employment; 6 months of ordinary 





Introduction of compulsory individual action 




Rights for unemployed aged 50-59 extended Membership D
1995/6:  Labour 
Market Reform II
Eligibility period for unemployment benefi ts 
shortened to 5 years; mandatory activation 





52 weeks of ordinary employment within 3 
years needed to qualify for unemployment 




Compulsory activation after 2 years Behaviour/
Conduct
R
Tighter eligibility criteria for unemployed under 
25; mandatory participation in education or job 
training after 26 weeks on benefi ts implying 





Tighter job suitability criteria for those 
unemployed for longer than 6 months; 





1997/8: Law on active 
social policy to replace 
bistandsloven
Compulsory activation for people on social 
assistance introduced (bistandsloven as social 





1998/9:  Labour 
Market Reform III
Eligibility period for unemployment benefi ts 
shortened to 4 years; mandatory activation 
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1993-2001




Activation mandatory after one year of 
unemployment; mandatory activation after 
6 months for young unemployed; tighter 
defi nition of suitable work after 3 months of 
unemployment; registration at unemployment 







Introduction of earmarked contribution to 





part of Labour Market 
Reform III
Contribution period to obtain early retirement 




Introduction of incentives to remain in labour 
market if claim to early retirement is rejected; 
de facto increase of age for early retirement 






Standard rate of early retirement allowance 
decreased to 91 per cent of maximum 




Sources: Goul-Andersen (2002); Green-Pedersen (2002a, 2002b) Clasen & Clegg (2007); 
Dingeldey (2007); Plovsing (2007: chap. 4). 
Notes: The classifi cation of reforms in terms of level of conditionality and direction draws on 
Clasen & Clegg’s scheme (2007); R: recommodifi cation, D: decommodifi cation.
use oecd data on replacement rates for particular types of unemploy-
ment, as some reforms took place before the oecd began to gather the 
respective data and issue reports based on this data.
 Second, some scholars have argued that the Danish reforms did not 
intend to reduce replacement rates per se, but aimed at activation and 
employability via tighter eligibility criteria and more intensive condition-
ality (e.g. Goul Andersen 2002). For instance, Klitgaard (2002: 188) char-
acterised the Danish labour market reforms as creeping disentitlements, 
as the reforms did not directly retrench the benefits as such, but would 
have lasting effects through changed eligibility criteria and conditional-
ity. In this respect, the social democrats did not reverse the effects of 
the previous centre-right government’s decisions to temporarily freeze 
maximum benefit amounts and to modify the indexation rules for unem-
ployment benefits. Likewise, Green-Pedersen (2002b: 70) argues that for-
mal replacement rates do not mirror the actual replacement rates in the 
case of Danish labour market reforms. This would imply only marginal 
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decreases of replacement rates, but Lyle Scruggs’ data (2006) neverthe-
less show some decline in replacement rates in Denmark over the period 
under consideration.
Table 6.4 Summary measures of benefi t entitlements for Denmark, 1989-2002
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2002/03a
Replacement rate 
(Scruggs) 70 70 69 67 65 64 63 62
Replacement rate 
(OECD) - - - 65 62 61 51 50
Source: Scruggs (2006); OECD (2010a).
Notes: The OECD summary measure is defi ned as the average of the gross unemployment 
benefi t replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family situations and three durations of 
unemployment. Bold fi gures represent post-reform years.
a. for 2002 Scruggs (2006), for 2003 OECD (2010b).
In Table 6.4, Scruggs’ data indicate that average replacement rates gradu-
ally declined under the social democratic government over the period 
when the three rounds of labour market reforms were launched.9 The 
same is true for the oecd measure, but the break in the time series be-
tween 1993 and 1995 calls for caution. This confirms that the social demo-
crats in Denmark might not have targeted replacement rates as such, but 
that they were reduced over the years via the reforms. The reforms may 
also have effects that are only visible in economic downturns (cf. Klit-
gaard 2002: 188) or due to modifications of the indexation rules, which are 
not easily detectable using the sources above.
 In sum, the labour market reforms implemented by the Danish social 
democratic government from 1993 to 2001 clearly indicated recommodi-
fi cation in terms of conditionality and employability. Even though it was 
unclear whether the reforms were actually responsible for lower replace-
ment rates, the substance of the three rounds of labour market reforms 
clearly emphasised employability and tighter conditions for benefi t entitle-
ments, including mandatory activation. Th is made benefi t recipients more 
depend ent on participation in the labour market or activation schemes to 
take up work. By engaging in recommodifying reforms after 1993, the sd 
thus changed its traditional stance on the welfare state. We would expect 
this departure from traditional social democratic policy commitments, as 
formulated by Esping-Andersen and outlined in Chapter 2, to be accompa-
nied by a dealignment of the party’s core constituency. Th is will be exam-
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ined once we have outlined the context of party competition in Denmark in 
the reform period, to hypothesise the expected pattern of electoral change.
6.4 Party competition and welfare state reforms, 1993-2001
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, two major blocs and three centre par-
ties played a decisive role in governmental formation in Denmark (e.g. 
Damgaard 2003). The left-wing bloc included the Social Democratic Party 
(sd), the Socialist People’s Party (sf), and, after 1990, the small radical-left 
Red-Green Alliance (el).10 The right-wing bloc was composed of the Lib-
eral Party (Venstre), the Conservatives, (Det Konservative Folkeparti) and 
the far-right Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet, FrP). The centre parties 
were the Social Liberals (Radikale Venstre, rv), the Centre-Democrats 
(Centrumdemokraterne, cd) and the Christian Democrats (Kristeligt 
Folkeparti, krf). As neither bloc had a majority after 1973, the three cen-
tre parties were decisive for the formation of coalition governments or for 
parliamentary support for minority governments, the latter being the rule 
in Denmark.
 After more than a decade in opposition, the sd was able to form a ma-
jority government in 1993 during the electoral term 1990-94, as the three 
centre parties withdrew support for the Conservative-Liberal govern-
ment as a consequence of a scandal and shifted sides to endorse the social 
democrats. This was also an effect of the sd’s departure from its more 
pronounced left-wing stance in the 1980s, where the party tried to form 
a government with the sf. The attempt failed, as neither party won a par-
liamentary majority nor was able to get support from the centre parties. 
With its new leader, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, and a new party constitution, 
the sd became more moderate and did not include the socialists in its 
coalition this time.
 As mentioned above, the sd-led government implemented three la-
bour market reform packages in the years between 1993 and 2001. Since 
the government’s parliamentary majority position lasted only until 1994, 
the government had to use the two left-wing parties, the sf and the Red-
Green Alliance, as support parties (Bille 1999; Nielsen 1999; Green-Ped-
ersen 2002a: 124). In welfare and labour market reforms, the government 
also got parliamentary support from the bourgeois opposition parties 
(Green-Pedersen 2001: 976, 2002a: 125). In light of the theoretical propo-
sitions on the role of left competitors for the electoral prospects of Third 
Way social democrats, the sf deserves particular attention, as the party 
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obviously represents the type of dangerous left-socialist competitor de-
scribed in the theoretical chapter. Though the sf was an established left-
wing contender for the Danish social democrats, the party obviously did 
not benefit from the reforms and even suffered a decline, as Tables 6.1 
and 6.2 indicate.11
 However, the sf’s strategy under the social democratic minority gov-
ernment should have made it difficult for the party to capitalise on the 
welfare state reforms and pull social democratic core voters further 
to the left. This was due to the form of bloc competition in Denmark 
between left-wing and right-wing parties (e.g. Kitschelt 2001, Green- 
Pedersen 2001, 2002a).12 The socialists were integrated in the left bloc 
and had been a supporting party throughout the sd-led governments 
after 1994. Moreover, by 2000 the ‘sf was now involved in a large number 
of agreements with the sd-rv-government and had [...] attained the sta-
tus of the most central supporter for the government’ (Mortensen 2011: 
303, own translation). Hence, the sf had limited room to attack the social 
democrats by engaging in a more pronounced opposition strategy. The 
latter implied the risk of toppling the government and creating a bour-
geois majority if the centre parties were to shift sides again (cf. Bille 1999; 
Nielsen 1999: 68ff ), and this was not in the sf’s interest. This distin-
guishes the sf from the German Left Party, which had been in opposition 
to social democratic majority governments, allowing it to engage in pure 
vote-seeking strategies in times of welfare reform. Accordingly, the sf 
leadership was criticised for being too compliant in its cooperation with 
the social democratic government (cf. Spier & Wirries 2007: 104; see 
also Mortensen 2011: chap. 17).13 Neither did the party threaten the social 
democrats with a withdrawal of its parliamentary support as a conse-
quence of the reforms. Thus although it was a dangerous challenger in 
principle, we would not expect the sf to have gained social democratic 
core votes between 1994 and 2001, since its strategy had seriously dam-
aged its credibility.
 By contrast, we would expect a right-wing authoritarian party, the 
Danish People’s Party, to attract this voter segment thanks to the reforms. 
The party was founded in 1995 as a splinter of the declining Progress Par-
ty. The df largely absorbed the FrP’s votes in its first appearance in the 
1998 Folketing election (Nielsen 1999). In contrast to the market-liberal 
Progress Party, the df developed centrist views on socio-economic is-
sues (Goul Andersen 2003b: 293, 2007: 37f ). In line with Kitschelt’s work 
(2003, 2004), the party can be characterised as social protectionist. We 
would expect this to allow the party to woo voters who are interested in 
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maintaining core welfare programmes with a programmatic and populist 
agenda (Nielsen 1999; Rydgren 2004). The party also presented itself as a 
social corrective for the Liberal-Conservative government after 2001, for 
which the df was the supporting party (Spier & Wirries 2007: 101f ). Thus, 
the df was a competitor for the sd on the economic dimension, in line 
with the literature on social protectionist parties, which argues that this 
type of party is able to attract social democratic core constituents.
 Moreover, like its ‘mother party’, the FrP, the df represents authoritar-
ian positions on socio-cultural matters, particularly on immigration. We 
would expect this to allow the party to make inroads among dissatisfied 
social democratic core constituents after the social democrats had aban-
doned their traditional welfare policy, since we would expect these voters 
to hold views closer to the df on non-economic issues, especially immi-
gration in the Danish case. Therefore, the df should be the most danger-
ous competitor for the social democrats and their backing among their 
core constituency.
 Another development in Danish party politics during this period needs 
to be addressed, namely the modernisation of the Liberal Party during 
the 1990s. The party had traditionally advocated market-liberal principles 
and represented farmers’ interests, but it began a modernisation process 
under Uffe Ellemann Jensen to attract new voter segments (Mortensen 
2008: chap. 5). Vote shares increased, but the party did not win office in 
the 1998 election. Anders Fogh Rasmussen replaced Ellemann Jensen as 
leader after the election. He intensified the change process and his party 
abandoned its pronounced market-liberal views (Qvortrup 2002: 205, 
210). Moreover, the party committed itself to the Danish welfare state, in 
contrast to its former programmatic stance (Mortensen 2008: 114ff ). This 
went in line with an explicit appeal to social democratic voters, claiming 
that the sd no longer represented their interests (ibid: 111f ).
 The liberal Venstre party also changed the socio-cultural aspects of its 
agenda after Fogh Rasmussen became party leader. After 1998, the party 
adopted a tougher stance on immigration and law and order issues (Qvor-
trup 2002: 206f; Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup 2008). One particular aim 
was to accommodate social democratic voters and limit possible losses to 
the df (cf. Mortensen 2008: 141ff ). Hence, the empirical analysis has to 
inspect whether Venstre’s turn towards a catch-all electoral strategy and 
the fact that the party explicitly targeted social democratic voters on so-
cial policy, as well as on immigration, led to gains.
 Having discussed the main features of party competition and the role of 
Danish competitor parties when the social democratic party reformed the 
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welfare state, I now formulate the expected electoral consequences. First, 
I do not expect the Socialist People’s Party to benefit from the recommod-
ifying reforms of the sd government and to foster a realignment of social 
democratic core voters, given the party’s lack of credibility. This makes 
the Danish case a special case, where credibility considerations affecting 
left-wing competitors to social democracy should limit the propensity to 
foster a left realignment.
 Second, it is expected that the Danish People’s Party would represent a 
more dangerous competitor for social democracy, as the party could fos-
ter a realignment of its core voters. This is because the df could woo so-
cial democratic voters with its social protectionist appeal and its sceptical 
position on immigration, in line with attitudes of social democratic core 
constituents. The party is the type of right-wing party that constitutes a 
serious danger for Third Way social democrats. An additional aspect to 
be examined empirically is gains for the Liberal Party, Venstre, among the 
social democratic voter base, as the party moderated its ideological posi-
tion on the economic dimension and adopted a stricter view on immigra-
tion and other domestic policy issues.
6.5 Data and variables
The data source for the analyses below is the Danish Election surveys 
for the 1994-2005 elections, which are used in both the descriptive and 
the statistical part of the analysis. The descriptive part first presents the 
attitudes of social democratic core voters towards potential or actual re-
forms that had been implemented. The respondents were asked about 
their attitudes towards tightened eligibility and suitability criteria as well 
as the generosity of benefits before the second and third package of la-
bour market reforms, which actually implemented such measures. The 
first round was moderate, as explained above, since only the eligibility 
period for benefits was shortened from eight to (a still generous) seven 
years.14 These items capture the electorate’s attitudes towards reform pro-
posals before the social democrats actually implemented measures that 
came very close to the proposals of the 1994 election survey. Afterwards, I 
present the strength of the alignment of social democracy’s core constitu-
ency during the period of investigation. Social democratic core voters are 
conceptualised as workers and lower white-collar employees that voted 
for the sd in the last election, as captured by the vote recall question in 
the data sets.
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 The statistical part uses a multinomial logistic regression model with 
party choice as the dependent variable. The party choice variable consists 
of all relevant parties for the period of investigation, including abstention. 
For reasons of space, the analyses will report only the results for the theo-
retically important parties. The statistical analysis focuses on the 1998 
and 2001 elections, which took place after the second and third round of 
labour market reforms. For the 1998 election, I used a proxy variable, ask-
ing whether a social democratic or a centre-right government is best at 
securing a balance between taxes and welfare, as a measure for attitudes 
towards reforms. The data set for the 2001 election contains an item that 
directly asks the respondents about their attitudes towards the Nyrup 
government’s social policy, which is a fair measure of the attitudes to-
wards this government’s welfare state reforms. These items are used as an 
independent variable in the logistic regression models. I also controlled 
for the immigration issue as a second independent variable, since this is 
often seen as an explanation for the df’s rise after 1995. This was done 
by introducing a variable measuring whether immigration was seen as a 
threat to the Danish national character. The rationale is that immigration 
had been a salient issue in general and the most important socio-cultural 
issue in the period under consideration. Many authors have pointed to 
the immigration issue as the main explanation for the increasing support 
for the df (Qvortrup 2002; cf. the volumes of Andersen et al. 1999; Goul 
Andersen & Borre 2003; Goul Andersen et al. 2007).
6.6 Results
 Attitudes towards reform proposals and party choice after 1993
As a first step, I present the attitudes towards potential reforms among 
three groups of voters in the 1994 election survey in Table 6.5. Except for 
the action plans that had been introduced in 1993 and reinforced and ex-
panded to other unemployed groups later, all of these proposals mirrored 
the actual reforms to come in the second and third round of labour mar-
kets reforms quite well. The results demonstrate that it is the social demo-
cratic core constituency that disliked the reform proposals the most. For 
all four proposals, this voter group was always most sceptical regarding 
a proposed tightening of eligibility criteria and benefit cuts. Given that 
these proposals found their equivalents in the labour market reforms to 
be implemented later, we can – in line with the theoretical arguments – 
expect the sd core voters to punish their party for these types of reforms.
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Table 6.5 Attitudes towards labour market reform proposals by voter group, percentage 
points
Tighter suitability criteria: force unemployed to take up work 
far from where they live [V164]
Voter group Good proposal Bad proposal Don’t know Total
Non-core constituency 19.4 74.3 6.3 100
Non-aligned core constituency 12.3 77.2 10.4 100
Aligned core constituency 9.9 85.1 5.0 100
N=660 Chi 12.5 P<.05
Set up individual plans of action for each unemployed 
person [V167]
Good proposal Bad proposal Don’t know Total
Non-core constituency 31.4 35.7 32.9 100
Non-aligned core constituency 27.6 30.3 42.2 100
Aligned core constituency 25.4 46.2 28.4 100
N=660 Chi 14.9 P<.05
Limit young people’s access to unemployment benefi ts 
[V168]
Good proposal Bad proposal Don’t know Total
Non-core constituency 28.2 57.6 14.2 100
Non-aligned core constituency 23.4 57.5 19.1 100
Aligned core constituency 14.7 71.8 13.6 100
N=660 Chi 13.7 P<.05
Reduce benefi ts after one year of unemployment [V169]
Good proposal Bad proposal Don’t know Total
Non-core constituency 32.4 56.1 11.6 100
Non-aligned core constituency 20.1 66.1 13.8 100
Aligned core constituency 15.9 79.3 4.8 100
N=660 Chi 26.5 P<.01
Source: Own calculations based on the respective items from Danish Election Study 1994.
Table 6.6 reports the vote shares among voters conceptualised as the 
social democratic core constituency and the remaining voters for the 
parties of theoretical relevance. The most striking feature is the sd’s se-
vere decline among its core constituents and among the non-core con-
stituency after 1998. However, the major difference is a clear pattern of 
a realignment of parts of the social democratic core constituency with 
the Danish People’s Party in this period. The df more than doubled 
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its share between 1998 and 2001, and retained its support among this 
voter group in the 2005 election. This does not apply to the non-core 
constituents, where the party only made moderate gains in 2005. The 
Liberal Party also won reasonable support among the social democratic 
voter base in 2001, bringing the party level with the social democrats. 
In contrast to the Danish People’s Party, however, this support declined 
in 2005.
Table 6.6 Party shares and non-voting among social democratic core constituency, 
Denmark 1998-2005 (per cent)
Core constituency 1994 1998 2001 2005
SD 36.5 42.5 28.9 29.6
Venstre 20.1 20.2 28.7 23.9
SF 8.7 8.2 4.8 3.7
DF - (5.7 for FrP) 7.4 15.8 17.0
All other parties 19.6 17.3 15.3 17.8
Non-voters 9.5 4.6 6.5 7.9
Non-core constituency
SD 13.3 31.4 23.6 18.4
Venstre 36.4 27.7 33.9 30.7
SF 8.9 6.2 7.3 7.2
DF - (4.1 for FrP) 6.5 6.9 8.9
All other parties 34.3 25.0 26.1 31.1
Non-voters 3.2 3.2 2.3 3.3
Source: Danish Election Studies 1994-2005.
Note: The percentage points indicate what percentage of a voter group chose a particular party 
or abstained in the respective elections from 1994-2005. Figures do not always add up to 100 
per cent due to rounding.
The two left-wing parties, the sf and the Red-Green Alliance (latter not 
shown), did not benefit from the social democratic decline and by and 
large retained their support among both groups or even declined, as the 
figures for the sf indicate. In line with expectations, no left competitor 
was able to attract social democratic core voters after 1994 or 1998, even 
though the social democrats engaged in reforms that went against the 
core constituency’s interests. There were some gains for the group of oth-
er parties among the non-core voters in 2005, half of which can be attrib-
uted to gains for the Social Liberals.
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 Non-voting slightly increased among the social democratic core elec-
torate after 1998, but not in a way that shows a significant dealignment 
towards the non-voter camp. However, I do not focus on non-voting ex-
plicitly in the remainder of the analysis, since all analyses below do not 
yield any significant effect as regards to increased non-voting among 
social democratic core voters due to the reforms. This differentiates the 
Danish case from the British case in particular, but also the German case 
analysed above, and will be further addressed in Chapter 8. Moreover, 
turnout rates in Denmark remained in a rather narrow interval between 
84.3 and 87.1 per cent in the period examined in this chapter, yielding no 
trend at all (cf. Table 6.2).
 Alignment of SD’s core constituency, 1994-98
As outlined above, the social democrats continued to reform the Danish 
welfare state in the electoral period 1994-98, especially the labour mar-
ket. This period was also characterised by the emergence of the Danish 
People’s Party, which was somewhat marginalised in Danish politics in its 
early years. Left-wing parties were the parliamentary basis of the sd-rv 
government in this period, and we would thus also expect them to have 
limited mobilising power among social democratic core voters due to 
their stance on socio-cultural matters. To measure the attitudes towards 
reforms in this period, I used the respondents’ assessment of whether 
the incumbent social democratic government was best at securing a fair 
balance between tax burden and social security. The rationale behind 
this analysis was to assess whether the social democrats had already lost 
a significant share of their core voters in the 1998 election and to de-
termine whether welfare policy played a large role in core constituents’ 
choice of party, even though the item on welfare policy is only a proxy, 
as discussed above. The results are expressed as predicted probabilities 
in Table 6.7.15
 The figures show that the social democrats were able to mobilise al-
most 90 per cent of their aligned core constituency in the 1998 election, 
so long as they were seen as the party to secure the right balance between 
taxes and social security (left-hand side of panel). As long as core voters 
attributed this image to the social democrats, no other party was able to 
pull a considerable share of core constituents away from them. With 5.1 
per cent, the sf was the only party in this group to achieve more than 5 per 
cent.
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Table 6.7 Predicted probabilities of vote choice for attitudes towards welfare policy 
among aligned core constituents, 1998 (per cent)
Balance tax welfare best secured by 
SD: yes
Balance tax welfare best secured by 
SD: no
SD 88.6 66.0 *
Venstre 0.2 5.0 *
SF 5.1 3.9
DF 0.4 6.8 *
Non-voting 2.1 3.7
Source: Predicted probabilities obtained from multinomial logistic regression model in Table 
A4.2 using Clarify. Note: The number of simulations to obtain the probabilities was set to 1,000. 
Figures do not always add up to 100 per cent as not all parties are listed in table. * p<.05. for 
diff erence between the columns.
Turning to the group of core constituents who do not think that a social 
democratic government is securing a fair balance between the tax bur-
den and social security (right-hand side of panel), support for the social 
democ rats has declined, but the party still attracts two out of three aligned 
core constituents. Here, the Danish People’s Party made some modest but 
significant gains. Not surprisingly, these gains concern voters who are 
sceptical about a social democratic government and concerned about im-
migration, but the figure does not exceed 10 per cent (not shown). The 
Liberal Party now mobilises 5 per cent of former sd core voters, which is 
a significantly different result compared to the party’s performance in the 
other group (0.2 per cent). The sf gains almost the same share of former 
social democratic voters if they do not see sd as securing a fair balance 
between taxes and social security. This is not surprising, as the sf sup-
ported a social democratic minority government in this period. Other 
parties also benefit if voters are disillusioned with the sd’s ability to se-
cure a fair balance between taxes and social security; the Conservatives 
are the biggest winner, with 4.6 per cent (not shown).
 The results for 1994-98 suggest that the social democrats retained large 
shares of their core constituents despite these constituents’ doubts that 
the party could secure a fair balance between taxes and welfare. There 
was no clear sign of a realignment of core voters due to dissatisfaction 
with the party’s welfare policy, as reflected in the stable electoral support 
for the sd between 1994 and 1998 shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. However, 
the analysis also revealed the first gains for the df and the Liberals among 
voters with negative views of the social democratic welfare policy.
RESULTS
 Alignment of SD’s core constituency and breakthrough of the Danish 
People’s Party, 1998-2001
As discussed above, the period between 1998 and 2001 comprised anoth-
er round of welfare state reforms by the social democratic government. 
In contrast to 1994 and 1998, we would now expect this to account for 
the declining support for the social democrats and the rise of the Danish 
People’s Party, as the descriptive analyses above suggest. As mentioned, 
the Danish election study for 2001 includes a variable asking respond ents 
to assess the welfare policy of the incumbent social democratic govern-
ment. This was used to construct a term indicating whether the voters 
had a negative or non-negative opinion of the Nyrup Rasmussen govern-
ment’s welfare policy in the 1998-2001 term. The item used for the im-
migration issue is a dummy indicating whether immigration is seen as a 
threat to the Danish national character. The voter groups are identified 
in the same way as in the previous section. Party choice is the dependent 
variable. The results for the relevant parties are shown in Table 6.8. I ran 
two models; the first one only examined attitudes towards the govern-
ment’s welfare policy and the second controlled for immigration, as this 
is by far the most prominent rival explanation for electoral change in this 
period.
 In the upper half of the table, the figures demonstrate first that the 
social democrats would lose substantially if core voters were disaffected 
with the welfare policy of the incumbent social democratic government. 
The left-hand side of the panel shows that those who were satisfied stuck 
to the social democrats with a probability of at least two-thirds, while 
a negative attitude towards immigration only causes moderate losses, as 
seen in the second column in the lower half of the table. Support for the 
sd dropped heavily to 21 per cent among core voters who were displeased 
with the party’s social policy. In line with expectations, the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party drew significant support from former social democratic core 
voters who opposed the sd’s welfare policy. By contrast, the socialists were 
not able to benefit among this segment of voters. Another striking effect 
is the strong gains for the Liberals. Almost one out of three disaffected 
social democratic core voters shifted to the Liberals in this election. The 
results provide strong evidence for the suspected electoral effects of the 
reforms.16 As mentioned, immigration was the most common explanation 
for electoral change in the period under review.
 The lower half of Table 6.8 shows that controlling for immigration 
does not change the quintessence of these findings. The sd’s losses were 
due more to attitudes towards its welfare policy than to whether voters
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Table 6.8 Predicted probabilities of vote choice for attitudes towards immigration and 
welfare policy among aligned core constituents (per cent)
Party Choice Assessment of welfare policy: 
good/neither good nor bad






All other parties 6.5 14.4
Non-voting 3.5 7.0
Assessment of welfare policy: 
good/neither good nor bad
Assessment of welfare
policy: bad










SD 75.0 68.5 27.3* 16.3*
Venstre 6.7 11.1 30.4* 32.8*
SF 6.0 2.2 5.8 1.3
DF 1.3 8.6 + 7.5* 32.8*
All other parties 7.6 5.6 20.8 10.5
Non-voting 3.5 3.9 8.2 6.3
Source: Predicted probabilities obtained from multinomial logistic regression model in using 
Clarify.
Note: The number of simulations to obtain the probabilities was set to 1,000. Figures do not 
always sum up 100 per cent due to rounding. * p<.05 for diff erence to column on the very left; 
+ indicates diff erences in the left-hand side panel.
regard immigration as a threat. There was no difference for the sf con-
cerning welfare, whereas the party seems to have been disliked by core
voters concerned about immigration. This may indicate that the party’s 
libertarian stance also mattered. The Danish People’s Party could only 
mobilise strongly on the immigration issue if social democratic core vot-
ers were alienated by the sd-led government’s welfare policy. The respec-
tive category for the df can be clearly distinguished from the other three 
constellations, suggesting that immigration only became such a large 
vote-puller for the df in the 2001 election due to the dissatisfaction with 
labour market reforms under the social democratic government.
 The Liberal Party’s gains were still related to the social policy dimen-
sion and to immigration as such. The results suggest that Venstre gained 
more votes among former social democratic core voters who were dis-
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pleased with the sd’s welfare policy irrespective of their attitude towards 
immigration.
 In sum, support for the social democrats was significantly contingent 
on the assessment of the welfare reforms under Nyrup Rasmussen. The 
party lost heavily among former core voters who opposed the welfare 
policy. In line with expectations, these voters realigned with the Danish 
People’s Party in the 2001 election. This could not be merely explained 
by immigration, but has its origin in the social democratic government’s 
welfare policy. As suspected, the Socialist People’s Party did not attract 
former social democratic core voters, since the party had dirty hands. 
Another striking development was the shift of the sd’s core supporters to 
the party’s main rival in the government formation, Venstre. The Liber-
als unexpectedly attracted one-third of these voters; this is an anomalous 
finding and will be discussed in the conclusion.
 A similar analysis using the 2005 election data (not shown) demonstrates 
that the eff ects were lasting. Th e realignment with the df proved stable, as 
the party retained nine out of ten voters from the social democratic voter 
base. Th e social democrats did not recapture considerable shares of voters. 
Th e Liberals lost some votes from this segment, but continued to perform 
quite well among them. Keeping in mind the results from Table 6.6, we 
have confi rmed with the additional analysis that the patterns of electoral 
change in the 2001 election lasted in the 2005 election.
6.7 Conclusion
The chapter examined what happens when social democrats reform the 
welfare state and face competitors from both sides of the political spec-
trum, as well as a mainstream party, that react to the social democrats’ 
strategic move. The chapter looked at the electoral consequences for the 
Danish social democrats after the party engaged in Third Way welfare 
state reforms after 1993. In line with my theoretical elaborations, the sd’s 
traditional voter alignment was based on its advocacy and implementa-
tion of a universalistic and decommodifying welfare state in Denmark. 
I hypothesised that the party would lose electoral ground after engag-
ing in recommodifying labour market reforms. I expected that, unlike in 
other countries, it would not be a contender from the left that would be 
able to foster a realignment of social democratic core voters, but rather 
a right-wing party, the Danish People’s Party. This party was expected 
to absorb the dissatisfied social democratic core constituents, as the re-
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forms worked as a catalyst for the electoral effects of the immigration 
issue, on which the df was close to the attitudes of social democratic 
core voters. Moreover, we also had to look at possible gains for the liberal 
party Venstre, as the party turned into a catch-all party during the pe-
riod under review and accommodated the attitudes of traditional social 
democratic core voters.
 The results confirmed the expected realignment of social democratic 
core constituents with the Danish People’s Party due the disaffection with 
the welfare state reforms and the expected relevance of the immigration 
issue for the df’s gains. The analysis demonstrated that opposition to the 
social democratic government’s welfare policy induced this realignment 
and that the shift to the df was lasting, as the party kept and even in-
creased its general electoral share and its support among the social demo-
cratic core constituency after 1998.
 In contrast to the German case, a left-socialist challenger was not able 
to attract dissatisfied social democratic core voters as a consequence of 
the reforms. The left-wing sf is a welfare party, but supported the reform-
minded social democratic government in parliament after 1994. I argued 
that this made the sf unelectable for social democratic core voters, as it 
left the sf lacking credibility in their eyes. Accordingly, the left socialist 
competitor failed to achieve a realignment.
 Another striking development was the electoral gains of the Liberal 
Party after it moderated its stance on welfare in the late 1990s. The party 
made inroads among the social democratic rank and file, and the analysis 
shows that negative attitudes towards the social democrats’ welfare policy 
explain these changes to a considerable degree. Although Venstre did not 
retain its strong position among these voter groups after gaining office in 
2001, it is likely that a realignment occurred. In contrast to its electoral 
record before the 1990s, Venstre now has much stronger backing among 
working class constituencies, and has been electorally stronger than the 
social democrats for about a decade. This is a new development in Danish 
politics, and one that coincided with the welfare state reforms of social 
democratic governments between 1993 and 2001.17 Unlike the df, Venstre 
did not maintain its support among the social democratic core elector-
ate, but the rising support for the party is nevertheless an anomaly and 
somewhat puzzling, on the grounds that despite its more welfarist stance, 
it was also parliamentarily involved in the labour market reforms of the 
Nyrup government. Future research should be undertaken to shed more 
light on the development of Venstre’s electoral alliances after 1993 and the 
actual mechanisms underlying the process described in this chapter.18
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 Non-voting did not substantially increase, and the analyses did not re-
veal that attitudes to social policy had significant effects on abstention. 
This marks a sharp contrast to both the British and German cases, which 
will be briefly discussed here. Denmark has traditionally had a remark-
able turnout, in an interval between 85 and 90 per cent (Elklit et al. 2005). 
This was also true for the period examined in this book, and there were 
no signs that the reform-averse social democratic core constituents would 
follow their British and German counterparts into the non-voter camp, as 
seen in the two previous chapters. One general reason is that Denmark 
has a rather low electoral threshold, making the political system more 
responsive to new electoral demands and providing dissatisfied voters 
with a lot of alternatives to choose from. This has kept political trust at a 
higher level (Marien 2011) and has ensured that people from lower social 
strata continue to vote (Elklit et al. 2005).
 One particular reason in this respect is that the low threshold does not 
marginalise new or small parties that appeal to voters who are dissatisfied 
with political decisions or the electoral programmes of the established 
parties. That has allowed many new parties to soak up the protest vote 
and to obtain parliamentary representation (examples include the Centre 
Democrats and Progress Party during the 1970s, the Unity List since the 
late 1980s, the Danish People’s Party since 1995 or the Liberal Alliance in 
recent years). With respect to the research question, the Danish People’s 
Party was not institutionally marginalised beforehand and could appeal to 
social democratic core voters after 1995 without risking extinction in case 
of bad results or political marginalisation. This is also one explanation in 
the study by Elklit et al. (2005) on turnout in Denmark, in which the Dan-
ish People’s Party on the right and the parties on the far left are seen as a 
mobilising factor that does not necessarily exist in countries with higher 
electoral thresholds. Another more explicit reason, in view of the welfare 
state reforms examined in this study, is the fact that two parties (Ven-
stre and df) actively wooed the social democratic core constituency and 
aligned their (new) electoral programmes to this voter segment. In sum, 
disaffected social democratic core voters had two clear alternatives in 
Denmark, compared to their British and German equivalents, who faced 
no or only one alternative to abstention.
 Moreover, the results have shown that immigration, as a prominent 
rival explanation for the Danish case, cannot be the main explanation 
for the electoral change found in the analysis. By contrast, attitudes to-
wards the social policy of the social democratic government were the 
driving force of the realignment of social democratic core constituents 
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with the Danish People’ Party and, surprisingly, the Liberal Party. One 
might object that the Socialist People’s Party could not mobilise new vot-
ers from this segment because its libertarian stance on domestic issues 
had an alienating effect. This may be true, as analyses controlling for 
immigration has shown, but it does not explain why the party, despite its 
welfare image, did not win on welfare policy during the period under re-
view. Immigration can, of course, be a supplemental explanation for the 
electoral change in Denmark, but the welfare reforms triggered realign-
ments to the df and Venstre. The df could only appeal so strongly on 
the immigration issue once the welfare link between the sd and its core 
constituency had been broken. The 2001 election was not only an elec-
tion on immigration, but also, surely, a welfare election, as maintained by 
Goul Andersen (2003b). Likewise, Giger (2011: 129) has shown that so-
cial policy was the major issue in the 2001 election, and not immigration. 
I will further address this rival explanation in the comparative summary 
in Chapter 8.
 This chapter may thus contribute to the literature on right-wing par-
ties and their electoral support. The df’s breakthrough is evidence that 
under certain circumstances, a right-wing party can foster a realignment 
of social democratic core voters as a consequence of welfare state reforms 
by using its respective electoral appeal and given the inability of left-wing 
competitors to attract those votes. In this case, a right-wing party can be 
a more dangerous contender for Third Way social democrats than a left-
wing party.
 This suggests that the lack of a left realignment and the rise of the 
right-wing df in Denmark are a consequence of the interaction between 
dissatisfaction with welfare state reforms and the positioning of parties 
on socio-cultural issues. The Danish case was special in that left-wing 
parties could not benefit from disaffection with unpopular welfare re-
forms implemented by a social democratic government. The next chap-
ter will examine the electoral fortunes of the Swedish SAP, a party that 
– in contrast with the British, German and Danish social democratic 
parties analysed above – did not engage in an outright transformation.

7 Sweden
The Swedish social democratic party (Sveriges Socialdemokratiska 
 Arbetareparti, sap) is often seen as a prototypical social democratic 
party. Due to its electoral strength, the sap was the dominant Swedish 
party in the 20th century, with long and often uninterrupted incumben-
cies allowing the party to realise its ambitious social policy objectives (e.g. 
Svensson 1994; Arter 1999a; 2003; Immergut 2002). Similarly, the Swedish 
welfare state is regarded as the closest match to Esping-Andersen’s ideal 
type of social democratic welfare state model (1990), with its generous 
universal social security schemes leading to an extraordinary degree of 
decommodification (Korpi & Palme 1998).
 This chapter looks at the electoral prospects of a social democratic 
party that has not transformed itself under a Third Way agenda, but has 
implemented more moderate reforms. During the economic crisis in the 
1990s, the sap cut welfare benefits and introduced welfare reforms, but 
was able to retain its traditional attachment to social democratic values 
(Anderson & Meyer 2004: 156; Bonoli 2004: 208). When the crisis was 
over, it withdrew some of the reforms. Other reforms were not part of 
a path-breaking policy change under a Third Way label, but largely in 
line with the social policy legacy of Swedish social democracy, as almps 
and workfare elements have always existed (Hort 2001). Under these con-
ditions, I would expect social democrats to retain a large proportion of 
their core constituents and not experience a dealignment or realignment 
of these voters. The chapter controls for one important rival explanation, 
the suspected decline of class voting. If the chapter reveals a higher de-
gree and no or only a moderate decline in class voting – understood as 
backing for the social democrats among the core constituency – the re-
forms in the three other cases must be regarded as a crucial factor for the 
changing alignment of core social democratic voters.
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7.1 The Swedish social democratic party and its social policy
The Swedish social democrats introduced three party constitutions in 
the second half of the 20th century and one immediately after the turn 
of the millennium (sap 1960, 1975, 1990, 2001). The sap’s party constitu-
tions emphasise egalitarianism and solidarity as the party’s basic prin-
ciples. Various passages in the constitutions criticise the effect of pure 
market allocation, and the welfare state and social policy are seen as the 
means to alleviate these effects. Each programme emphasises income 
maintenance in case of sickness, old age, invalidity and unemployment 
via universal social security schemes. Redistribution through taxation 
and a wage policy based on solidarity are also emphasised, to improve the 
living standards of the lower social stratum. However, what makes the 
sap different from the other social democratic parties examined above is 
the reference to almp, both in the 1960 and 1975 programmes and in the 
later ones. almps are seen as an instrument to fight unemployment by 
upgrading and supporting the labour force to adapt to changing working 
conditions.
 The social policy record of the Swedish social democrats shows that 
the sap realised its social policy aspirations by developing a highly de-
commodifying welfare state in the second half of the 20th century, given 
its politically dominant position. It also indicates the particular nature 
of Swedish social democracy, namely its early reliance on workfare prin-
ciples.
 After the Second World War, the sap held office for more than 30 
years without interruption (1945-76).1 As a major social policy invention 
in 1948, which was copied by other Nordic countries, the party imple-
mented a universal flat-rate pension scheme and abolished the hitherto 
existing eligibility criteria for old-age pensions (Esping-Andersen &  Korpi 
1987: 49). In the 1950s, the sap (in coalition with the Agrarian Party) in-
troduced compulsory and publicly-run health and accident insurance 
schemes to replace private insurance funds, with opposition from other 
centre-right opposition parties (Esping-Andersen & Korpi 1987: 49). Af-
ter intense political debate and the end of the sap-Agrarian coalition, the 
sap accomplished employer-financed earnings-related pensions (Allmän 
Tillägspension, atp), which came into effect in 1963, as well as supplemen-
tal earnings-related schemes for other welfare schemes (Esping-Andersen 
1985: 108f; Esping-Andersen & Korpi 1987: 53; Olsson 1990: 119).
 The post-war 1940s saw the formulation of the active manpower poli-
cy and the establishment of the National Labour Market Board (Arbets-
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marknadsstyrelsen, ams), also against the wishes of the bourgeois opposi-
tion parties (Esping-Andersen & Korpi 1987: 58; Olsson 1990: 132). The 
main focus of the ams had been to secure every citizen’s right to become 
a wage earner and to organise the almp, including evaluation of the un-
employed’s willingness to take up work or participate in almp measures. 
In order to qualify for income maintenance via generous social benefits, 
the unemployed had to show willingness to search for and take up work 
or to participate in qualification programmes. The role of the state was 
to support the unemployed with almp and qualification measures so that 
they could rejoin the labour force. The foundation of the ams thus es-
tablished the work-to-welfare idea as an important element of the Rehn-
Meidner plan and as one of the sap’s early principles (Hort 2001: 249). In 
this vein, a certain degree of conditionality was implemented early on in 
the Swedish welfare state. The system has been characterised as a civilised 
version of workfare (Hort 2001) and has been internalised by the Swedish 
workforce. This marks a crucial difference to the other social democratic 
parties examined above and also for the path of labour market policies in 
the 1990s, as we will see in Section 7.3.
 After the constitutive pillars of the Swedish welfare state had been 
implemented under social democratic governments, the existing poli-
cies were reinforced in the 1960s and 1970s. In response to a recession, 
the active manpower policy administrated by the ams was extended by 
new employment programmes, in order to upgrade the labour force and 
increase the labour supply (Esping-Andersen & Korpi 1987: 61; Olsson 
1990: 133). The eligibility period of the unemployment benefits was ex-
tended, and special allowances for elderly members of unemployment 
insurance funds were introduced (ibid: 151, 157). In 1974, the replace-
ment rates of unemployment insurance increased substantially from 
what was originally 50-60 per cent, although the initial benchmark of 90 
per cent was not reached in practice (Olsson 1990: 156). Moreover, the 
replacement rate for the health insurance scheme from 70 to 90 per cent 
in the period between 1963 and 1974, and waiting days were abolished in 
1967 (ibid: 130ff, 152).
 In 1974, the union-administered and still voluntary unemployment in-
surance scheme was supplemented by public unemployment assistance to 
cover the uninsured or those who were ineligible for benefits in the union 
scheme (Olsson 1990: 134; Åmark 2005: 111). After 30 years in office, the 
sap lost power in 1976, when a centre-right government led by the Centre 
Party took over. The bourgeois parties held office until 1982, with some 
interruptions in government composition (see Särlvik 2002: 257).2 In this 
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period, neither major social policy innovations nor significant rollbacks 
took place, given the electoral threat of the sap (Huber & Stephens 2001: 
241; Immergut & Jochem 2006: 119-120). The first, modest austerity mea-
sures were not introduced until 1980 (Olsson 1990: 223f; Huber & Ste-
phens 2001: 241).3 The most controversial topic – fiercely opposed by the 
social democrats – was the reintroduction of waiting days for sick pay and 
a reduction of the replacement rate for health insurance from 90 to 87 per 
cent. As the latter measures were seen as affecting social democratic core 
voters in particular, the sap 1982 electoral campaign focused on these is-
sues, and the party promised to withdraw the cuts and to increase unem-
ployment benefits (ibid; Starke 2008: 169).
 The sap returned to power with the 1982 election and, as promised, 
abolished the waiting days for sick pay and raised unemployment ben-
efits. The 1980s marked a watershed for the sap in other policy areas than 
social policy, as the party introduced new policy paradigms under its new 
‘Third Road’ agenda (Feldt 1985; cf. Pontusson 1992a, 1992b for a critical 
assessment). The paradigm shift was limited to economic policy and did 
not affect social policy, unlike other paradigm shifts under Third Way 
labels (Huo 2009: 70). The sap even engaged in a further expansion of the 
welfare state (cf. Palme & Wennemo 1998; Starke 2008: 169). After the sap 
won the 1988 election, Sweden was hit by an economic crisis. The party’s 
response to the crisis will be discussed in Section 7.3.
 Summing up the ideological commitment to the welfare state in its 
party constitutions and the policy record of Swedish social democracy, 
it becomes clear that the party successfully realised a highly decom-
modifying welfare state in line with its ideology. In contrast to most 
of its sister parties, the sap always promoted almp as one aspect of its 
productivity-centred ideology. These principles were incorporated in 
the sap’s social policy agenda at an early stage and realised in Swedish 
welfare policies. Moreover, they were persistently advocated by the par-
ty, administered through the union-run unemployment funds and inter-
nalised by the working class as the sap’s core constituency. This consti-
tutes a major difference from other social democratic parties – with the 
exception of the Norwegian DNA –where such principles and policies 
had been part of the transformation towards a Third Way agenda, and 
thus marked a break with the social policy legacy of unconditional rights 
to income-maintaining social security benefits (Stjernø 2005: chap. 4; 
Huo 2009).
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7.2  The core constituency of Swedish social democracy
In terms of the framework on the alignment of core voters to social demo-
cratic parties in Chapter 2, the Swedish social democratic party should 
have been able to align particular classes due to its successful realisation 
of decommodification. Table 7.1 demonstrates that the sap indeed drew 
on the support of those classes conceptualised as the social democrat-
ic core constituency in Chapter 2 before the crisis of the 1990s. Manual 
workers and lower white-collar employees were the party’s electoral back-
bone during the golden age of the welfare state, as well as after the two oil 
crises in 1973 and 1981. In contrast to its British or Danish sister parties, 
the sap gained much more support among the lower white-collar class as 
a result of its strategic courting of this class (Svensson 1990, 1994; Åmark 
2005). In terms of social policy, this has been attributed in particular to 
the introduction of the earnings-related pension scheme (atp) in 1959, as 
the social democrats created a broader wage-earner alliance (Svensson 
1990, 1994; Esping-Andersen 1985: 108ff; Arter 1999a: 152, 2003: 97; Åmark 
2005: 118ff ).4 The sap had a large core constituency during the second 
half of the 20th century. Despite signs of a decline that began in the 1970s, 
the sap always remained dominant among those segments.
Table 7.1 Party shares for selected parties by selected social classes, Sweden 1960-94
1960 1968 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994
SAP RNM 55 54 43 42 43 43 44 36 50
Industrial 83 79 68 71 75 71 73 61 73
Other workers 71 69 58 62 62 56 60 49 57
M RNM 10 9 13 24 29 20 17 23 22
Industrial 2 2 3 5 7 10 6 10 6
Other workers 4 5 5 8 13 13 7 14 11
VPK RNM 1 2 3 3 5 6 7 2 3
Industrial 4 2 5 5 5 5 4 3 7
Other workers 3 1 5 5 4 5 6 4 4
C RNM 6 10 24 12 12 7 9 10 6
Industrial 4 9 17 12 10 6 7 6 6
Other workers 11 14 22 15 13 11 12 11 9
Source: For 1960 and 1968: Oskarsson (1994); for 1976-2002: Oscarsson & Holmberg (2008).
Notes: RNM: Routine non-manual; Swedish studies normally distinguish between industrial and 
other workers.
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 The traditional centre-right parties’ performance among the social 
democratic voter base does not reveal a consistent pattern. With the ex-
ception of the Centre Party in the 1970s, neither party made considerable 
and lasting inroads among those voters (Liberals not shown). The stable 
support among workers and lower white-collar employees (cf. Arter 2002: 
14) for the Communist Party vpk – later the Left Party – was attributed to 
the so-called comrade vote; that is, social democratic sympathisers ‘lend’ 
their vote to the communists to increase the sap’s parliamentary power 
resources and bargaining potential (Arter 2003: 77).
 Table 7.2 shows the vote shares for Swedish general elections after con-
stitutional reforms in 1969, when the country shifted to unicameralism 
with the Riksdag as a one-chamber parliament (e.g. Särlvik 2002). Särlvik 
(2002) has identified this period as Sweden’s sixth electoral era, due to the 
changes in the electoral system, and it is used as the period of reference 
here. The figures demonstrate the sap’s electoral dominance. It remained 
the strongest party in the years after 1970, with a double-digit distance to 
the next party (with the exception of the 2006 election). The continued 
electoral dominance of Swedish social democracy has been described by 
Arter (2003: 83). The sap averaged 46.9 per cent of the votes under the old 
two-chamber system from 1944-69.
Table 7.2 Vote shares in Swedish general elections, 1970-2006
1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006
SAP 45.3 43.6 42.7 43.2 45.6 44.7 43.2 37.7 45.3 36.4 39.9 35.0
M 11.5 14.3 15.6 20.3 23.6 21.3 18.3 21.9 22.4 22.9 15.3 26.2
C 19.9 25.1 24.1 18.1 15.5 12.41 11.3 8.5 7.7 5.1 6.2 7.9
FP 16.2 9.4 11.1 10.6 5.9 14.2 12.2 9.1 7.2 4.7 13.4 7.5
VPK2 4.8 5.3 4.8 5.6 5.6 5.4 5.8 4.5 6.2 12.0 8.4 5.9
KD3 1.8 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.9 …1 2.9 7.1 4.1 11.7 9.1 6.6
MP - - - - 1.7 1.5 5.5 3.4 5.0 4.5 4.6 5.2
ND/SD4 - - - - - - - 6.7 1.2 - 1.4 2.9
Other 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.0 2.6 1.7 2.7
Turnout 88.3 90.8 91.8 90.7 91.4 89.9 86.0 86.7 86.8 81.4 80.1 82.0
Source: for 1970: Arter (1999a); for 1973-2002: Statistiska centralbyrån (2004); for 2006: val.se
Notes: 1. In 1985 the Centre Party and the Christian Democrats formed an electoral alliance.
2. After 1990, the party used the label VP.
3. The abbreviation KDS has also been used for Christian Democrats.
4. 1991 and 1994: Ny Demokrati, afterwards Sverigedemokraterna.
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The centre-right parties’ share (m, c, fp and later also kd) is highly vola-
tile, supporting the arguments of a divided bourgeois camp in Sweden 
(e.g. Arter 1999a, 1999b; Kitschelt 2001a). The Swedish Left Party, the for-
mer communist party, remains in a rather narrow interval between 4.5 
and 6 percentage points, with the exception of the extraordinary 1998 
election (see below).
 Summing up, support for the Swedish social democrats is rooted in a 
particular social stratum, in line with Chapter 2’s theoretical arguments 
on the role of decommodifying social policies for social democratic voter 
alignments; and the party has clearly been the dominant party. Next I will 
describe the sap’s policy during the 1990s, a time when Sweden was hurt 
by an economic crisis and the sap reacted with cutbacks and welfare state 
reforms. The policy will be situated into the commodification framework 
outlined in Chapters 2 and 3.
7.3 The Third Road, crisis responses and welfare state reforms in the 
1980s and 1990s
As mentioned, the sap underwent an ideological and programmatic 
transformation in the form of its Third Road paradigm (Den tredje vägen), 
developed under finance minister Kjell-Olof Feldt and his collaborators 
during the 1980s (Feldt 1985; Pontusson 1992a, 1992b). However, unlike 
other social democratic parties that transformed themselves using Third 
Way agendas, the policy change was limited to economic and fiscal policy 
and did not affect the sap’s welfare policy, which was actually partly ex-
panded (cf. Palme & Wennemo 1998; Starke 2008: 169; Huo 2009: 70). 
While the name is reminiscent of the ‘Third Way’, the approach captured 
different policy areas from those addressed by the Third Way agendas of 
the sap’s various sister parties. Moreover, the Third Road emerged in the 
1980s, but did not serve as the ideological background to or blueprint for 
the welfare state reforms of the 1990s.
 Briefly, the Third Road implied a departure from the party’s tradition-
al instruments in economic, monetary and fiscal policy, as supply-side 
economics, wage restraint and capital market liberalisation became new 
policy instruments. The main goals of this policy change were to enhance 
the competitiveness of Swedish industry, increase investments and cre-
ate balanced economic growth (Pontusson 1992a, 1992b; Huber & Ste-
phens 2001: 242ff; Huo 2009: 275ff ). The sap implemented its new Third 
Road stance when it was in government between 1982 and 1991, which 
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mainly implied market liberalisation, the privatisation of publicly-owned 
enterprises and companies, a shift to supply-side economics and an anti-
inflationary monetary policy (Pontusson 1992a, 1992b: 115ff ). This did not 
shield Sweden from an economic crisis in the late 1980s, with large budget 
deficits and growing unemployment rates that the sap had to tackle.
 The sap minority government responded by implementing austerity 
packages and tax reforms with the support of the Liberal Party in 1990, 
but also by engaging in compensatory measures in social policy (Palme & 
Wennemo 1998: 14). Although these packages reduced the replacement 
rates of sickness insurance (ibid: 13), they did not contain fundamental 
labour market reforms or cuts (Huber & Stephens 2001: 243f; Arter 2003: 
89f ). In the 1991 elections the sap suffered defeat due to the unpopular 
cutbacks and the deteriorating economic situation. A centre-right gov-
ernment led by the Moderate Party’s leader Carl Bildt took over.
 The new centre-right government engaged in austerity politics and a 
restructuring of the welfare state in line with the coalition parties’ po-
litical views (Bergqvist & Lindbom 2003: 390; Starke 2008: 171). The aus-
terity measures included a reduction of the replacement rates for sick-
ness, parental leave and unemployment insurance from 90 to 80 per cent, 
which was supported by the sap (Palme & Wennemo 1998: 16ff; Timonen 
2003: 95). Moreover, waiting days for sickness (one day) and unemploy-
ment insurance (five days) were re-introduced. Indexation rules for both 
the universal and the earnings-related pension were moderately changed 
for the years 1993 to 1996 through non-decisions.
 The bourgeois coalition transformed the existing Ghent system of un-
employment insurance into a publicly run and mandatory unemployment 
scheme which did not imply any retrenchment, but was characterised as 
an attack on the trade unions’ and sap’s power resources (Merkel et al. 
2008: 168). The centre-right government further introduced labour mar-
ket programmes for the young and long-term unemployed to fight unem-
ployment. The social democrats were against these programmes because 
of tighter eligibility criteria and the abolition of the income maintenance 
principle. The programmes for the long-term unemployed were approved 
by the sap, given their non-recommodifying character, as they re-quali-
fied the unemployed for benefits and focused on education and requali-
fication (Timonen 2003: 102). In the 1994 election, the social democrats 
regained power after promising to withdraw some of the cutbacks in wel-
fare schemes (Merkel et al. 2008: 161).
 Th e organisational reform of the unemployment insurance was immedi-
ately repealed and the union-administered Ghent scheme reinstalled 
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(Starke 2008: 171). Other minor reforms concerning labour market regula-
tions were also reversed by the new social democratic government (Bergh 
& Erlingsson 2009: 77). However, the sap stuck with the reductions in the 
replacement rates of the major social security schemes and the modified 
indexation rules implemented by its centre-right predecessor, in accord-
ance with its primary aim to consolidate the budget. This was not in line 
with the sap’s decommodification aspiration, but was accompanied by 
other measures in the 1994 austerity package stressing two other social 
democratic core principles, egalitarianism and solidarity.5 In cooperation 
with the Left Party, the sap implemented higher taxes on capital gains, 
wealth, property and a supplementary 5 per cent tax on high incomes la-
belled a ‘solidarity tax’ (Merkel et al. 2008: 161f ). As the budget deficit was 
still considerable by the end of 1994, the sap demanded further consoli-
dation measures. The Left Party opposed them, so the sap cancelled its 
cooperation with the Left Party and shifted to the Centre Party as its new 
partner for consolidation measures and welfare reforms in the remainder 
of the electoral term 1994-98 (Arter 2002: 11f; Särlvik 2002: 258f; Merkel 
et al. 2008: 162f ).
 In 1995, the legislative coalition between the sap and the Centre Party 
implemented a further reduction of the replacement rate of all welfare 
benefits from 80 to 75 per cent, to come into effect in 1996. Due to fierce 
resistance from the trade unions, the measures only stayed in effect tem-
porarily and the replacement rates returned to the previous level of 80 
per cent in September 1997, as promised (Palme & Wennemo 1998: 27ff; 
Timonen 2003: 95).6 In addition, benefits for the first 100 days of unem-
ployment were increased (Huo 2009: 209).
 Other proposals were aimed at tightening the eligibility criteria for un-
employment insurance, which again met with fierce resistance from the 
unions and the unemployed. The proposals were designed to increase the 
qualification period for benefit entitlements, shorten the eligibility pe-
riod and manipulate the calculation rules for the benefits, implying lower 
benefits (Timonen 2003: 96f ). Given the proposals’ unpopularity and the 
public resistance from the unions, the sap finally dropped the proposals, 
which would have meant considerable recommodification. The sap only 
managed to limit the eligibility period to three years, a fourth year being 
contingent on participation in active labour market or qualification pro-
grammes (Merkel et al. 2008: 168). But even this reform was postponed to 
2001 when unemployment decreased sharply.
 Especially in the period between 1995 and 1999, the sap government 
maintained and expanded the Swedish tradition of almps. Its record 
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in this area was balanced, however. On the one hand, the new measures 
aimed to upgrade and qualify the labour force in times of high unemploy-
ment and via wage subsidies providing long-term unemployed with public 
service employment or private sector employment. On the other hand, 
young unemployed people (under 25) faced tighter eligibility criteria, as 
the programmes’ compensation was not related to previous income lev-
els or unemployment benefi t levels, but refl ected a fl at-rate activation 
benefi t, which could be supplemented by social assistance (so-called 
 utvecklingsgaranti). Furthermore, the mandatory participation did not 
(re-)qualify the unemployed for unemployment benefi ts, as previous legis-
lation had done. Both aspects are at odds with traditions in Swedish almp 
(see Hort 2001: 259; Timonen 2003: 96, 102f ),7 but these measures were 
targeted at the margins of the labour market, not the core labour force.
 Even though the focus here is on labour market policy, another major 
reform needs to be discussed.8 In the 1990s, Sweden’s pension system was 
reformed to cope with the future demographic challenge. The new mea-
sures were put into operation under the bourgeois coalition (1991-94), 
and it was up to the sap government to fully implement the reform. The 
measures had to be implemented gradually and required long transition 
phases, even though they had been characterised as fundamental and 
path-breaking for Sweden. Among the major features, indexation was 
changed to wages, inflation and demography and not only to inflation, 
as before. Pensions are now calculated based on lifetime contribution 
records rather than on the best 15 years of a person’s working history; this 
will likely benefit workers and lower white-collar employees. Retirement 
age was made more flexible. The flat-rate pension became means-tested, 
but a guaranteed pension partly financed by employers was introduced 
as a supplementary scheme to secure the high degree of universalism 
(Merkel et al. 2008: 175). Finally, a residence requirement of 40 years was 
introduced, which favours Swedish wage earners and disfavours immi-
grants.
 The pension reform has generally not been characterised as an out-
right retrenchment or a break with the sap’s commitment to welfare, but 
as an adaption to demographic changes in the coming decades (Palme 
& Wennemo 1998: 20ff; Anderson & Meyer 2004; Bergqvist & Lindbom 
2007). The level of expenditure is expected to be the same under stand ard 
assumptions of economic development, and the 1998 and 1980 replace-
ment rates do not differ considerably (Palme & Wennemo 1998: 25; Lind-
bom 2001). The contents of the reform have been evaluated as being in 
continuity with the existing goals and attributes of Swedish social democ-
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racy, the Swedish pension system and the Swedish welfare state more 
generally (Anderson & Meyer 2004; Bergqvist & Lindbom 2007: 394). Al-
though the reforms have some recommodifying aspects, as the generosity 
of pensions became dependent on previous labour market participation, 
this did not reflect a significant departure from the sap’s stance on social 
policy. Traditionally, highly decommodifying schemes require previous 
labour market participation, and this is in accordance with the sap’s pro-
ductivity-centred stance. Furthermore, the redistributive elements in the 
pension reforms favour the sap’s blue-collar core constituency  (Anderson 
& Meyer 2004: 153). Since its implementation, the pension reform has been 
a non-issue in election campaigns (ibid: 156). Th e path-breaking Swedish 
pension reform does not represent a particular Th ird Way element or have 
strong elements of recommodification that are contrary to the interests of 
the social democratic core constituency, and will not be discussed further 
in this chapter.
 In 1998, Sweden’s economic situation began to improve significantly 
and the budgetary crisis was over. Nevertheless, the sap was punished 
by the electorate in the 1998 election, but stayed in office. With the 1998-
2002 electoral term, the sap returned to an expansive strategy concern-
ing the welfare state, especially by extending social services. Except for 
the reform of the unemployment eligibility period to come into force in 
2001, encompassing labour market or welfare state reforms indicating 
recommodification were not implemented. The sap’s moderate labour 
market reforms appear to have been a response to a serious economic 
crisis rather than a sign of a significantly changed stance on the welfare 
state. Table 7.3 provides an overview of reforms actively implemented by 
the sap as governing party (1994-2002), or at least supported during the 
years in opposition (1991-94). As outlined in Chapter 3, the reforms are 
classified based on the framework developed by Clasen & Clegg (2007). 
Briefly stated, the framework classifies labour market reforms in terms 
of conditionality; that is, whether benefit claimants have to fulfil few 
or many criteria to qualify for benefits as a consequence of a legislative 
change.
 The summary of the labour market and welfare state reforms reveals 
that some reforms implied a certain recommodification, as eligibility cri-
teria have been tightened and lower benefit levels have been introduced. 
Nevertheless, most of these measures can be characterised as moderate, 
as few waiting days and still remarkably high replacement rates of 80 per 
cent do not suggest a considerable degree of recommodification.9
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Table 7.3 Classifi cation of labour market reforms introduced or supported by SAP, 1991-
2002






geois government and 
SAP
Income replacement level of social security 




1993 Introduction of 1 waiting day for 
sickness insurance and 5 waiting days for 








Labour market development programme 
for long-term unemployed with focus on 
re-qualifi cation; programmes also re-entitled 




1993-98 Non-adjustment of maximum unemployment 










1995/6 Replacement rate of unemployment and other 





1997 Replacement rate of unemployment and other 
social security schemes increased to 80 per cent 




1997 Tighter eligibility criteria for unemployment 
insurance; benefi t entitlement conditional 
upon 26 weeks of work in the last 12 months 
or 450 hours of work over an uninterrupted six- 




1997 Basic and maximum amount of unemployment 
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Table 7.3 Classifi cation of labour market reforms introduced or supported by SAP, 1991-
2002






Mandatory participation in labour market 
programmes for young unemployed under 
25 after 100 days of unemployment; no (re-)
qualifi cation for unemployment benefi ts 
possible (non-mandatory before; participation 






1997/2001 Tighter eligibility criteria for unemployment 
insurance came into eff ect in 2001; eligibility 
period for unemployment benefi ts shortened 
to three years; a fourth year on benefi ts 





2000 Activation guarantee for long-term 
unemployed introduced; eligibility contingent 
on participation in labour market training 
programmes or qualifi cation measures of at 











Sources: Palme & Wennemo (1998); Lindbom (2001, 2002, 2007); Palme et al. (2002); Timonen 
(2003); Merkel et al. (2008: chap. 8); Starke (2008); Huo (2009); Christiansen et al. (2010).
R: recommodifi cation, D: decommodifi cation.
The same is true for the qualification period of 26 weeks of work (pre-
viously 20 weeks) to qualify for unemployment benefits and an eligibil-
ity period of three years before mandatory activation for ordinary wage 
earners takes place (Palme & Wennemo 1998: 33).10 Other measures were 
already temporary or counterbalanced by later reforms, such as the in-
crease in the basic and maximum amounts of unemployment benefits af-
ter the immediate crisis had passed. To assess how these measures have 
influenced the degree of income maintenance in the Swedish case, Table 
7.4 provides an overview of the replacement rates.
Table 7.4 Summary measures of benefi t entitlements for Sweden, 1989-2003
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Replacement rate (Scruggs) 87 88 90 81 73 72 70 76
Source: Scruggs (2006). Bold fi gures indicate post-reform years.
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The figures follow the logic of the reforms quite closely with a time lag, 
as the average replacement rate decreased from about 90 per cent in the 
early 1990s to 80 and later 70 per cent, and then recovered in line with 
the sap’s policy described above. The figures also fit Lindbom’s claim 
(2001: 142f ) that the lower replacement rates between 1993 and 1998 were 
the effect of non-indexation, was a highly non-transparent way of cutting 
back. They indicate quite a bit of recommodification, but at a very high 
base level. On that score, the replacement rates calculated by Lindbom 
(2001) show that the level of generosity of Swedish unemployment insur-
ance in 1998 was the same as it had been in 1980. Thus, the sap’s policy 
cannot be regarded as outright retrenchment in a quantitative sense, 
as some of the cuts during the crisis were counterbalanced afterwards. 
Further more, the replacement rates remained high compared with those 
of other countries and did not drop considerably below the replacement 
rates of the 1980s.
 On balance, the sap implemented some reforms and measures point-
ing to limited recommodification during an economic crisis, but in line 
with previous assessments and interpretations, the reforms were moder-
ate and often temporary compared to the three other cases, as we will 
see below. The sap did not fundamentally break with its social policy 
principles or with the main pillars of the Swedish welfare state: there 
were no fundamental ideological transformations, path-breaking policy 
changes or big bang reforms implying considerable recommodification.11 
The sap’s policy is to a large extent consistent with the traditional social 
democratic principles outlined in Chapter 2 and has been characterised 
as coherent with the party’s programmatic stance (Anderson & Meyer 
2004; Merkel et al. 2008: 180ff ). After the reforms, the generosity of the 
Swedish welfare state remained the same, or even greater, than it had 
been in 1980, before Sweden was hit by two economic crises (Lindbom 
2001, 2002, 2007).
 Most commentators argue that the reforms neither dismantled nor re-
trenched the Swedish welfare state, but simply responded to the deterio-
rating economic situation (Hort 2001; Lindbom 2001; Timonen 2003; 
Merkel et al. 2008: chap. 8; Starke 2008: chap. 7; Bergh & Erlingsson 2009). 
Unlike in the other cases, no encompassing reforms implying tighter eli-
gibility criteria or work obligations have been introduced in Sweden (cf. 
Hort 2001: 262). The reforms did not fundamentally enhance condition-
ality for the core workforce in terms of claiming benefits, and Swedish 
labour market policies are still a civilised version of workfare (Hort 2001). 
Some of the measures reflect incremental changes that have to be seen 
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in light of traditions of active labour market policies and the workfare el-
ement that always played a role in Swedish welfare policies and the sap’s 
commitment to social policy (Bergqvist & Lindbom 2003; Timonen 2003: 
7). Most of these reforms, which introduced harsher conditions and tight-
er criteria, concerned the fringes of the labour market (e.g. labour mar-
ket entrants, immigrants, or social assistance recipients) rather than the 
Swedish labour market insiders; that is, the sap’s core voter base (Lindvall 
& Rueda 2012). The same claim has been made with regard to new almp 
schemes (Huo 2009: 112).12
 In sum, we would expect the electoral setback and the extent of dealign-
ment for the sap to be more limited than for its British, Danish and Ger-
man sister parties. We would expect dealignment to mainly take place in 
the period between 1994 and 1998, after which we would expect the sap to 
recover, when traditional social democratic principles regained strength. 
This is further discussed in the following section on party competition in 
Sweden in the period between 1991 and 2006.
7.4 Party competition in Sweden, 1991-2006
The Swedish party system has traditionally been characterised as that 
which most closely matches the Scandinavian five-party system consist-
ing of two left parties – the hegemonic social democratic party sap and 
the small far-left communist party (Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna, vpk) 
– and three middle-sized bourgeois parties, the Centre Party (Center-
partiet, c), the Liberal People’s Party (Folkpartiet, fp) and the Moderate 
Party (Moderaterna, m), a secular conservative party (Arter 1999b; Särlvik 
2002). Social democratic minority governments were the norm in the last 
four decades of the 20th century (Steffen 2006: 92). After the 1976 elec-
tion, the party system assumed an increasingly bipolar structure consist-
ing of a left and a centre-right bloc, even though the Centre and Liberal 
Party occasionally cooperated with the sap on legislation. It was only in 
the 1990s, when the five-party system was permanently enlarged by two 
small parties, the Greens (Miljöpartiet de Gröna, mp) and the Christian 
democrats (Kristdemokraterna, kd),13 that these parties were able to pass 
the 4 per cent threshold in two consecutive elections. Far-right parties 
had no lasting impact. The New Democrats (Ny Demokrati, nd) gained 
parliamentary representation between 1991 and 1994, but then disap-
peared. The recently emerging Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, 
sd) were not able to pass the electoral threshold during the period under 
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review.14 Considering these features of party competition in Sweden, the 
Left Party should be the most dangerous challenger in terms of the frame-
work on party competition. I will discuss the role of other parties briefly.
 Historically, the Left Party was an orthodox communist party with a 
small but stable core constituency of blue-collar workers that secured 
parliamentary representation thanks to the ‘comrade vote’ mentioned 
above (Arter 2002: 14).15 In recent decades, the party underwent a process 
of modernisation, including a shift towards a left socialist stance and a 
broader electoral programme emphasising ecological and feminist issues 
(Arter 2002, 2003; Spier & Wirries 2007: 80ff ), although Arter (2002: 24) 
claims that its policy agenda changed little. Since striking ‘Communist’ 
from the party name in 1990, the party has run under the label ‘Vänster-
partiet’ (the Left Party), which will be used during the remainder of this 
chapter.
 As mentioned, the Left Party cooperated with the sap on the first crisis 
packages, as it legislatively supported cutbacks and tax increases to stabi-
lise the budget. After the cooperation with the sap ended in 1995 and the 
social democrats collaborated with the Centre Party on further austerity 
measures and social security reforms, the Left Party found itself in a more 
favourable opportunity structure. Given the perceived rightward shift of 
the sap due to policies of fiscal prudence and cooperation with bourgeois 
parties, the Left Party capitalised on the expanded policy space on the 
political left (Arter 2002; Blomqvist & Green-Pedersen 2004). The party 
could now act as the defender of the Swedish welfare state and appealed to 
disaffected social democratic voters with a distinct reform-averse stance 
(Arter 2002: 11, 2003: 93; Blomqvist & Green-Pedersen 2004: 606). Arter 
(2002) has – somewhat provocatively – characterised the party strategy 
as a social democratisation of the Swedish Left Party. The party developed 
a more oppositional profile before the 1998 election and represented the 
type of dangerous left-wing challenger described in Chapter 2, at least for 
the 1998 elections.
 After the sap’s disastrous result in the 1998 election, the social demo-
crats were able to remain in office thanks to a legislative coalition with 
the Left Party and the Greens (Särlvik 2002: 258f; Madeley 2003: 165f ). In 
other words, the Left Party rescued the government, whose policies it had 
previously fiercely criticised and whose supporters it had absorbed (Spier 
& Wirries 2007: 114). The legislative coalition implied no direct policies 
in return for the cooperation of the left (Steffen 2006: 93). As mentioned 
above, the sap returned to welfare state expansion in the 1998-2002 elec-
toral term after the economic crisis. These measures allowed the sap to 
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claim all the credit, not to share it with potential coalition partners. The 
Left Party’s strategy to back a sap minority government without getting 
something in return has been characterised as useless, and the party was 
seen as a Babylonian captive of the sap (Spier & Wirries 2007: 84; Merkel 
et al. 2008: 160). Thus we could expect the Left Party to make temporary 
gains in the 1998 elections as a consequence of the austerity policies un-
der the sap government. However, due to the temporary nature of the 
reforms and the Left Party’s strategic mistakes, which damaged its cred-
ibility after 1998, we would not expect the party to foster a lasting realign-
ment of social democratic core voters.
 Turning to the other type of serious challenger, authoritarian right-
wing parties, we can rule out beforehand that these parties benefited from 
the sap’s reforms after 1994 or the financial crisis in the 1990s more gener-
ally. During the 1991-94 electoral term, when a bourgeois four-party coali-
tion governed Sweden, the right-wing New Democrats were represented 
in parliament after gaining 6.7 per cent of the vote in the 1991 election. 
However, the party failed to pass the threshold in 1994 after internal tur-
moil, and virtually disappeared (see Rydgren 2002). This party was not a 
credible challenger to the sap during the period of welfare state retrench-
ment and crisis management and is not further addressed in the analysis. 
Similarly, the Sweden Democrats were not an effective challenger before 
2006, when the party gained 2.9 per cent of the votes and came close to 
parliamentary representation. The party only gained in importance after 
the period of social democratic crisis management and after four years 
of bourgeois government, when it passed the 4 per cent threshold in the 
2010 election. In other words, right-wing parties did not challenge the 
sap during the period of investigation.
 We should not expect the other parties that competed with the social 
democrats during the period under review to be serious challengers for 
core constituency voters. Beginning with the main bourgeois party, the 
Moderates, I would not expect this party to make any systematic gains 
among social democratic core voters given its distinct market-liberal 
agenda and proposals for welfare and tax cuts in the period between 1994 
and 2002. This changed after 2002 under the new leader, Fredrik Rein-
feldt, as the party softened its market-liberal programme (Agius 2007; 
Oscarsson & Holmberg 2008). The same applies, to a similar degree, to 
the Liberal Party, which joined forces with the Moderates in opposition to 
form a united bourgeois bloc after 1998.
 To some extent, the Centre Party has been an option for moderate so-
cial democratic core voters, as suggested in Table 7.1. Nevertheless, we 
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would not expect the party to have sufficient credibility to attract social 
democratic voters, not to mention reach a realignment, given its support 
for various crisis packages and the retrenchment of social benefits af-
ter 1991. The fact that the party was willing to join a coalition with the 
welfare-critical Moderate Party during the period of investigation further 
detracts from its ability to attract dissatisfied sap voters.
 The Greens are a left-libertarian party that appeals to the highly-edu-
cated new middle class, and are thus not seen as a credible contender for 
social democratic core voters. The only small party that we might expect 
to make some gains during the period of investigation is the Christian 
Democrats (kd). Previous work on the kd claims that the party is nor-
mally not able to gain votes from the sap (or other major parties), and 
the party has traditionally had its stronghold among middle-class officials 
(Karvonen 1996: 133). This changed in 1991 when the party attracted other 
occupational groups, when it uncharacteristically showed a pronounced 
interest in social welfare (Karvonen 1996: 137). Unfortunately, the party 
has received little attention in the literature; only the descriptive data in 
Keman et al. (2006) shows an accentuation of the kd’s welfare profile over 
time. A tentative presumption is that the party may have profited from 
the sap’s response to the crisis. The party did not have dirty hands, since 
it did not participate in the crisis agreements between the established 
parties and it has a profile on welfare. Then again, the party may have had 
a harder time creating lasting ties to social democratic core voters, as it 
increasingly affiliated with the reform-minded bourgeois camp after 1998. 
This will be examined empirically.
 On balance, the Swedish case confirms my control case with respect to 
the electoral consequences of its welfare reforms. Given that the reforms 
have been characterised as moderate and largely in line with Sweden’s 
and the sap’s social policy traditions, we can expect the electoral effects 
to be more limited than in the other cases. Moreover, there should be 
no lasting realignment of social democratic core constituents with other 
parties. As the most likely competitor, we would expect the Left Party to 
make gains in 1998 among the sap’s core electorate, but I would not ex-
pect lasting gains, given the nature of the reforms (as well as the sap’s and 
the Left Party’s strategies in the period under investigation). Other pos-
sible effects concern the Christian Democrats, but this requires empirical 
investigation, as the limited literature on this party does not allow us to 
construct a well-grounded hypothesis.
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7.5 Data
The data used in the empirical analysis come from three different sources: 
the Swedish Election Studies, the Riks-SOM opinion surveys and the exit 
polls for the Swedish Election Studies. The reason for using three data 
sources is the lack of variables on the reforms during the 1990s in the elec-
tion studies. The annually conducted Riks-SOM surveys contain items on 
labour market reform proposals that allow us to measure the respective 
attitudes in the descriptive part, but do not contain a vote recall question 
for electoral behaviour. The exit polls for the 1998 and 2002 election allow 
us to analyse voter migration patterns for the two elections and are used 
in the logistic regression model for the 1998 election.
 The dependent variable in the logistic models is reported party choice 
for all relevant parties, whereas non-voting could not be separated in all 
analyses due to data limitations. The independent variables are the voter 
group, as described in Chapter 3, and variables that capture attitudes to-
wards labour market policies as proxies for the respondents’ attitudes to-
wards the reforms.
7.6 Analysis
 Attitudes towards labour market reform proposals and party shares
I first present attitudes towards several reform proposals and assessments 
of the sap government’s labour market policy, to show that such poli-
cies are not endorsed by the sap’s core constituency. The 1996 and 1998 
Riks-som surveys contain the respective items, and the data sources thus 
cover the period when sap engaged in crisis management. Some of the 
proposals were actually implemented as reforms before the 1998 election. 
Other proposals, such as the limited eligibility period for unemployment 
benefits, were not introduced by the sap. However, the results indicate 
that the sap’s core constituency heavily opposed the proposals and they 
were ultimately dropped by the sap. The voter groups’ attitudes towards 
these proposals are presented in Table 7.5.
 The first item on whether almp should increasingly be used to fight 
unemployment is in line with the earlier claims about the sap’s produc-
tivity-centred tradition. The social democratic core constituency is more 
enthusiastic about the proposal of increasingly using almp measures dur-
ing the crisis. This indicates that the early accentuation of almp and the 
sap’s work-centred ethos are reflected in the respective attitudes among 
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its core voter base, which does not oppose such measures. Moreover, as 
described above, the sap indeed extended the use of almp during the pe-
riod of investigation.
 In contrast, proposals that clearly imply retrenchment and recommod-
ification, such as lower unemployment benefits, shortened eligibility pe-
riods and a reduced public sector, met with fierce opposition among the
Table 7.5 Attitudes towards labour market reform proposals by voter group, 
percentage points
Increased use of ALMP 1996 [V143]
Voter group Good proposal Neither Bad proposal Total
Non-core constituency 40.3 28.4 31.3 100
Core constituency 48.1 25.0 26.9 100
N=1,426 Chi2: 8.8 P<.05
Lower unemployment benefi ts 1996 [V146]
Good proposal Neither Bad proposal Total
Non-core constituency 18.3 27.1 54.6 100
Core constituency 12.5 14.2 73.3 100
N=1,430 Chi2: 56.4 P<.00
Reduce the public sector 1996 [V127]
Good proposal Neither Bad proposal Total
Non-core constituency 33.1 21.7 45.2 100
Core constituency 19.2 19.9 60.9 100
N=1,409 Chi2: 43.1 P<.00
Limited eligibility period for unemployment benefi ts 1998 
[V270]
Good proposal Neither Bad proposal Total
Non-core constituency 32.5 27.4 40.1 100
Core constituency 22.5 20.6 56.9 100
N=1,462 Chi2: 41.5 P<.00
Attitude towards labour market policy and fi ght against 
unemployment 1998 [V245]
Good policy Neither Bad policy Total
Non-core constituency 13.3 24.3 62.4 100
Core constituency 19.2 29.9 50.9 100
N=1,460 Chi2: 20.5 P<.00
Source: Own calculations based on Riks-SOM surveys 1996 & 1998.
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social democratic core voter base, but found more approval among other 
voters. This confirms the expected social policy preferences of the social 
democratic core voter base, as theorised in Chapter 2, since proposals 
leading to recommodification are refused.
 The last item reveals that while non-core constituents were even more 
sceptical about the sap’s labour market policy in 1998, every second re-
spondent from the core constituency was not satisfied with the social 
democrats’ policy in this area. This confirms that the crisis management 
measures were unpopular in general, but were not endorsed by the social 
democratic core constituency. This may explain why the sap was unable 
to retain its strong support from 1994 in the 1998 election, and why the 
Left Party made gains. Next, I will look at descriptive statistics examin-
ing the electoral strengths of the parties among the voter groups between 
1991 and 2006.
 Table 7.6 shows that the sap did not suffer a pronounced decline among 
the party’s traditional core constituency during the period of investiga-
tion. The party mobilised almost four out of ten voters from this segment 
in all elections between 1991 and 2006, expect for the extraordinary result 
in 1994, when more than 60 per cent supported the social democrats after 
four years of bourgeois government. Nevertheless, the level of support 
among core voters in 2006, when the party lost office, was not fundamen-
tally different from that in 1991. On the contrary, there was slightly weaker 
support among non-core constituents in 2006 and a decline among this 
voter segment after the 1994 election.
 The Left Party, which has been identified as the most serious challeng-
er to the sap, made considerable gains among the social democratic core 
constituency. After the sap engaged in cutbacks and crisis management 
between 1994 and 1998, the former communists mobilised every seventh 
social democratic core voter in the 1998 election. However, the support 
did not last; the vote shares declined in the following two elections, and 
the support was actually weaker in 2006 than in 1994, in terms of the so-
cial democratic core voter base.
 Surprisingly, the figures for the Christian Democrats show a similar 
pattern in the period under review. The support peaks with the 1998 
election, but the Christian Democrats were not able to gain a lasting 
foothold among these voters, as the figures for 1991 and 2006 do not dif-
fer dramatically. An important difference from the Left Party is that the 
variation of the Christian Democrats’ vote shares is higher among non-
core constituents, whereas the opposite is true for the Left Party. As 
expected, the latter party is obviously more latter party is obviously more
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Table 7.6 Party shares and non-voting among voter groups, Swedish Riksdag election 
1991-2006 (per cent)
Core constituency 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006
SAP 44.4 54.4 41.9 44.9 40.6
Conservatives 13.4 9.6 11.1 5.9 16.4
Left Party 2.8 7.3 12.0 8.8 7.0
Centre Party 8.2 6.4 2.7 4.1 5.3
Liberals 4.6 3.3 1.7 8.2 5.5
Christian Democrats 6.0 3.3 8.4 6.2 4.9
Greens 2.4 3.3 3.0 4.3 4.0
Ny Demokrati/ SD1 6.9 0.8 - - 3.2
Non-voting 10.6 11.0 15.8 15.6 10.0
Non-core constituency 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006
SAP 25.3 33.0 26.6 27.9 22.7
Conservatives 27.0 28.0 29.0 16.7 30.4
Left Party 3.4 4.4 7.6 5.8 5.0
Centre Party 8.3 9.1 5.8 6.4 8.9
Liberals 11.3 10.5 5.8 18.5 8.7
Christian Democrats 7.8 3.9 12.6 10.4 7.9
Greens 3.7 4.5 4.7 6.1 5.9
Ny Demokrati/SD1 6.4 1.2 - - 1.0
Non-voting 6.2 5.4 7.1 7.2 7.1
Source: Own calculations based on the fi gures reported in Oscarsson & Holmberg (2008: 
appendix A) and Swedish Election Studies. Figures do not always add up to 100 per cent due to 
rounding.
Notes: 1. 1991 and 1994: New Democrats; 2006: Sweden Democrats.
dangerous for the sap’s electoral fortunes among its rank-and-file. The 
vote shares of the other bourgeois parties and the Greens do not show 
patterns of lasting gains among the sap’s core voter base. Non-voting 
among core constituents remained between 10 and 15 per cent with no 
pronounced trend. This will not be discussed specifically in the remain-
der of the analysis.
 The electoral punishment after the crisis, 1994-98
The next step is to model the electoral effects for the two elections where 
they are especially important, namely the 1998 and 2002 elections. I used 
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exit polls for the 1998 Riksdag election and the Riks-som survey of 1998 
in the analyses. The first data set has a vote recall question but no explicit 
item on social policy or labour market policy attitudes, and only one item 
on assessment of the sap’s policy. The latter allows me to examine the 
effects of disaffection with the sap’s labour market policy on vote choice 
in 1998, but unfortunately lacks a vote recall variable. The combined use 
should nevertheless indicate whether there are clear patterns of electoral 
effects, in particular whether social democratic core voters shifted to the 
Left Party in 1998.
Table 7.7 Predicted probabilities of vote choice among voter groups by perception of 
SAP policy, 1998 election (per cent)
Aligned Core Constituency
Assessment of policy:





Left Party 11.7 26.7*
Christian Democrats 1.6 14.8*
Centre Party 0.7 2.9*
Liberals 0.8 6.3*
Greens 1.7 5.5*
Other parties 0.8 9.1*
Source: Predicted probabilities obtained from multinomial logistic regression models using 
Clarify (Tomz et al. 2003).
Notes: 1. Aligned core constituency is defi ned as being a worker or a lower white-collar 
employee and having voted for the social democrats in the previous general election. The 
number of simulations to obtain the probabilities was set to 1,000. Figures do not always add 
up to 100 per cent due to rounding. The Swedish data do not include reliable information on 
non-voting and were thus excluded from the models. * indicates that the party share reported 
in the right-hand side is signifi cantly distinguishable from the share in the left-hand side at the 
0.05 level.
Table 7.7 shows the predicted probabilities from a logistic regression 
model using the exit polls for the 1998 election. The figures demon-
strate that the sap kept core constituents satisfied, but was punished 
by those who were dissatisfied, as the shares between the two groups 
differ significantly by about 65 per cent. As expected, the Left Party had 
been able to attract disaffected former social democratic core voters, as 
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they attracted more than every fourth voter if these conditions applied. 
The former communists remained the largest party but they stayed 
weak among non-core constituents, especially if they were dissatisfied 
with the sap’s policy. This confirms that this party represents the type 
of left-socialist challenger conceptualised in Chapter 2. The Christian 
Democrats also gained considerably among core constituents who had 
supported the sap in the 1994 election but who had then become dis-
satisfied. Their share is higher among non-core voters who are sceptical 
towards sap’s policy (not shown).
 While these figures fit quite well into the party shares and their be-
tween group variation shown in Table 7.6, one should recall that the 
item asked respondents about their general assessment of the sap’s la-
bour market policy performance. This may explain the relatively clear 
and significant differences between the left- and the right-hand panel of 
the table.
 The SAP’s recovery and the Left Party’s setback, 1998-2002
A further step investigates whether these patterns were reversed, at 
least partly, with the 2002 election, where the sap recovered and the 
Left Party and the Christian Democrats lost a great share of the so-
cial democratic core constituents whom they had previously attracted. 
This would confirm the expectation that the sap suffered a temporary 
setback, but not realignment to challengers. As the exit polls for the 
2002 election contain no applicable items on policy, it is only possible to 
examine the voter migration patterns (see Table 7.8). Although it is far 
from an optimal procedure, the figures in Table 7.8 on voter migration 
give an indicative picture. In the 2002 election, the sap was able to keep 
a large share of those core constituents who had voted for the party in 
the previous election, and did not lose a considerable share to the Left 
Party.
 The Left Party lost every fourth voter from the social democratic core 
voter base to the sap in the 2002 election, and was only able to retain 
six out of ten voters from this voter segment. The party thus declined in 
popularity among these voters and was not able to foster a lasting realign-
ment as the sap regained momentum. The Christian Democrats also lost 
a considerable share of voters from the social democratic core voter base, 
as almost every second voter turned to another party. Suprisingly, this 
benefited the Liberals rather than the sap. However, this did not substan-
tially damage the sap’s recovery among this voter segment, as the largest
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Table 7.8 Voter migration in 2002 election (per cent)
Party choice in 2002 election
Voter group and party 
choice in 1998 election












83.5 1.5 4.8 1.8 8.4 100
(2,193)
Core constituency 
aligned to Left Party
25.3 0.3 60.1 2.1 12.2 100
(732)
Core constituency 
aligned to Christian 
Democrats
9.0 6.0 1.4 55.3 28.3 100
(367)
(total N=8,062)
Source: Own calculations based on VALU exit polls 2002.
share of (back-)flow to the sap came from the Left Party. If we compare 
Table 7.8 with Table 7.6, we see that the sap’s adherence to a more tradi-
tional social democratic agenda prevented a serious challenger from mak-
ing lasting gains.
 This can be proven by analysing the item on whether respondents fa-
vour lower unemployment replacement rates available in the Riks-SOM 
2002 data set. Table 7.9 shows vote decisions in the 2002 Riksdag election 
contingent on voter group and attitudes towards lower unemployment 
benefits. It captures attitudes towards a reform proposal implying recom-
modification. The sap performed best among reform-averse voters in the 
2002 election, as every second core voter chose the sap. In other words, 
the sap was still able to attract these voters and had not damaged its wel-
fare image substantially in the years before. The Left Party is strongest 
among the reform-averse, which is not too surprising. The party also de-
fends welfare schemes, and the previous analyses show that it always had 
a backing among workers and lower white-collar employees. The Moder-
ates and, to a lesser extent, the Liberal Party attract voters who endorse 
reduced income compensation in case of unemployment, reflecting the 
parties’ reform-minded images.
 The analysis for the 2002 election thus demonstrated that the sap was 
able to recapture many of those voters that the party had lost in the previ-
ous election, in particular to the Left Party. This means that in line with 
expectations, no realignment of social democratic core voters took place.
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Left Party 4.2 11.9*
Christian Democrats 5.4 2.0
Centre Party 6.6 4.8
Liberals 15.8 9.0*
Greens 3.1 7.2
Other Parties 4.6 2.2
Non-voting 10.3 8.9
Source: Predicted probabilities from logistic regression model using Riks-SOM 2002 data set.
7.7 The SAP’s electoral fortunes in opposition
This section discusses some recent developments in Sweden that, at first 
glance, contradict my arguments: namely, the sap’s disastrous 2010 elec-
tion and the simultaneous breakthrough of the right-wing Sweden Demo-
crats (Sverigedemokraterna).
 In the 2010 Riksdag election, the sap experienced an electoral disas-
ter, as the party only got 30.7 per cent of the vote, the worst result since 
the First World War. The party remained in opposition as it failed obtain 
a majority with its potential coalition partners, the Greens and the Left 
Party. It seems that the sap’s decline occurred one or two electoral terms 
later than that of its British, Danish or German sister parties, which lost 
heavily as a consequence of Third Way reforms. One may speculate that 
the loss of core constituents and the weakened electoral position of social 
democratic parties are inevitable in the long run, which would confirm 
the arguments from the class voting literature.
 However, I argue that this does not contradict the book’s theoretical 
arguments for several reasons. First, and most importantly in terms of the 
book’s main claim, the party was not in offi  ce during the electoral term 
2006-2010 preceding the debacle, and was thus not responsible for any re-
forms or retrenchment, since a centre-right majority coalition held power.
 Second, the Moderates, the sap’s biggest competitor, have become 
more moderate and have presented themselves as Sweden’s ‘New Labour 
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Party’ since 2006 (Agius 2007; Lindbom 2008; Oscarsson & Holmberg 
2008: chap. 4; cf. also www.moderat.se). This has allowed the party to gain 
a foothold outside its own constituency and to compete with the sap at 
eye level, which had not been the case for decades. Third, the sap’s new 
leader, Mona Sahlin, was unable to gain strong support among the elec-
torate in 2010 in her fight against the popular leader of the Moderates, 
Fredrik Reinfeldt. On the contrary, she remained quite unpopular (see the 
polls reported in Dagens Nyheter, 1 April 2010).
 Furthermore, the electoral breakthrough of the Sweden Democrats 
needs to be addressed. In the 2010 election, the party managed to pass 
the 4 per cent threshold for the first time. The party represents a seri-
ous challenger in my framework, as a right-wing authoritarian party that 
also used a social protectionist agenda in the 2010 campaign. The Sweden 
Democrats played no role during the sap’s incumbency, but emerged as 
a nationwide challenger to the established parties under a centre-right 
government. Hence, the Sweden Democrats’ breakthrough is not at odds 
with my arguments, since it could hardly be the welfare policy of the then 
oppositional sap that allowed the Sweden Democrats to win a sufficient 
number of votes in 2010.
 Indeed, there are two more obvious reasons for their successful 2010 
campaign. First, under a new leader, Jimmie Åkesson, the party has aban-
doned its extremist positions of recent years . Second, the party may have 
successfully targeted those voters that became disaffected with the Swe-
dish taboo on putting immigration and related problems on the political 
agenda. The latter could be the case, since the political salience of immi-
gration has been limited, as the parties of the centre-right do not mobilise 
on this issue at all. This is different from Denmark, where both the Danish 
People’s Party and the mainstream bourgeois parties have put the issue on 
the agenda since the 1990s (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup 2008).
 Hence, the breakthrough of the Sweden Democrats is not completely 
at odds with my theoretical expectations, but has to be explained by fac-
tors other than welfare state reforms. Explaining the breakthrough of the 
Sweden Democrats may be an issue for future research agendas.
7.8 Conclusion
The goal of this last case study chapter was to examine the electoral pros-
pects of a social democratic party that did not undergo a transformation 
under a Third Way agenda and did not introduce path-breaking welfare 
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state reforms. I demonstrated that the sap indeed introduced some 
welfare state reforms and cutbacks in social security schemes, but the 
meas ures were a reaction to the serious economic and financial crisis in 
Sweden during the 1990s. The reforms were not part of an ideological 
change, as the sap retained a more traditional stance in the period under 
review. The reforms were often temporary and can been characterised 
as moderate, as they were in line with the sap’s traditional principles 
of almp and workfare. They did not introduce tighter conditionality or 
restrict eli gibility for the core workforce compared to measures intro-
duced by other Third Way social democrats, as the following chapters 
will demonstrate.
 In this case, I expected the social democrats to be able to maintain sub-
stantial backing among their core constituency, as the decommodification 
link was not completely broken. The anticipated electoral effects were a 
temporary setback after the 1994 election, but not an outright dealign-
ment or realignment of the core constituency. The Left Party was iden-
tified as the most serious challenger in accordance with my theoretical 
framework and was thus expected to benefit from the dissatisfaction with 
the sap’s crisis management in the 1998 election, but not afterwards.
 The empirical analysis met these expectations to a considerable degree. 
The sap was not able to retain its extraordinary level of support among 
core constituents from the 1994 election, as the party was punished in the 
1998 election. However, the sap managed to keep more than four out of 
ten voters from its core voter base over the period examined, even though 
the party lost office in the 2006 election. This means that the sap could 
still draw on the support of a stable core constituency after having en-
gaged in crisis management during the 1990s, but not in a transformation 
towards a Third Way agenda, in contrast to many other social democratic 
parties. Similarly, the Left Party’s support among the sap’s traditional vot-
er base peaked with the 1998 election, but the party was not able to make 
lasting inroads among these voters. This voter segment turned to the Left 
Party due to dissatisfaction, but returned to the sap in the 2002 election. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the Christian Democrats also benefited from the 
dissatisfaction with the sap in 1998, but the gains did not last and the 
party was even stronger among the non-core constituency in this period, 
which distinguishes it from the Left Party. This is not completely at odds 
with the theoretical framework, as the Christian Democrats had some 
appeal on welfare during the 1990s, even though the party does not fit 
into a left-socialist or right-wing authoritarian category. This party may 
be regarded as a miniature version of the traditionally welfare-minded 
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Christian Democratic parties in Continental Europe, at least during the 
period of crisis management.
 In line with expectations, we found neither a dealignment nor a re-
alignment of social democratic core constituents in a case where social 
democracy stuck to a more traditional agenda. The sap was at least partly 
able to maintain the decommodification principle in its social policy. This 
is not to say that the sap did not engage in some recommodification, but 
there was no outright policy change as a consequence of a Third Way 
agenda.
 On balance, the results show that class voting in the Swedish case did 
not decline. Class is still distinctive when it comes to party choice, as 
Swedish social democracy still draws on a particular core voter base con-
sisting of workers and lower white-collar employees. The Left Party was 
an alternative for those voters, since their temporary gains had a strong 
class base, as shown above. This is in line with the theoretical claim that 
class-based social policy attitudes structure the logic of party alignments. 
Similarly, the Moderates attract the upper social strata, as, until recently, 
they appealed to voters who preferred to see the welfare state dismantled.
 This does not mean that there has not been a decline in class voting in 
Sweden, but it has not declined strongly as a secular societal trend. Rath-
er, it remains at a respectable level as long as parties with a class-based 
appeal maintain their traditional policy principles that attract particu-
lar voters, in this case championing decommodification as a social policy 
principle.
 In the previous section, we discussed recent developments in the 2010 
Riksdag election in Sweden that, at first glance, seem to disagree with 
the theoretical predictions for the Swedish case. These concern the sap’s 
electoral disaster and the emergence of a right-wing party, the Sweden 
Democrats. Given that the sap was in opposition at that time and not re-
sponsible for policy making, I argued that the disaster must be explained 
by reasons other than the social policy-based arguments made in this 
study.
 Finally, I want to address the obvious data limitations. The data sources 
used do not consist of all of the variables that would allow for a more 
consistent analysis, using the same data sources throughout the chapter. 
This poses a problem, as it prevents us from studying the direct electoral 
effects of social policy attitudes on party alignments. Nevertheless, the 
calculations of the party shares drawn from Oscarsson & Holmberg’s fig-
ures (2008: appendix A), which do rest on the election studies, revealed 
that the sap mobilised a considerable share of core constituents over the 
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period examined. Together with the patterns of voter migrations shown 
above, this indicates that an outright setback for the sap among its core 
voter base has not occurred. The combined descriptive and statistical 
analysis revealed that the gains of the Left Party (and the Christian Demo-
crats) were temporary, even though the proof was indirect. Further analy-
sis with sophisticated items would give a more comprehensive picture.
 Summing up, the Swedish case provided evidence that social demo-
crats are able to retain a strong backing among their core constituency 
if they do not adopt a Third Way agenda and instead stick to more tradi-
tional social policies by maintaining the decommodification principle to 
a sufficient degree. In this case, core voters do not dealign from the party 
or even realign with other challengers on the margins.

8 Comparative Summary
This chapter summarises the findings of the preceding chapters and 
puts them in a comparative setting. It reviews the empirical support for 
the theoretical framework and the party competition argument made in 
Chapter 2 and addresses the extent to which the developments in the four 
countries converge and diverge. Rival explanations and developments 
that seem to diverge from my framework are then discussed.
8.1  General expectations and summary of fi ndings
The book’s very general point of departure was that social democratic par-
ties that have engaged in recommodifying welfare state reforms risk being 
punished by the electorate, on the grounds that social democrats have en-
gaged in policies that contradict their traditional social policy stance and 
their core constituents’ attitudes. Drawing on Esping- Andersen’s work 
(1985, 1990), I argued that social democracy typically formed and aligned 
a core constituency consisting of manual workers and lower white-collar 
employees. These classes have few resources and marketable skills and 
thus demand income replacement in case of invalidity, old age, sickness 
and unemployment, which is understood as the decommodification of 
the wage earner. Moreover, they typically benefit from the redistribution 
of income, given their average below-median incomes. These classes fa-
vour generous and universal social security schemes as well as egalitar-
ian policies, which matches the core principles of social democracy as 
such parties traditionally advocate decommodification and redistribution 
(Esping-Andersen 1985; Merkel et al. 2008; Huo 2009). As a result, these 
voters formed lasting alignments with social democratic parties in the 
post-war era and the Golden Age of the welfare state.
 My claim was that these alignments can be upheld as long as social dem-
ocrats do not break with the decommodifi cation principle in social policy. 
I maintained that social democrats risk alienating their core constituents if 
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they engage in recommodifying policies, as happened in a couple of coun-
tries where social democrats reformed the welfare state under Th ird Way 
agendas (Dingeldey 2007; Merkel et al. 2008; Huo 2009). Th e welfare state 
reforms tightened the eligibility criteria for social security schemes or cut 
benefi ts. I expected core constituents to punish social democratic parties 
in elections, because the latter had engaged in policy change that contra-
dicted the attitudes and social policy preferences of the core constituency.
 To test this claim, I chose the cases of Denmark, Germany, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom. In contrast to British, Danish and German social 
democracy, which modernised under Third Way agendas, the Swedish 
sap adhered to a more traditional stance in the 1990s and did not break 
fundamentally with the decommodification principle. The British Labour 
Party, the Danish sd and the German spd implemented path-breaking 
labour market reforms after they had adopted Third Way agendas. The 
reforms sharpened conditionality in social security, tightened eligibility 
criteria and entitlements, cut the replacement rates of unemployment 
benefits and thus introduced considerable recommodification of labour 
against social democracy’s traditional notions in social policy. Therefore, 
I expected the Labour Party, the sd and the spd to risk a lasting electoral 
setback among their core constituents.
 The Swedish sap did not suspend the decommodification principle 
substantially when it was in government between 1994 and 2006. It intro-
duced some welfare state reforms and retrenchment early in this period, 
but these measures were part of the government’s crisis management 
policy when Sweden was hit by an economic crisis during the 1990s rath-
er than elements of a distinct Third Way agenda. Furthermore, some of 
the measures were temporary and were withdrawn once the crisis was 
over. The sap did not enhance the conditionality of social security for the 
core workforce and the eligibility criteria were only tightened moderately 
compared to the reforms in Denmark, Germany or the United Kingdom. 
Other reforms concerned the fringes of the labour market rather than the 
core labour force. Furthermore, some elements of workfare always existed 
in the sap’s policy, whereas Labour, the sd and the spd engaged in radical 
policy change under Third Way agendas. In sum, I expected the sap to 
have avoided lasting dealignment of core voters in contrast to its British, 
Danish and German sister parties.
 I developed a framework that conceptualises the expected logic and na-
ture of the electoral punishment, to guide the book’s empirical investiga-
tions. Even though I presumed that electoral setbacks among core voters 
occur for reform-minded Third Way social democrats, I argued that the 
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extent of the punishment is contingent on the electoral system and party 
competition. The next sections review and compare the findings in view 
of these arguments.
 The role of the electoral system for the electoral eff ects of the reforms
The first crucial aspect of the electoral effects framework was the role of 
the electoral system for the behaviour of social democratic core constitu-
ents after ‘their’ party had departed from its traditional stance on welfare 
under Third Way agendas. A fptp system typically leaves voters with the 
non-voting option, as it effectively prevents the rise of competitor par-
ties for social democratic parties. In contrast, a pr system does not pre-
vent the emergence of new parties and thus does not prevent the rise of 
competitors for social democrats. This difference structures the electoral 
consequences of reforms: the most likely outcome in an fptp system is 
abstention on the part of social democratic core voters, whereas realign-
ment is much more likely under a pr system, as the alternatives are not 
marginalised through the electoral system. In the latter case, non-voting 
also remains an option. Table 8.1 presents the figures for the abstention of 
social democratic core voters, as well as non-core voters, for recent elec-
tions in the four countries.
 Table 8.1 reveals that increasing abstention on the part of social demo-
cratic core voters as a consequence of the reforms is a particularly British 
phenomenon occurring in a country with an fptp electoral system. New 
Labour began to implement New Deal labour market reforms after taking 
power in 1997. The reforms enhanced the conditionality in the unemploy-
ment insurance system and tightened eligibility criteria, as outlined in 
Chapter 5. The non-voter shares among Labour’s core constituency dou-
bled in the period between 1997 and 2010. This becomes especially visible 
if we compare the results from the first column of the table; that is, before 
the Third Way was realised with the turnout rates from the fourth column 
when Third Way social democrats had held office for two terms. Here 
the pattern for the uk is striking, since abstention among Labour’s core 
constituency has tripled. By contrast, the degree of variation in the other 
countries is much smaller. The chapter on the uk shows that disaffected 
Labour core voters abstained after 1997. As they did not come back in the 
following election, there has been a much lower turnout among these vot-
ers under the aegis of New Labour.
 In Germany, there was a modest increase in the number of non-voters 
among the spd’s traditional voter base when the red-green coalition was
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Table 8.1 Non-voter shares among social democratic core constituents and non-core 
constituents
Social democratic core constituency
UK 14.7 (1992) 21.6 (1997) 35.1 (2001) 43.8 (2005) 37.6 (2010)
Germany 18.6 (1994) 12.0 (1998) 10.5 (2002) 12.5 (2005) 25.0 (2009)
Denmark 7.6 (1990) 9.5 (1994) 4.6 (1998) 6.5 (2001) 7.9 (2005)
Sweden 10.6 (1991) 11.0 (1994) 15.8 (1998) 15.6 (2002) 8.9 (2006)
Non-core constituency
UK 10.2 (1992) 14.6 (1997) 25.7 (2001) 23.4 (2005) 18.4 (2010)
Germany 7.0 (1994) 4.4 (1998) 2.0 (2002) 7.3 (2005) 13.4 (2009)
Denmark 10.7 (1990) 3.6 (1994) 3.2 (1998) 2.3 (2001) 3.3 (2005)
Sweden 6.2 (1991) 5.4 (1994) 7.1 (1998) 7.2 (2002) 6.6 (2006)
Source: Own calculations. Shaded cells indicate fi rst-past-the post-electoral system.
in power between 1998 and 2005. Chapter 6 revealed that the spd lost core 
voters through abstention in 2005 as consequence of the reforms, but this 
was not as pronounced as in the case of Labour in Britain, where the exit 
option was clearly the dominant electoral eff ect. However, in the 2009 fed-
eral election, turnout among spd core constituents dropped sharply, which 
will be further addressed in the conclusion. In Denmark, there is no clear 
observable trend for the Nyrup period, only a slight increase for the elec-
tions 1998-2005, but abstention in 2005 remained at roughly the same level 
as in 1990. Moreover, the analysis in Chapter 7 did not yield any signifi cant 
results for increased non-voting, due to disaff ection with social policy. 
Denmark thus remains the case where the reforms did not produce any 
increased and class-based abstention. Th is fi ts with offi  cial data reporting 
stable turnouts during the period under review (www.folketinget.dk).
 In Sweden, non-voting among the sap’s core constituents increased 
modestly after the party introduced measures to fight the crisis, but the 
figures never reached British or German levels, and turnout among these 
voters recovered with the 2006 election. Looking at the lower half of Ta-
ble 8.1, we can observe that there is less variation in abstention among 
non-core constituents. In all four countries, non-core voters had a higher 
turnout than core voters, irrespective of the electoral system or whether 
reforms had been implemented by the ruling social democrats. In this 
group, the patterns are also less clear than those for the social democratic 
core constituency. For the uk, we notice the fptp effect for these voters 
too, but the increase is much more moderate over the whole period. Simi-
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larly, abstention among non-core voters in Germany increases in 2009, 
but not as much as among the spd’s rank and file. The other two cases 
show no patterns if one regards the figures for the Danish 1990 election 
as an outlier. This brief comparison confirms the argument that it is pre-
cisely the social democratic core constituency that is concerned about 
and affected by the reforms, and then has to decide whether to continue 
supporting the social democrats.
 In sum, the expected effect of the electoral system on the electoral out-
come has been confirmed by the case studies as well as the brief compari-
son of turnout in this chapter. The British Labour Party faced increasing 
abstention by the party’s core constituents under the country’s fptp sys-
tem, whereas the social democratic parties in the three other countries 
did not lose their core voters primarily through abstention, as the coun-
tries have pr systems. This brings us to the second crucial aspect of the 
party system framework: the presence of particular competitor parties 
that may attract social democratic core voters.
 The role of party competition for the electoral eff ects of the reforms
I argued that under pr systems, competitor parties have a much better 
chance of fostering a realignment of social democratic core voters and 
that, in line with the literature, left-wing parties should be the most dan-
gerous competitors for reform-minded social democrats, as they also tra-
ditionally have pro-welfare programmes. Right-wing parties represent the 
second type of dangerous competitors due to their socio-cultural appeal 
to social democratic core voters. The four cases are classified in Figure 
8.1, which shows the effective competitors the social democratic parties 
faced during the period under review.
Figure 8.1 Electoral system, party competition and eff ective competitors for reform-
minded social democrats, c. 1990-2009
FPTP PR
Reforms Competitors marginalised Left Right
No Non-existent Sweden (only in 1998) -
Yes United Kingdom Germany Denmark 
In contrast to Figure 3.1, this figure accounts for the credibility consider-
ations concerning competitors. Qualifications apply when it comes to the 
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matter of whether social democratic core voters will shift to a competitor 
as a consequence of the reforms. If the parties engaged in reforms on their 
own, or supported reforms as part of a formal or legislative coalition, they 
have dirty hands and are not seen as credible by disaffected social demo-
cratic core voters. This is why Denmark is now classified as having had 
no left challenger. Similarly, if a vote for a leftist party is wasted because 
the party is marginalised by the electoral system, there is no reason for a 
voter to shift.
 Another type of party that may benefit from Third Way reforms is 
that of the mainstream party that has traditionally attracted a consid-
erable share of social democratic core voters or has accommodated the 
preferences of these voters. Examples include welfare-minded Christian 
democratic parties such as the cdu, or a mainstream competitor to social 
democrats such as the Danish Liberals, which transformed the basis on 
which it appealed to voters when the Danish social democrats reformed 
the welfare state.
 The case study chapters demonstrated that the predicted logic of 
electoral change could be confirmed by the empirical analysis to a 
large extent. The Labour Party did not experience a realignment of 
core constituents with a party on the margins. As mentioned above, 
the main electoral effect in the British case was increased abstention 
by Labour’s core voters after the party changed its policy under New 
Labour.1 This is in line with the anticipated effect of an fptp system, 
as this system was expected to prevent the emergence of serious com-
petitors such as leftist pro-welfare and/or authoritarian right-wing 
parties. Nevertheless, some gains for the Liberal Democrats and minor 
parties did occur.
 However, the Liberal Democrats have not won over enough of the so-
cial democratic core constituency in Britain to be able to speak of a re-
alignment such as that seen in Germany, where a left competitor made 
considerable and lasting advances to the detriment of the social demo-
crats. The Liberal Democrats did increase their vote share under New 
Labour in general, but this was not associated with a distinct realignment 
of Labour core voters. In terms of my framework, the Liberal Democrats 
turned out to be an ambiguous case.2
 In Britain, other parties had been marginalised due to the fi rst-past-
the-post electoral system and Labour was not in any real danger of losing 
large vote shares to opponents on the far left or far right. However, there 
are some indications that Labour’s ideological repositioning and policy 
change have led to gains for parties on the margins. Th e far-right bnp has 
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made continuous advances under the aegis of New Labour, typically in 
(former) Labour strongholds (Ford & Goodwin 2010; Goodwin et al. 2010).
 The two cases where social democrats reformed the welfare state un-
der pr systems yielded two instances of successful realignments and one 
without a realignment to a dangerous competitor. Concerning leftist par-
ties, my empirical analyses revealed a realignment of social democratic 
core voters with a leftist competitor in Germany, but not in Denmark, 
after the reforms. The Left Party in Germany was able to foster such a 
realignment after the spd engaged in path-breaking welfare state reforms 
in the electoral period 2002-05 and later under the grand coalition. In 
contrast, no such development occurred in Denmark, where neither the 
sf nor the Red-Green Alliance attracted social democratic core voters.3 
This requires some discussion of the preconditions for the success of left-
ist competitors to social democracy in light of the party competition ar-
guments of this book.
 Given the theoretical arguments on the role of leftist competitors for 
the reforms’ electoral consequences, the Left Party’s breakthrough in 
Germany reflected a pretty straightforward development. The party was 
founded in reaction to the spd’s policy change, in particular the Hartz 
reforms. Mobilising on anti-reform and pro-welfare from the very begin-
ning, the Left Party presented itself as a credible alternative to the four 
established parties, at least for the reform-averse segments of the elector-
ate. The Left Party and its predecessor the pds had not been involved in 
legislation and were thus not responsible for policy making at the federal 
level, as the government had an overall majority. The social democrats in 
particular had been attacked for their policy changes under Schröder and 
the Left Party presented itself as the ‘real’ social democratic party, defend-
ing the welfare state.
 The party was thus able to pursue a clear opposition policy, given its 
‘clean hands’, and to attack the spd on its own turf, the welfare state. 
Chapter 6 demonstrated that a negative attitude towards the spd’s re-
forms was a significant predictor of a realignment of social democratic 
core constituents with the Left Party. The Christian democrats did not 
benefit from the reforms, despite their traditional welfare image, since 
the party had its own reform agenda and had damaged its credibility 
beforehand. The realignment towards the Left Party is thus consistent 
with my arguments, as social democratic core voters shifted to a left-
ist pro-welfare party that had not damaged its credibility with previous 
political responsibility. The realignment was lasting; the spd did not 
recover this voter segment and the Left Party even increased its share 
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in the 2009 federal election. This differs from the Danish case, which 
also featured a leftist competitor, but one that could not foster a re-
alignment of social democratic core voters, as demonstrated in Chap-
ter 7.
 In terms of my theoretical framework on the importance of left-so-
cialist challengers, the Danish sf was an established leftist and pro-wel-
fare party that could be expected to attract social democratic core voters 
as a consequence of welfare state reform. Nevertheless, the socialists 
failed to accomplish a realignment of social democratic core supporters. 
My explanation is that the party had dirty hands before the third and 
most comprehensive reform package was launched by the social demo-
cratic government, because it was one of the parties that supported the 
sd minority government after 1994. The party generally cooperated with 
the social democratic government between 1993 and 2001 (Spier & Wir-
ries 2007: 100, 104; Mortensen 2011: chap. 17). Consequently, Chapter 7 
revealed that the sf did not make gains among social democratic core 
voters who opposed the welfare policy of the reform-minded social 
democratic government. The sf’s shares among reform-averse social 
democratic core constituents did not differ from its shares among the 
more reform-minded, and voters did not turn to the socialists due to the 
reforms.
 By contrast, the Danish case demonstrated the realignment of this 
voter segment with a right-wing competitor, the Danish People’s Par-
ty. The party emerged in Denmark in 1995 after an internal split in the 
Progress Party, which had a market-liberal agenda.4 The Danish People’s 
Party was not involved in the Nyrup government’s welfare state reforms 
as the party was often not part of cross-party agreements (Forlig), which 
are typically used in Danish legislation processes if there is a minority 
government (Christiansen 2008). Unlike the sf, the party generally did 
not support the social democratic minority government. Like the Left 
Party in Germany, the party could perform a pure opposition and pro-
test strategy, as its credibility had not been damaged beforehand. The 
analyses in Chapter 7 have so far shown that this party made its first 
gains among the social democratic core constituency in the 1998 elec-
tion and was able to forge a lasting realignment of social democratic core 
voters in the 2001 election after the third and most encompassing round 
of labour market reforms. Many reform-averse social democratic core 
constituents shifted to the Danish People’s Party and stuck to the party 
in the 2005 election.
 Another development in the Danish case is an anomaly that cannot be 
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fully explained by my framework: the Liberal Party’s gains in the period 
between 1990 and 2005. In general, the Liberals made considerable gains 
among the social democratic voter base as the party started to appeal to a 
broader voter segment in the 1990s. However, the party supported several 
of the social democrats’ reforms and thus had dirty hands. Nevertheless, 
the analyses for the period between 1998 and 2001 show that the Liber-
als attracted social democratic core voters who were dissatisfied with the 
social democrats’ approach to welfare.
 Finally, the Swedish sap’s core voters did not realign with a competitor. 
The party lost core constituents to the Left Party in 1998 after having en-
gaged in crisis management and cuts. However, in line with expectations, 
this was not a lasting realignment, as the sap regained a considerable 
share of these votes from the Left Party in 2002. The Left Party’s sup-
port among the social democratic core constituency peaked with the 1998 
election, after which support dropped to normal levels again. The Chris-
tian Democratic Party, which also mobilised core voters from the sap in 
the 1998 election, experienced similar temporary gains. The Swedish case 
thus demonstrates that the sap could keep a considerable share of core 
constituents, as the party maintained the decommodification principle 
when it governed between 1994 and 2006. There were no patterns of last-
ing realignments to a challenger such as the Left Party, or dealignment of 
the sap’s electoral backbone.
 The gains have elements of realignment, but this must be interpreted 
with some caution. The party’s share among the social democratic voter 
base is not stable. It declined somewhat after the Liberals’ victorious 2001 
election, whereas the df has kept these voters for at least one decade. 
It is striking that the Liberals won these votes despite having supported 
several of the social democratic welfare state reforms in the Folketing. 
The party’s gains are puzzling in terms of my arguments, as is the non-
increase in non-voting in the Danish case. One reason could be that two 
parties – the df and the Liberals – explicitly wooed the social democratic 
core constituency, and thus offered two alternatives to abstention. More-
over, a rather low threshold of two per cent provides voters with many 
alternatives at the ballot.
 Summing up, the theoretical arguments on how social policy affects 
partisan alignments to social democratic parties and the party system ar-
gument for the electoral consequences of welfare state reforms are sup-
ported by the empirical analyses to a considerable extent. Social demo-
cratic parties that abandon their traditional stance on welfare and pursue 
recommodification alienate their core constituents and face punishment at
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Table 8.2 Summary of empirical fi ndings
Hypothesised Observed
Sweden No dealignment as reforms were 
moderate; temporary gains for Left Party 
after 1998
Temporary gains for Left Party after 
1998; Christian Democrats increase vote 
share in 1998; no lasting realignment
UK Dealignment of Labour core voters into 
non-voter camp
Dealignment of Labour core voters into 
non-voter camp; (indirect) gains for 
Liberal Democrats and minor parties
Germany Realignment of social democratic core 
constituents towards Left Party
Realignment of social democratic 
core constituents towards Left Party; 
abstention of social democratic core 
voters (especially 2009)
Denmark Realignment of social democratic core 
constituents with Danish People’s Party 
Realignment of social democratic core 
constituents with Danish People’s Party; 
realignment with Liberals among social 
democratic core constituency
the polls. The actual extent of the electoral backlash depends on the party 
system, that is, the presence or absence of particular competitor parties, 
which is also contingent on the electoral system. In the countries where 
Third Way social democrats faced credible competition from the wings, 
core voters realigned with those parties. However, this did not happen in 
the fptp system due to the marginalisation of non-mainstream parties 
(see Table 8.2).
8.2 Discussion of rival explanations
The summary of the findings reveals first that the blame-avoidance argu-
ment found in the New Politics literature does not hold if social demo-
crats reform the welfare state in ways that are contrary to the parties’ 
traditional social policy image.
 Paul Pierson’s seminal New Politics of the Welfare State approach (1994, 
1996, 2001) states that the logic of welfare state reform diverges from the 
logic of welfare state expansion, as policy makers cannot claim credit for 
the former but only for the latter. This is because the welfare state has 
formed its own constituency and, consequently, policy makers interested 
in re-election refrain from introducing encompassing reforms. If policy-
makers nevertheless implement reforms, they apply various strategies of 
blame-avoidance to evade electoral punishment.
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 The cases revealed that blame-avoidance strategies may work once, but 
they do not prevent a party from losing its core voters in the long term 
if the party pursues policies that run counter to its traditional stance on 
welfare. This is illustrated by the German 2002 election and the Danish 
1998 election. In the campaign for the 2002 federal election, Chancel-
lor Schröder used the flood in the eastern states and the impending war 
in Iraq to rescue his unpopular red-green coalition, and his government 
maintained its majority. Prior to that, Schröder’s government had imple-
mented the Riester pension reform, which introduced a partial capitalisa-
tion of old-age provisions in Germany that ran counter to the spd’s princi-
ples on pensions and social policy. However, Schröder’s blame-avoidance 
measures did not prevent losses for the spd and gains for the Left Party 
among the social democratic core constituency in the following elections. 
Likewise, Danish Prime Minister Nyrup Rasmussen survived the 1998 
election by a tight margin after the first labour market reforms had been 
implemented, by promising not to reform the popular early retirement 
scheme. Afterwards, the social democrats continued to implement labour 
market reforms, including a reform of the early retirement scheme. In 
the 2001 election, the social democrats were severely punished and many 
social democratic core voters realigned with the Danish People’s Party. 
Hence, blame-avoidance may allow a party to survive the (first) election 
after ideological change and/or unpopular reforms, but has not prevented 
the lasting farewell of social democratic core constituents. In this vein, 
Pierson’s argument concerning the general electoral threat of welfare 
state retrenchment is correct, as the analyses reveal considerable electoral 
punishment. On the other hand, blame-avoidance does not work if par-
ties depart from their traditional stance on welfare and are punished. This 
punishment is not only an electoral defeat, but goes hand in hand with a 
dealignment of core constituents, even if blame-avoidance measures have 
been taken.
 The findings reveal that reforming the welfare state is electorally haz-
ardous, particularly for parties such as social democratic parties, which 
traditionally tie their core constituencies to specific welfare policies. This 
is a more fine-grained specification of the arguments made by Pierson, Vis 
and Giger, which point to the general electoral risks if incumbents engage 
in retrenchment (Pierson 1994, 1996; Vis 2009, 2010; Giger 2011; Giger 
& Nelson 2011). With respect to Pierson and the New Politics School, 
blame-avoidance is not a lasting strategy to evade electoral setback for 
reform-minded social democrats. Parties matter in terms of whether re-
trenchment is electorally costly or not. Parties that traditionally advocate 
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risk-hedging social policies are exposed to severe losses if they violate 
this principle by cutting back the welfare state. Parties with no reputation 
on welfare may find it easier to retrench the welfare state without taking 
the electoral blame, since in doing so, they are not acting against their 
own social policy legacy (cf. Giger & Nelson 2011). This may explain the 
mixed results in Giger’s research, with its focus on vote choice for incum-
bents after retrenchment (Armingeon & Giger 2008; Giger 2011; Giger & 
 Nelson 2011). Giger’s recently published book maintains that the electoral 
risks attributed to welfare state reforms are probably overstated, as many 
incumbent governments survive elections despite having engaged in re-
trenchment. Moreover, the electoral blame varies substantially between 
electoral contexts. In light of these claims, I briefly contrast the results 
from Giger’s book with the findings of this study.
 Given the two different research designs, the comparison remains nec-
essarily crude. As mentioned, Giger’s main claim is that the electoral risks 
of retrenchment are probably overrated, as only a few incumbent govern-
ments have been punished after retrenchment (see also Giger & Nelson 
2011). Considering my findings, Giger’s claim may be too general, but this 
could be caused by the research design.
 As Giger’s analysis only chooses for or against the incumbent govern-
ment (respectively the main governmental party) as the dependent vari-
able, there is no distinction between parties or party families. Therefore, 
completely different types of parties are treated as being within the same 
category, such as reform-minded market liberals and pro-welfare social-
ists, when in office. But there are strong reasons to expect the electoral 
effects to differ by party family if governments engage in cutbacks. My 
analyses demonstrate the electoral effects of reforms implemented un-
der Third Way agendas by ruling social democrats. These effects cannot 
be identified by Giger’s research design. A related weakness is the prior 
exclusion of non-voters from the analysis (cf. Giger 2011: 68), which may 
have weakened or even added bias to some of the effects. As my book 
shows, this is especially true for countries with majoritarian electoral sys-
tems, since reform-averse voters often have no alternative and thus do 
not necessarily shift to the opposition, but stay at home. This segment of 
voters and their behaviour in the wake of welfare state reforms are unfor-
tunately not captured by Giger’s analysis.
 Giger also used only one election per country (except for Portugal), 
which makes it difficult to trace back the long-term effects of retrench-
ment found in her thesis. Also, the elections are not selected based on 
whether considerable retrenchment took place, so many elections where 
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reforms were likely to have influenced the results are omitted, for instance 
the British general election in 2001, the German federal election in 2005, 
the Swedish 1998 Riksdag election and the elections in New Zealand dur-
ing the period of radical retrenchment in the 1980s and 1990s.
 The results of my study thus supplement Giger’s contribution with a 
more nuanced account of the actual electoral consequences of reforms. 
After they depart from their conventional social policies, parties with a 
traditional programmatic commitment to a generous welfare state risk 
losing parts of their core constituency to other parties or to abstention. 
This was the case for Third Way social democrats that suspended decom-
modification to a substantial degree. The actual electoral effects of such 
policy changes can be quite substantial, as this book has shown. It has 
proved fruitful to conceptualise policy changes from both a qualitative 
and quantitative perspective to obtain a more comprehensive picture of 
the actual change.
 An important implication is that we have to take into account which 
type of party implements which policy to formulate our expectations 
about the electoral consequences of welfare state reforms. Simple budget 
consolidation measures implemented under bourgeois governments may 
ultimately be less costly than recommodification implemented by social 
democrats, as the latter party family draws on a core constituency that 
demands the very opposite.
 The same can be argued when it comes to another rival explanation, 
one that originates from the New Politics School. Ross (2000) maintains 
that social democrats could use their ownership of social policy issues to 
avoid electoral blame when they chose to reform the welfare state. This 
‘Nixon-goes-to-China logic’ did not work in the cases where social demo-
crats reformed the welfare state.
 The results show that this explanation does not apply to the British, 
Danish and German cases. The three social democratic parties mod-
ernised under Third Way agendas and while they might have won the first 
Third Way election with their traditional welfare image, this reputation 
was subsequently damaged in all three cases. Under its novel New Labour 
label, British social democracy lost the image of representing the interests 
of the working class and the unemployed to a considerable degree. Core 
voters no longer attributed this image to their traditional political choice 
after the party engaged in the New Deal reforms, and stayed at home. In 
Denmark, the centre-right parties caught up with or even took over the 
social democrats’ ownership of welfare issues during the period between 
1994 and 2001, when the sd changed its programme and reformed the 
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welfare state (Goul Andersen 2003a; Blomqvist & Green-Pedersen 2004). 
The Danish People’s Party successfully presented itself as the represen-
tative of ordinary wage earners and claimed that the social democrats 
had lost this function. In Germany, the Left Party attacked the social 
democrats for having departed from their social democratic profile under 
Schröder and the Agenda 2010 reforms. So did many social democratic 
voters (e.g. Debus 2008). In turn, the Left Party increased its share of vot-
ers, who saw this party as owning the welfare issue.
 In view of this evidence, Ross’ claim about issue ownership is rather 
static and does not account for loss of the welfare issue as a result of re-
forms breaking with social democracy’s traditional social policy image. 
If this happens, other parties may win the issue and an electoral setback 
occurs, contrary to the Nixon-goes-to-China logic.
 Th erefore, the two rival explanations do not apply to a comprehensive 
explanation of the developments in Denmark, Germany and the United 
Kingdom. Blame-avoidance cannot prevent long-lasting dealignments of 
partisans after retrenchment. Th is perspective is rather myopic and while 
it may help explain why one election was successful, it fails to account for 
subsequent losses. It may be easier for social democrats to implement wel-
fare state reforms given their ownership of the welfare issue, as elabo rated 
by Ross (2000) and as shown for the cases of Denmark and the  Netherlands 
in Green-Pedersen’s analysis (2002a). Nevertheless, the parties lose the is-
sue by reforming the welfare state, and other parties may have a chance to 
win the issue among a significant share of the electorate and thus mobilise 
previous social democratic core supporters. In this vein, recommodifying 
reforms implemented by social democrats cause electoral setbacks that 
cannot be explained or prevented by blame-avoidance or ownership of 
welfare issues.
 Furthermore, the results must be placed in the context of another rival 
explanation, the postulated decline of class voting as a trend in modern 
societies. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, the decline of class vot-
ing literature offers various explanations concerning the weakening effect 
of voters’ social class on vote choice and party alignment. In particular, it 
has been argued that social democratic parties need to modernise their 
appeal to middle-class constituencies and tone down their working-class 
appeal, as this latter constituency is shrinking. Th is argument typically 
concerns the period before the Th ird Way; that is, between the 1970s and 
1990s. It can be argued that my fi ndings simply refl ect a continuation of 
the trend towards the declining importance of class for the vote choice – 
especially the role of class for alignment towards social democratic parties.
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 However, the empirical analyses demonstrated that the reforms did af-
fect whether social democrats would lose considerable support among 
their core constituencies, mainly through dealignment (United Kingdom) 
or realignment (Denmark, Germany). In Sweden, the deviant case, the 
sap’s share among its rank and file fluctuated rather than declined, as 
the party did not adopt a Third Way agenda. The reforms may have trig-
gered a weakening of support for social democrats among traditional core 
voters. Of course, this development can be interpreted as a further de-
cline in class voting, but in contrast to macro-level explanations, the study 
demonstrated that there is no secular trend towards declining support for 
social democrats among their traditional core voters. Rather, policy and 
policy change mattered for the logic of electoral change.5 Accordingly, 
the Third Way may be seen as a response to the decline of class voting in 
a first step (e.g. Giddens 1998), but also as a catalyst of this (postulated) 
trend, as the diverging development in Sweden showed.
 In a similar vein, the declining support for social democracy could be 
regarded as the cost of ruling. One simple argument may be that the par-
ties studied in this book have simply suffered average losses after ruling 
for long periods. All social democratic parties contested at least three 
elections after having gained office in the 1990s.6 Admittedly, the costs of 
ruling may account for some of the decline, but not for the departure of 
the social democratic core constituency. The average costs of ruling for 
mainstream parties are likely to appear among swing voters who do not 
belong to the core constituency. According to Esping-Andersen’s theory, 
the social democratic core constituency was traditionally the electoral 
backbone and was tied to the party irrespective of the political situation. 
The results demonstrated that the losses occurred in the core electorate 
after reforms were implemented, which strongly suggests that the results 
cannot be solely explained by the average costs of ruling, but also by the 
policy change introduced by Third Way social democrats. Otherwise, the 
Swedish pattern of electoral change could be expected to be more similar 
to those found in the other countries, as the sap – liked Labour and the 
spd – governed for three consecutive terms. In view of the fact that by 
1995, at least one out of four voters in Western Europe belonged to occu-
pational groups conceptualised as social democracy’s core constituency 
(see Table. 2.3), the losses for Third Way social democrats were of a non-
negligible nature, but not a simple result of declining class voting.
 Another rival explanation from the literature on the new right is that 
these parties tend to win by mobilising on socio-cultural issues, espe-
cially immigration, as their positions on these issues match those of so-
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cial demo cratic core voters (Kitschelt 2001b; Scheuregger & Spier 2007; 
Houtman et al. 2008; Kriesi et al. 2008). This objection concerns the Dan-
ish case in particular. One might argue that the df’s gains were the result 
of a specific aspect of social democracy’s transformation under the Third 
Way agenda, which did not concern welfare policy as such, but rather 
socio-cultural issues. Giddens has proposed ‘cosmopolitan pluralism’ as a 
distinct Third Way value (Giddens 1998: 66; cf. also Kriesi et al. 2008: 16). 
Kitschelt (2001b: 440), using the examples of New Labour and the Demo-
crats under Clinton, has argued that social democracy has increasingly 
endorsed libertarian positions to attract the new middle class and highly-
skilled employees. The price was sacrificing those parts of the core con-
stituency that do not hold libertarian attitudes. This generated increasing 
voter potential for authoritarian right-wing parties. From this perspec-
tive, the Third Way also has alienating effects on social democracy’s core 
constituency, which endorses other values on the socio-cultural dimen-
sion than ‘cosmopolitan pluralism’.
 On that score, the emergence of the immigration issue over the last two 
decades is often seen as the driving force for electoral change in Denmark 
(cf. the volumes of Andersen et al. 1999; Goul Andersen & Borre 2003; 
Goul Andersen et al. 2007; also Qvortrup 2002). Not surprisingly, and 
given Giddens’ and Kitschelt’s arguments, this concerns the rise of the 
Danish People’s Party with its sceptical views on immigration. Similarly, 
the sf’s failure to attract social democratic core voters should be the con-
sequence of the presence of the immigration issue on the political agenda, 
as the party alienated possible new voters with its libertarian stance.
 However, the Danish case reveals that the Danish People’s Party’s suc-
cess depended considerably on the voters’ attitudes towards the Nyrup 
government’s social policy. Social democratic core constituents who op-
posed the Nyrup government’s welfare policy and saw immigration as a 
threat were more likely to switch to the df. Attitudes towards immigra-
tion as such do not account for the realignment. The df could only capi-
talise strongly on the immigration issue once the welfare link between 
the sd and its core voter had been broken as a consequence of the labour 
market reforms. Moreover, Goul Andersen (2003b) has claimed that the 
2001 election was also a welfare election, and not only an election where 
the agenda was dominated by immigration. Giger (2011: 129) has shown 
that social policy was the major campaign issue in the 2001 election for 
the Folketing.
 Similarly, one may object that it has been the left-libertarian image of 
the Socialist People’s Party that has accounted for the party’s failure to 
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gain from the reforms. The results for the party did not differ on the opin-
ion about the reforms, indicating that the party had no chance to mobilise 
new supporters despite its welfare image. One reasonable explanation is 
that the party had dirty hands after supporting the social democratic gov-
ernment. It is true that the party’s performance among voters with a scep-
tical stance on immigration was weaker, but this was not contingent on 
these voters’ attitudes on welfare policy. The party clearly did not benefit 
from its position on immigration, but it had already damaged its cred-
ibility by supporting the social democratic government that introduced 
the labour market reform. Otherwise, the party would have gained votes, 
at least among voters who did not regard immigration as a threat, but 
who were displeased with welfare. The rival explanation that the cultural 
dimension is the driving force of gains of the authoritarian right and non-
gains for the left becomes more supplemental in light of my findings. The 
reforms triggered the electoral change in the Danish case, whereas the 
immigration issue magnified the effects, to the advantage of the Danish 




Th is book has investigated the electoral consequences faced by social 
democrats after having transformed themselves under Third Way agen-
das and reformed the welfare state in ways that are contrary to traditional 
social democratic principles such as decommodification, solidarity and 
egalitarianism (Esping-Andersen 1985, 1990). Esping-Andersen concep-
tualised the alignment to social democratic parties as a match between 
their supply of social policy and the demands of the working class and 
lower white-collar employees. Thus, the decommodification of the wage 
earner has traditionally been a priority for social democracy, as these pol-
icies bound social democracy to its core constituency.
 Applying a partisan politics perspective, I argued that by adopting the 
Third Way agenda, social democrats risk alienating their core constitu-
ency, as this implies a moderation of social democracy’s stance on social 
policy. In particular, the welfare state reforms implemented under the 
Third Way broke with the decommodification principle, since eligibility 
and entitlements were curtailed, the universality and generosity of social 
security reduced and benefits cut. Hence, the guiding focus has been the 
core constituency’s potential dealignment from social democracy. Inte-
grating Esping-Andersen’s theory into arguments from the New Politics 
of the Welfare State literature, I established a framework conceptualising 
the electoral consequences of recommodification for social democracy.
 First-past-the-post electoral systems produce a dealignment of social 
democratic core voters into the non-voter camp, as this electoral sys-
tem effectively prevents the emergence of serious competitor parties for 
Third Way social democrats. In contrast, pr systems not only produce 
dealignments, they are also expected to produce realignments of social 
democratic core voters, as dangerous challengers to social democracy 
are present or can easily emerge. Two types of parties have been identi-
fied as the most dangerous competitors for Third Way social democracy. 
First, left-socialist parties can attract social democratic core voters due 
to their pro-welfare stance in times when social democrats have damaged 
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their welfare reputation. Second, authoritarian right-wing parties have a 
chance to woo social democratic core voters if the welfare link is broken, 
because they match voters’ preferences on socio-cultural issues. An im-
portant qualification in this respect is that credibility considerations af-
fect whether social democratic core voters will shift to a competitor. The 
claim is that realignments do not occur automatically once voters become 
dissatisfied with the social democrats. If challengers alienate possible vot-
ers by adopting a reform agenda of their own or a distinctly libertarian 
domestic policy, then they destroy their prospects of winning voters from 
the social democrats. These propositions were examined using the cases 
of Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
 The Swedish case supported the claim that social democrats are able 
to maintain stable support from the traditional core constituency if they 
stick to traditional social democratic principles in social policy. The Brit-
ish case demonstrated that Third Way social democrats lose core voters 
to abstention if they reform the welfare state under a majoritarian elec-
toral system. The case of Germany revealed that a credible left-socialist 
challenger could forge a realignment of social democratic core voters as a 
consequence of Third Way reforms. The Danish case demonstrated that 
left competitors could not attract social democratic core voters if they had 
previously lost credibility. Moreover, it supported the claim that right-
wing authoritarian parties could foster a realignment of social democratic 
core voters as an effect of Third Way reforms. The results raise questions 
about the political implications of the Third Way and social democracy’s 
future electoral fortunes, questions that will be discussed after consider-
ing the applicability of the book’s arguments to further cases.
9.1 Applicability of arguments to other countries
Given that the theoretical framework of the electoral consequences of wel-
fare state reforms featured four countries with considerable variation in 
party systems and party behaviour, it should be possible to apply the argu-
ments to other countries where social democratic parties have reformed the 
welfare state.
 Th e arguments about electoral systems and which types of parties are 
dangerous challengers also apply to other countries. In New Zealand, social 
democrats reformed the welfare state under an fptp system in an example 
of radical welfare state retrenchment (Starke 2008). Both major parties en-
gaged in far-reaching reforms of social security as well as the economy in 
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general. Th e Labour Party (1984-90) reformed and retrenched various social 
security schemes and implemented tax reforms contradicting the traditional 
social democratic ideal of egalitarianism. Between 1984 and 1990, turnout 
in New Zealand declined by 8.5 per cent, a development that resembles the 
situation in the uk. Labour lost power, but the National Party continued the 
welfare state reforms, which led to the rise of new contenders, in particular 
a leftist party called ‘NewLabour’ that is the opposite of the British equiva-
lent.1 Th e party won 5.1 per cent of the votes and one seat under the fptp 
system in the 1990 election. At the end of the reform period and a successful 
referendum to change to a mixed member proportionality system (mmp), 
New Zealand saw the establishment of left- and right-wing populist parties 
as new competitors to New Zealand Labour. Th is refl ects the patterns found 
in the uk, Denmark and Germany.2
 In the Netherlands, the Labour Party (PvdA) began to modernise its 
programme and ideological stance in the 1980s after a long period in op-
position, despite good election results. The programmatic change first 
became visible in a coalition with the Christian Democrats (1989-94), and 
the party was among the first to develop a distinct Third Way agenda 
(Green-Pedersen et al. 2001). In this period, the party was involved in a 
highly unpopular reform of the very generous early retirement scheme. 
This was followed by significant losses for both major welfare parties in 
the 1994 election, where two retiree parties gained parliamentary repre-
sentation. Nevertheless, the PvdA remained in office after forming a coali-
tion with the right-wing liberals (vvd) and the social liberals (d66). This 
‘purple’ coalition continued to reform the Dutch welfare state, making the 
labour market more flexible, increasing the use of active labour market 
policies and tightening eligibility criteria for social security schemes in 
the period between 1994 and 2002 (Vis et al. 2008). The social democrats 
went from having about one-third of the popular vote to less than one-
sixth in the 2002 election. The same period saw the rise of the otherwise 
marginalised Socialist Party (sp) to 6 per cent of the votes, gains for the 
pro-welfare Christian Democrats and the landslide victory of Pim For-
tuyn’s list. After the social democrats formed another reform coalition 
with the cda, the sp peaked in 2006 with 16.6 per cent of the vote. The 
rise of the socialists is especially reminiscent of the developments in Ger-
many, where a populist left-socialist party gained momentum after the so-
cial democratic party engaged in welfare state reforms as a consequence 
of an ideological realignment towards the centre. Since 1998, the PvdA 
has never reached 30 per cent or more of the votes after the party revised 
its programme and engaged in a reform of the Dutch welfare state.
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 The case of the Norwegian Labour Party (Det Norske Arbeiderparti, 
dna) matches the case of the Swedish sap to some degree. The party 
modernised moderately during the 1990s with a new discourse called 
‘work line’ (Arbeidslinje) in response to growing unemployment (Dahl & 
Drøpping 2001; Huo 2009: 70f ). The reforms emphasised almps and lim-
ited reforms of eligibility criteria and entitlement periods, but they were 
neither a fundamental break with the dna’s traditional social policy posi-
tions nor did they fundamentally recalibrate or retrench the Norwegian 
welfare state (e.g. Dahl & Drøpping 2001; Huo 2009: 211ff ).3 The Labour 
Party’s vote share during this period fluctuated around 35 per cent be-
tween 1989 and 2009, with the exception of 2001, when the party only 
received 24.3 per cent after a brief stint as an ineffective minority gov-
ernment. The Left Socialist Party did not make lasting gains in the elec-
tions during this period. Hence, the case of the dna resembles the pattern 
found for its Swedish sister party, as the reforms were moderate and the 
party did not suffer a lasting punishment, remaining the strongest party 
throughout the period.
9.2 Contribution to existing literature and political implications
My evidence shows that the literature drawing on party politics and party 
competition as explanations for reforms can be rewritten into a frame-
work of the electoral consequences of those reforms. Determinants for 
the likelihood of welfare state reforms, such as the electoral system, the 
nature of party competition, and in particular the presence of left-social-
ist and authoritarian right blackmail parties, also structure the electoral 
consequences once the reforms have been implemented.
 One implication is that majoritarian electoral systems not only deter-
mine the likelihood of reforms, as suggested by some authors (Kitschelt 
2001a; Starke 2008), but also structure the electoral aftermath of the re-
forms. A majoritarian system such as the British fptp electoral rule has 
been said to increase the propensity of reforms, as the party system does 
not include any serious veto players that can attack social democrats 
when they go for welfare state reform. The same logic applies after the 
reforms, as reform-averse voters lack an effective and credible alterna-
tive to abstention. It has been argued that pr systems hamper welfare 
state recalibration, especially if veto players such as left-socialist parties, 
Christian democrats or other kinds of blackmail parties exist. As these 
parties constitute a serious electoral threat to reform-minded parties, 
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policy makers seeking re-election find it more difficult to implement 
reforms. This book reveals that the presence of such parties structures 
not only the path towards reforms, but also their electoral consequences 
in principle. pr systems with or without very low thresholds are likely 
to produce more electoral turmoil and lasting realignments as a conse-
quence of unpopular reforms than majoritarian systems that keep black-
mail and protest parties out.
 A further implication is that those parties must be credible: they do not 
attract social democratic core voters simply by being there, as the litera-
ture often assumes. I demonstrate that credibility considerations do play 
a role in the electoral prospects of challengers. The two parties that ‘came 
in from the cold’ as non-established parties, the Left Party in Germany 
and the Danish People’s Party, forged realignments, whereas the socialists 
in Denmark failed because they had dirty hands. In Sweden, the Left Party 
was unable to retain the votes gained in 1998 after the economic crisis, 
probably because it had acted as a support party for the social democratic 
government, which it had previously criticised for its crisis management. 
Similarly, the German cdu/csu failed to capitalise on its welfare image af-
ter the spd engaged in path-breaking reforms, since the party had its own 
reform agenda. In other words, blackmail parties or veto players identi-
fied by the new politics literature (Kitschelt 2001a) do not automatically 
benefit once reforms are implemented by a competitor, but are judged on 
their previous strategies. This implies that policymakers may implement 
reforms against the odds and avoid serious punishment if veto players 
(e.g. left-socialist or Christian Democratic parties) have dirty hands. Such 
situations may ease electoral dilemmas for reform-minded actors. The 
party and party competition literature should consider the credibility of 
suspected serious challengers to reform-minded mainstream parties.
 This book contributes to the ongoing debate on the importance of 
class voting in Western democracies. As a point of departure, the Third 
Way was claimed to be a reaction to the suspected decline of class voting, 
namely the declining importance of working class votes for the electoral 
prospects of social democracy. My results show that in instances where 
social democrats adapted a Third Way agenda, this was a catalyst for de-
clining support for social democracy on the part of the manual classes. In 
this respect, Kitschelt (1994) claimed that the old social democratic work-
ing class constituency would become too small to play a significant role 
in social democratic parties’ future electoral considerations. This is why 
social democrats have to incorporate new middle class constituencies in 
their electoral programmes and tone down their working-class image. In 
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a recent comment, Keman (2011) stated that the Third Way increased the 
office-seeking capability of social democracy, but its electoral position 
did not improve because it moved towards the political centre. Moving to 
the centre is regarded as an adaption to changing party systems and party 
competition to secure social democracy’s potential to preserve govern-
ment participation. Keman maintained that, at least in terms of office-
seeking, the Third Way had been relatively successful.
 However, my findings indicate that relying on these strategies can 
sometimes be dangerous, as the loss of this part of the electorate may dis-
possess social democrats of the ability to form majorities. Support from 
the core constituency may have dropped to the point where it is difficult 
to achieve parliamentary majorities, as seen in the cases of Denmark and 
Germany. In Denmark, the Danish People’s Party took over a consider-
able part of social democracy’s working class constituency after 1995. The 
votes were not used for a centre-left majority, but the Danish People’s Par-
ty had supported a bourgeois minority government for more than a dec-
ade. During this decade, the sd had no chance to return to government, 
as the votes lost to the df were a lasting loss for the bloc of leftist parties. 
Even the 2011 Folketing Election revealed a further small loss for the sd, 
and at the time of writing the party has never gained more than 25.8 per 
cent after 2001, and only the strong social liberals allowed the sd to re-
place the centre-right government supported by the Danish People’s Party. 
In Germany, the votes that the spd lost to the Left Party cannot be used to 
form a social democratic majority coalition (nor a centre-right coalition as 
in Denmark). Th e Left Party is still fundamentally an opposition party, and 
not credible or responsible enough to be included in any coalition at the 
federal level, which is to the disadvantage of the social democrats. Another 
aspect is that the low turnout of social democratic core constituents in 
the 2009 federal election allowed the bourgeois parties to form a majority 
coalition with fewer votes than the cdu/csu and fdp gained together in 
2005, but without obtaining a parliamentary majority.4 Th is is one striking 
eff ect of the lower turnout of former spd core constituents.
 Similar effects have been shown by Karreth et al.’s recent study (2012) 
on the electoral effects of social democracy’s move to centrist positions 
under the Third Way. While successful at the first few elections, the repo-
sitioning eventually led to electoral slack and a weaker political position 
on the part of social democratic parties. Voters positioned on the cen-
tre-left or the left abandoned social democracy, which in turn could not 
maintain support among centrist voters. Further effects found by Karreth 
et al. (ibid.) have been the strengthening of left challengers and increas-
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ing abstention among leftist and former social democratic voters. These 
results resemble the findings in this book from a left-right perspective 
and lead to similar conclusions, namely that European social democracy 
lost former strongholds under the Third Way, while failing to attract new 
centrist (middle-class) voters in the long run.
 Thus Third Way reforms may have shifted the balance of power in a 
couple of countries as social democratic parties lost a crucial segment 
of their electorate, and it is somewhat doubtful whether they could fully 
compensate for this by winning new core voters, as suggested by Kitschelt 
(1994, 1999), Giddens (1998) or Keman (2011). I will discuss this in more 
detail below.
 Having analysed the breakthrough of the Danish People’s Party, we 
learned that the Third Way could present a favourable opportunity struc-
ture for parties of the new right. As social democrats have abandoned 
the old positions in social policy that bound them to a working class con-
stituency, authoritarian right-wing parties may now exploit this by ap-
pealing to these voters. This is especially effective if the parties’ stance 
on socio-cultural issues, such as immigration or law and order, is supple-
mented by social protectionist appeals on welfare issues. Authoritarian 
right-wing parties can be regarded as post-industrial labour parties, in 
line with Kitschelt’s propositions (2001b). This is reflected by the findings 
from the Danish case and recent developments in several other countries, 
where such parties have tried to combine a social protectionist stance on 
the socio-economic dimension with authoritarian appeals on the socio-
cultural dimension.
 A related development is the emergence of a new social populist Left 
in response to the transformation of social democracy in some countries 
and Third Way welfare state reforms (March & Mudde 2005). Die Linke’s 
breakthrough is not only a German phenomenon; a similar development 
occurred in the Netherlands, where the Socialist Party gained nationwide 
significance after being completely marginalised in its first electoral ap-
pearances during the 1980s and early 1990s. After the period examined 
in this book, the Socialist People’s Party in Denmark seems to have de-
veloped in a similar direction. Having failed to gain votes in the elections 
from 1990 to 2005, the party abandoned libertarian positions in domestic 
policy to some extent and used a tougher rhetoric on those issues. This 
was combined with an expansionary and somewhat populist stance on 
welfare, which allowed the socialists to gain 13 per cent in the 2007 elec-
tion and capture a lot of working-class votes, as a recent poll has shown 
(Redder 2010). However, the party damaged its credibility again after the 
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2011 election, when the party joined the social democrats and the social-
liberals to form a government. The sf has campaigned on withdrawing 
the early retirement reforms of the previous centre-right government, but 
has now been forced to implement those reforms as a governmental party. 
This produced bad opinion polls after the 2011 election and is another 
tentative corroboration of the credibility argument on left-wing challeng-
ers made in this book.
 Finally, Kriesi and collaborators’ excellent book seems to apply beyond 
parties of the new right (Kriesi et al. 2008). Intensifying globalisation and 
welfare state recalibration may benefit not only authoritarian right-wing 
parties in terms of political mobilisation of the ‘losers of globalisation 
and modernisation’, but also a new social populist Left. These parties may 
attract such voter segments with a distinct social protectionist agenda, 
promising higher social benefits and an anti-establishment attitude. Such 
developments have already been observed by Kriesi et al. (2008: 340) and 
should be addressed in future research, to which I now turn.
9.3 Implications for future research on social democracy
In line with the electoral dilemma that preceded the Third Way, future 
research should examine what kinds of electoral and strategic dilem-
mas are faced by today’s social democracy. This will enhance our under-
standing of social democracy’s political future. New Labour insider and 
spin doctor Peter Mandelson recently described the strategic consid-
erations of the Labour Party before the 2010 general election (Mandel-
son 2010: chap. 12). As the party faced both the Conservatives and the 
relatively strong Liberal Democrats as serious opponents, New Labour’s 
campaign team had to choose between a riskier appeal to the middle 
classes, which could keep the party in office for one more term, or ap-
pealing to core voters, securing its traditional supporters to outperform 
the Liberal Democrats at least. This implies that the strategic trade-
off is still manifest for the electoral considerations of social democratic 
parties, even though most Third Way agendas have been abandoned in 
principle.
 Furthermore, I claim that social democracy’s future strategic trade-off 
could not only be a dilemma, but increasingly a trilemma between appeal-
ing to the traditional core constituency, appealing to new middle-class 
constituencies, and appealing to various outsider groups. Beginning with 
the latter, economic and societal changes have, at least in some countries, 
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produced various groups of labour market outsiders and even a new post-
industrial underclass as part of the electorate. This segment lacks regu-
lar employment and often lacks regular employment records, unlike the 
traditional social democratic core constituency (Huo 2009: 321; Lindvall 
& Rueda 2012). Moreover, these people have often drawn social security 
benefits, in particular social assistance and housing benefits, for long pe-
riods or even their whole lives. In Max Weber’s words (1920), they con-
stitute ‘Versorgungsklassen’ (literally classes of public provision) and rely 
on the welfare state not only if they temporarily drop out of the market, 
for instance due to unemployment, but also as their main and perma-
nent source of income. This problem was one motivation for some social 
democratic parties to adopt Third Way policies, but it remains urgent 
in many Western countries. For instance, the German spd recently tried 
to strengthen its appeal to this voter segment by advocating higher ben-
efits for the long-term unemployed and expansion of benefits for children 
from poor households.
 These groups have different political preferences and demands from 
working-class or middle-class voters, which creates a political conflict 
between new and old social risk clienteles (Rueda 2005, 2006, 2007; 
Armingeon 2006; Kitschelt & Rehm 2006; cf. also further contributions 
in Armingeon & Bonoli 2006). Armingeon (2006: 118f ) states that these 
trade-offs concern class-based social democratic parties in particular. 
Similarly, Rueda (2005, 2006, 2007) has proposed that labour market 
insiders and outsiders do not share political attitudes, especially on la-
bour market and social policies. Social democrats have often been biased 
towards insiders and have neglected the political demands of outsider 
groups (cf. the recent analysis of this claim by Lindvall & Rueda 2012). 
If social democracy focuses more on socially weak outsider groups, as 
maintained by Huo, electoral considerations may increasingly become a 
trilemma, as all three groups – the old core constituency, the middle class, 
and the outsiders (or the new underclass) – have distinct preferences and 
attitudes that are difficult to unite under a coherent electoral programme. 
Lindvall and Rueda’s analysis (2012) indicates that changing priorities in 
favour of outsider protection brings electoral costs for social democratic 
parties.
 An important aspect of this is the challenge from a new social popu-
list left. We have established that the Third Way also accounted for the 
emergence of this type of party, and future research agendas should con-
ceptualise this party family in a more elaborate manner and analyse its 
electoral fortunes. It is likely that social populist left parties affect the 
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political landscape around the insider-outsider divide and hence the 
strategic considerations of social democracy. These parties may appeal to 
outsiders by promising higher social security benefits and by advocating 
tightly regulated labour markets for precarious forms of employment. 
This has been the recent strategy of the Left Party in Germany, which 
intensified the spd’s strategic dilemmas to incorporate both groups in its 
electoral programme. This calls for more research on the new populist 
left to enhance our knowledge on recent dynamics in electoral change in 
several countries.
 The topics mentioned are strongly related to the discussion on wheth-
er social democratic parties have actually won new voter groups and 
formed new electoral coalitions by modernising their ideology, reform-
ing the welfare state and appealing to highly skilled constituencies, as 
proposed by Kitschelt (1994, 2001b), Häusermann (2006, 2010) or Buse-
meyer (2009). Silja Häusermann (2006, 2010) argues that post-industrial 
pension reforms could be implemented as cross-cutting social divisions 
have allowed policymakers to engage in coalition-building. This has led to 
cross-class reform coalitions across the traditional capital-labour cleav-
age. As veto players and opponents have been incorporated in the public 
debate and legislative process, new actor coalitions have made it possible 
to implement pension reforms that otherwise would have failed. Another 
variant of the argument goes that social democrats have increased their 
focus on education to attract voter segments that prefer to see an expan-
sion of the educational system (Busemeyer 2009). In some contexts, this 
strategy may generate new electoral alliances with the well-educated off-
spring of social democracy’s old core constituency.
 It has been argued that centre-left parties such as social democrats 
forged new societal alliances with highly skilled libertarian segments 
and various groups of labour market outsiders, who may form a new 
core constituency after levels of support from the working class have 
dropped (cf. Kitschelt 1994 for similar propositions). There are reasons 
to be sceptical about the proposition that social democrats have really 
attracted a considerable number of new voters who will form a lasting 
core constituency as a consequence of the policy shift. Even though this 
study has examined another type of reform, my results indicate that 
social democ racy’s electoral strength did not seriously improve, as the 
votes lost among the core constituency were not offset by new voters 
from other constituencies due to the reforms. The Third Way may have 
increased social democracy’s strategic flexibility, especially in terms of 
broadening the coalition options, as stated by Keman (2011). This is one 
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likely reason why cross-class coalitions and cross-party coalitions in wel-
fare state recalibration were possible, as demonstrated by Häusermann 
(2006, 2010). On the other hand, it is doubtful whether these develop-
ments went in line with new and stable electoral alliances between social 
democracy and the new target voter groups (see Karreth et al. 2012 for a 
similar argument).
 Future research has to investigate whether recent welfare state recali-
bration has materialised in new and stable electoral alignments or merely 
ephemeral reform coalitions in parliaments. The findings here point to 
the latter direction as the gains, if they were even made, among the admit-
tedly roughly specified non-core constituency, were not substantial. One 
reason could be that social democracy’s traditional working-class con-
stituency was indeed tied by the party’s programmatic commitment in 
the heyday of welfare capitalism, whereas the new voter groups have more 
ambiguous attitudes on socio-economic issues, as Häusermann suspects 
(2010: 215f ).
 It is more difficult to forge a lasting alignment with social groups that 
lack coherent and consistent social policy preferences compared to the 
match between old social democracy’s political positions and the working 
class constituency’s social policy preferences. This problem needs to be 
elaborated by using recently developed class schemes to account for labour 
market stratification in post-industrial societies (Müller 1999; Kitschelt & 
Rehm 2005; Güveli 2006; Oesch 2006). The schemes distinguish occu-
pational groups that authors such as Kitschelt (1994) and Häusermann 
(2006, 2010) have identified as target constituencies for social democracy. 
Comparative and longitudinal studies should reveal whether and under 
which circumstances social democratic parties can successfully forge new 
class coalitions with the highly skilled and libertarian segments of the 
electorate.
 The cases studies in this book suggest that only New Labour succeeded 
in gaining a foothold among new groups of the electorate. Together with 
the current electoral bias of the British electoral landscape, the party sur-
vived the 2001 and 2005 elections with comfortable majorities, despite 
the dealignment of parts of the core constituency. Labour might have won 
the new voter groups that Kitschelt and others have specified as new tar-
get groups for the same reason that it only suffered a dealignment, but no 
realignment, of its core voters. The electoral system prevents competition 
from parties that typically attract these voters. Apart from the mainstream 
Liberal Democrats, New Labour did not face a distinctly left libertarian, 
green or radical liberal party in Westminster elections. This may have 
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compensated for the losses among Labour’s traditional core electorate 
and secured the majorities in 2001 and 2005, in spite of the large drop in 
turnout caused by the party’s ideological transformation. Labour has thus 
suffered fewer political costs as a consequence of the modernisation un-
der the Third Way compared to its Continental sister parties, as recently 
claimed by Randall & Sloam (2009).
 Similarly, Stubager’s analysis (2006) of the education cleavage in Den-
mark showed that the social democrats did not attract the highly edu-
cated after the programmatic adaption in the 1990s, but that the Social 
Liberals and the Socialist People’s Party had their strongholds among 
these voters. Similarly, political commentators in Germany were scepti-
cal about the spd’s future electoral prospects when the party started to 
mobilise on the same issues as the Greens recently did (Lachmann 2010). 
This does not benefit the spd, as the voters prefer the ‘original’ party and 
not the copy. More turmoil for the spd occurred after the former so-
cial democratic senator of finance for the State of Berlin, Thilo Sarrazin, 
published a book in which he criticised, among other things, Germany’s 
immigration policy in recent decades, especially focusing on problems 
caused by immigrants from Muslim countries (Sarrazin 2010). The spd’s 
leadership immediately decided to launch an investigation and to termi-
nate his party membership, as the book’s theses were said to contradict 
the party’s principles. However, this decision resulted in massive losses 
for the spd in the polls, as many voters, spd core voters in particular, 
agreed with Sarrazin’s critique. One may thus speculate whether it is al-
ways fruitful for social democratic parties to emphasise distinct libertar-
ian stances, as suggested by Giddens, Kitschelt, Häusermann and others, 
and which some did under Third Way labels. In combination with fur-
ther welfare state recalibration, libertarian programmes may not be vote-
winners for mainstream social democratic parties, as they do not attract 
considerable voter shares beyond the proposed new target groups. A 
related aspect that should be examined in further research is whether 
competition with green, social liberal or left-libertarian parties has fore-
closed the forging of new electoral alliances. These types of parties are 
likely to have absorbed considerable shares of these voter groups on the 
Continent before the social democrats directed their attention to them 
with the Third Way. A first systematic analysis accounting for electoral 
systems suggested that social democratic parties failed to attract the new 
target constituencies in countries applying pr with rather low thresh-
olds, whereas this was more successful under majoritarian systems, such 
as those in Australia or the uk (Arndt 2011). It can be argued that the 
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tougher competition for these voter segments in Continental Europe ac-
counts for social democracy’s failure to form new alignments with the 
Third Way, and its sacrifice of its core constituency. In this respect, the 




 Appendix A: Appendix to Chapter 4 (United Kingdom)
 Data sources
bes 1992, study no. 2981
bes 1997, study no. 3887
bes 2001, study no. 4619
bes 2005, study no. 5494
bes 2010, study no. not yet assigned
 Description of variables used in analysis
Items and their wording for measurement of perception that the Labour 
Party looks after the interests of social groups in Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7:
For 1997 election study, items labintwc and labintun have been used:
How closely do you think that the Labour Party looks after the interests 
of ...
[working class people], [unemployed people]
 1 very closely
 2 fairly closely
 3 not very closely
 4 not at all closely
 8 don’t know
 9 not answered
For 2001 election study and 2005 election study, the following items have 
been used:
 2001: items cq9a and cq9c
 2005: items cq2a and cq2c
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Some people say that political parties look after the interests of some 
groups and are not so concerned about others. How well do you think 
that the Labour Party looks after the interests of the following groups? 
[a) working class people] [c) People who are unemployed or on benefits]
 1 Very well
 2 Fairly well
 3 Not very well
 4 Not at all well
 8 Don’t know
The categories 1 and 2 have been coded as Labour represents the interests 
of these groups (1); the categories 3 and 4 have been coded as Labour does 
not represent the interests of these groups (0); the categories 8 and 9 had 
been excluded from the analysis. The index was derived from the two 
dummy variables and coded as described in Section 4.5 of the text.
Table A1.1 Eff ects of voter group membership and perception of Labour Party on party 
choice in British General Election 2001. Coeffi  cients from multinomial logistic 
regression models




Conservatives Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 0.71** 0.75**
Aligned core constituency -3.13*** -3.18***
Perception (Reference: Labour represents 
both groups)
Labour does not represent one of the groups 0.86*** 0.82***




LibDems Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 0.89*** 0.92***
Aligned core constituency -1.50*** -1.35***
Perception (Reference Labour represents 
both groups)
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Table A1.1 Eff ects of voter group membership and perception of Labour Party on party 
choice in British General Election 2001. Coeffi  cients from multinomial logistic 
regression models




Labour does not represent one of the groups 0.62*** 0.66**




Other parties Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 0.96** 0.92*
Aligned core constituency -0.52 -0.49
Perception (Reference Labour represents 
both groups)
Labour does not represent one of the groups 0.99** 0.95**




Non-voting Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 1.41*** 1.39***
Aligned core constituency -1.01*** -0.87***
Perception (Reference Labour represents 
both groups)
Labour does not represent one of the groups 0.73*** 0.80***





Nagelkerke’s R2 22.9 34.8
BIC’ -292.04 -196.18
Note: ***: signifi cant at .001-level, **: signifi cant at 0.01-level, *: signifi cant at 0.05-level, !: 
signifi cant at 0.1-level. Reference category for party choice: Labour Party. Further control 
variables for region not shown.
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Table A1.2 Eff ects of voter group membership and perception of Labour Party on party 
choice in British General Election 2005. Coeffi  cients from multinomial logistic 
regression models




Conservative Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency -0.88*** -0.88***
Aligned core constituency -2.52*** -2.59***
Core constituency: abstention in 2001 1.67! 1.66!
Perception (Reference: Labour represents 
both groups)
Labour does not represent one of the 
groups
1.32*** 1.38***




LibDems Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency -0.31 -0.26
Aligned core constituency -1.27** -1.31**
Core constituency: abstention in 2001 1.86* 1.68!
Perception (Reference: Labour represents 
both groups)
Labour does not represent one of the 
groups
1.36*** 1.40***




Other parties Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 0.47 0.51!
Aligned core constituency 0.37 0.51
Core constituency: abstention in 2001 3.12** 3.02**
Perception (Reference: Labour represents 
both groups)
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Table A1.2 Eff ects of voter group membership and perception of Labour Party on party 
choice in British General Election 2005. Coeffi  cients from multinomial logistic 
regression models




Labour does not represent one of the 
groups
1.53*** 1.57***




Non-voting Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 0.72*** 0.70***
Aligned core constituency -0.52 -0.42
Core constituency: abstention in 2001 4.31*** 4.08***
Perception (Reference: Labour represents 
both groups)
Labour does not represent one of the 
groups
1.15*** 1.15***





Nagelkerke’s R2 20.6 32.5
BIC’ -227.85 -130.29
Note: ***: signifi cant at .001- level, **: signifi cant at 0.01-level, *: signifi cant at 0.05-level, !: 
signifi cant at 0.1 level. Reference category for party choice: Labour Party. Further control 
variables for region not shown.
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 Appendix B: Appendix to Chapter 5 (Germany)
 Data sources
German National Election Studies 1965-2005
Politbarometer 2002, ZA3849 & ZA3850 [merged into one dataset]
Politbarometer 2003, ZA4003 & ZA4004 [merged into one dataset]
Politbarometer 2005, ZA4258 & ZA4259 [merged into one dataset]
German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), Pre-Release 1.3. [accessed at 
http://www.dgfw.info/daten.php]
 Description of variables used in analysis
Items and their wording for measurement of attitudes towards reform 
proposals in Table 5.5:
V192: Der Bundeskanzler hat eine Reihe von Vorschlägen zur Reform der 
sozialen Sicherungssysteme gemacht. Gehen Ihnen diese Vorschläge alles 
in allem gesehen…
(Th e Federal Chancellor has made a lot of proposals concerning the reform 
of the social security system. Altogether, do you think these proposals …)
 1. zu weit (go too far)
 2. sind sie gerade richtig (are appropriate)
 3. gehen Ihnen diese Vorschläge nicht weit genug ? (are not sufficient?)
V200: Es gibt auch den Vorschlag, das Arbeitslosengeld zu kürzen, um zu-
sätzliche Anreize zu schaff en, auch schlechter bezahlte Jobs anzunehmen.
(There is also a proposal to cut unemployment benefits to increase incen-
tives to accept lower paid jobs.)
 1.  Finden Sie diesen Vorschlag gut, oder (Do you think that this is a 
good proposal, or)
 2. finden Sie ihn nicht gut? (a bad proposal)
V236: Seit 2003 sind eine Reihe von Reformen in den Bereichen Gesund-
heit, Rente, Arbeitsmarkt und Steuern beschlossen worden. Ganz allge-
mein gefragt: Waren diese Maßnahmen…
(Since 2003 a lot of reforms concerning health, pensions, labour market 
and taxes have been implemented. Generally speaking: do you think these 
measures were…)
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 1. eher richtig (generally right)
 2. eher falsch (generally wrong)
V239: Seit Anfang des Jahres werden die bisherigen Arbeitslosenhilfe und 
die Sozialhilfe zum Arbeitslosengeld II („zwei“) zusammengefasst. Damit 
für Arbeitslose, die länger als ein Jahr arbeitslos, der Anreiz höher wird, 
wieder Arbeit anzunehmen, werden die Leistungen im Vergleich zur bis-
herigen Arbeitslosenhilfe in der Regel gekürzt. Finden Sie…
(Since the beginning of this year, benefits for the long-term unemployed 
and social assistance have been merged into a single scheme [Arbeits-
losengeld II]. To increase incentives to accept a new job for persons who 
have been unemployed for more than a year, benefits have in most in-
stances been cut compared to previous unemployment assistance. Do you 
think …)
 1. diese Kürzungen richtig (these cuts are appropriate)
 2. Finden Sie die nicht richtig (these cuts are not appropriate)
V240: Langzeitarbeitslose müssen jetzt eine Arbeit annehmen, auch wenn 
die Bezahlung bis zu 30 Prozent unter dem jeweiligen Lohnniveau liegt. 
Finden Sie das…
(The long-term unemployed now have to accept a job, even if the remu-
neration is up to 30 per cent below the actual wage level. Do you think 
this is …)
 1. richtig (appropriate)
 2. Finden Sie das nicht richtig (not appropriate)
 Items and their wording for assessment of government’s performance 
in Table 5.7:
V221: Was meinen Sie, macht die Bundesregierung ihre Arbeit alles in al-
lem gesehen…
(On balance, do you think the federal government does a)
 1. eher gut (good job)
 2. eher schlecht (bad job)
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 Items and their wording for measurement of attitudes towards reforms 
in Table 5.8:
Variable V236 as described for Table 5.5 has been used as the dependent 
variable.
 Items and their wording for measurement of attitudes towards reforms 
in Table 5.9:
Vn158_C1-vn158_C3: Und warum haben Sie diese Partei gewählt? Bitte 
nennen Sie mir die wichtigsten Gründe.
(And why did you choose this party? Please specify the most important 
reasons)
Coded as named if respondent named the following reasons for his vote 
decision in items Vn158_C1-vn158_C3 ‘Sozialpolitik’ (Soz. Gerechtigkeit, 
Hartz IV, sozialere Politik, Mindestloehne etc.)
Table A2.1  Eff ects of voter group membership and assessment of government’s 
performance on party choice in federal election 2002. Coeffi  cients from 
multinomial logistic regression models
Party Choice Variable Model without controls
CDU/CSU Voter group (Reference: non-core constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 1.01***
Aligned core constituency -1.57***
Government: bad job 2.31***
Constant -0.94***
PDS Voter group (Reference: non-core constituency) 
Non-aligned core constituency 1.01***
Aligned core constituency -1.02***
Government: bad job 1.13***
Constant -1.55***
Greens Voter group (Reference: non-core constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 0.07
Aligned core constituency -1.49***
Government: bad job 0.32*
Constant -1.70***
APPENDIX B: APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5 (GERMANY)
Table A2.1  Eff ects of voter group membership and assessment of government’s 
performance on party choice in federal election 2002. Coeffi  cients from 
multinomial logistic regression models
Party Choice Variable Model without controls
FDP Voter group (Reference: non-core constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 0.45**
Aligned core constituency -1.33***
Government: bad job 1.88***
Constant -2.17***
Non-voting Voter group (Reference: non-core constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 2.02***
Aligned core constituency -0.63***





Note: ***: signifi cant at .001- level, **: signifi cant at 0.01-level, *: signifi cant at 0.05-level, !: 
signifi cant at 0.1 level. Reference category for party choice: SPD. Other parties not shown.
Table A2.2  Eff ects of voter group membership and assessment of welfare state reforms 
on party choice in federal election 2005. Coeffi  cients from multinomial logistic 
regression models




CDU/CSU Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 2.14*** 2.40**
Aligned core constituency -2.09*** -2.13***
Core constituency: aligned with PDS 2002 -1.30 -1.28
Core constituency: abstention in 2002 0.02 0.02
Sex: men 0.24
Religion (reference: no/other confession)
Catholic 0.95***
Protestant 0.45*
Reforms: wrong 0.95*** 1.04***
Constant 0.09 -0.66
 APPENDICES
Table A2.2  Eff ects of voter group membership and assessment of welfare state reforms 
on party choice in federal election 2005. Coeffi  cients from multinomial logistic 
regression models




Left Party Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 1.16* 1.43**
Aligned core constituency -0.38 -0.30
Core constituency: aligned with PDS 2002 4.00*** 3.47***
Core constituency: abstention in 2002 1.90*** 1.78***
Sex: men 0.23
Religion (reference: no/other confession)
Catholic -0.95**
Protestant -0.78**
Reforms: wrong 1.36*** 1.38***
Constant -2.03*** -1.23***
Greens Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 2.09*** 2.23***
Aligned core constituency -1.87*** -1.85***
Core constituency: aligned with PDS 2002 0.50 0.29
Core constituency: abstention in 2002 -0.13 -0.43
Sex: men -0.52**
Religion (reference: no/other confession)
Catholic -0.15
Protestant -0.37
Reforms: wrong 0.07 -0.01
Constant -1.00*** -0.47
FDP Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 1.77*** 1.94***
Aligned core constituency -2.11*** -2.17***
Core constituency: aligned with PDS 2002 n.e. n.e.
Core constituency: abstention in 2002 n.e. n.e.
Sex: men -0.02
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Table A2.2  Eff ects of voter group membership and assessment of welfare state reforms 
on party choice in federal election 2005. Coeffi  cients from multinomial logistic 
regression models




Religion (reference: no/other confession)
Catholic 0.33
Protestant -0.07
Reforms: wrong 0.57* 0.58*
Constant -1.65*** -1.49***
Non-voting Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 1.90*** 2.04***
Aligned core constituency -0.79** -0.88**
Core constituency: aligned with PDS 2002 1.73* 1.41!
Core constituency: abstention in 2001 -3.29*** 3.01***
Sex: men 0.00
Religion (reference: no/other confession)
Catholic -0.11
Protestant -0.29
Reforms: wrong 1.55*** 1.54***
Constant -1.77***
N 2354 2345
Nagelkerke’s R2 33.1 41.4
BIC’ -716.48 -526.00
Note: ***: signifi cant at .001- level, **: signifi cant at 0.01-level, *: signifi cant at 0.05-level, 
!:signifi cant at 0.10-level. n.e.: not estimated parameter due to empty cells in data matrix. 
Reference category for party choice: SPD. Other parties not shown. Further control variables for 
age categories not shown.
 APPENDICES
 Appendix C: Appendix to Chapter 6 (Denmark)
 Data sources
Danish Election Studies 1973-2005
 Description of variables used in analysis
Items and their wording for measurement of attitudes towards reform 
proposals in Table 6.5:
There is disagreement over the ways to fight unemployment, and there 
are many proposals. People disagree both as to whether these proposals 
will work, and whether they are good or bad because they may also have 
other effects. I shall now read some proposals to you and ask whether you 
think it is a good or bad proposal, taking everything into account
V164: Forcing the unoccupied to take work far from where they live
V167: Setting up individual plans of action for each unemployed
V168: Limiting young people’s access to unemployment benefits
V169 Reducing benefits after one year of unemployment
 1. Good proposal
 2. Bad proposal
 3. Don’t know
 Items and their wording for measurement of attitudes towards 
government’s social policy in Table 6.7:
V58: Jeg vil nu læse en række problemer op for Dem, og jeg vil gerne høre, 
hvem De mener, er bedst til at løse problemet; en socialdemokratisk ledet 
regering, eller en borgerlig regering?
I shall now read some problems to you, and I want to know who you think 
is better at solving the problem: the present government led by the Social 
Democrats, or a bourgeois government?
Til at sikre den rette balance mellem skattetryk og social tryghed? (Secure 
the right balance between taxes and welfare)
 1.  Socialdemokratisk ledet regering (Present social democratic govern-
ment)
 2. Borgerlig regering (Bourgeois government)
 3. Ingen forskel (No difference)
APPENDIX C: APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 6 (DENMARK)
Assessing a social democratic government to perform a balanced policy is 
coded as 1 and other categories as 0.
V106: Indvandring udgør en alvorlig trussel mod vores nationale egen-
art.
(Immigration constitutes a serious threat to our national culture)
 1. Helt enig (Totally agree)
 2. Nærmest enig (Partly agree)
 3. Hverken/eller (Neither agree nor disagree)
 4. Nærmest uenig (Partly disagree)
 5. Helt uenig (Totally disagree)
Coded as dummy variable in analysis: respondents agreeing fully or partly 
with the statement ‘Immigration constitutes a serious threat to our na-
tional culture’ are coded as 1, others are coded as 0. Other answers such 
as ‘don’t know’ have been treated as missing values.
 Items and their wording for measurement of attitudes towards 
government’s social policy in Table 6.8:
V62: Hvor godt mener De, at Nyrup-regeringen har håndteret de følgende 
områder i de sidste 3-4
år? [Velfærden].
How well has the Nyrup-government handled the following areas [Wel-
fare] in the past 3-4 years?
 1. Meget godt (very well)
 2. Godt (well)
 3. Hverken godt eller dårligt (neither well nor poorly)
 4. Dårligt (poorly)
 5. Meget dårligt (very poorly)
Assessment welfare policy under Nyrup Rasmussen for 2001 election: 
Dummy variable, responses for poorly and very poorly were recoded to 1 
indicating poorly, others to 0 indicating neither/well.
V105: Indvandring udgør en alvorlig trussel mod vores nationale egenart.
(Immigration constitutes a serious threat to our national culture)
 APPENDICES
 1. Helt enig (Totally agree)
 2. Nærmest enig (Partly agree)
 3. Hverken/eller (Neither agree nor disagree)
 4. Nærmest uenig (Partly disagree)
 5. Helt uenig (Totally disagree)
Coded as dummy variable in analysis: respondents agreeing fully or partly 
with the statement ‘Immigration constitutes a serious threat to our na-
tional culture’ are coded as 1, others are coded as 0. Other answers such 
as ‘don’t know’ have been treated as missing values.
Table A3.1  Eff ects of voter group membership and social policy attitudes on party 
choice in Danish General Election 1998. Coeffi  cients from multinomial logistic 
regression models




Social Liberals Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 0.51! 0.40
Aligned core constituency -2.31*** -2.28***




Conservatives Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 0.52* 0.55*
Aligned core constituency -3.31*** -3.34***




Venstre Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 0.89*** 0.75**
Aligned core constituency -4.15*** -4.38***
Balance tax-welfare: SD government -3.54*** -3.57***
Age (continuous) 0.01*
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Table A3.1  Eff ects of voter group membership and social policy attitudes on party 
choice in Danish General Election 1998. Coeffi  cients from multinomial logistic 
regression models






SF Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 1.15*** 0.95***
Aligned core constituency -1.32*** -1.37***






Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 1.19*** 1.17***
Aligned core constituency -2.33*** -2.41***




Non-voting Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 1.00** 0.82*
Aligned core constituency -1.27** -1.40**





Nagelkerke’s R2 49.6 54.6
BIC’ -972.82 -783.48
Note: ***: signifi cant at .001- level, **: signifi cant at 0.01-level, *: signifi cant at 0.05-level, !: 
signifi cant at 0.1-level Reference category for party choice. Unity List and other parties not 
shown. Further control variables for region not shown.
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Table A3.2  Eff ects of voter group membership, attitudes towards immigration and 
assessment of government’s social policy on party choice in Danish General 
Election 2001. Coeffi  cients from multinomial logistic regression models




Social Liberals Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 0.28 0.38






Welfare policy: neither 0.34 0.34
Welfare policy: bad 0.61 0.50
Immigration is threat -2.93** -2.91**
Age (continuous) - 0.02
Sex: men - -0.09
Constant -0.91*** -0.84
Conservatives Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 0.65! 0.71*
Aligned core constituency -1.75*** -1.80***
Welfare policy: neither 1.02** 1.01**
Welfare policy: bad 2.28*** 2.29***
Immigration is threat 0.08 0.06
Age (continuous) - 0.00
Sex: men - 0.81**
Constant -1.45*** -2.06**
Venstre Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 0.82** 0.83**
Aligned core constituency -1.82*** -1.87***
Welfare policy: neither 1.37*** 1.35***
Welfare policy: bad 2.55*** 2.55***
Immigration is threat 0.62** 0.61**
Age (continuous) - -0.01
Sex: men - 0.61**
Constant -0.66*** -0.37
SF Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 0.76* 0.83*
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Table A3.2  Eff ects of voter group membership, attitudes towards immigration and 
assessment of government’s social policy on party choice in Danish General 
Election 2001. Coeffi  cients from multinomial logistic regression models




Aligned core constituency -1.35** -1.26**
Welfare policy: neither 0.40 0.40
Welfare policy: bad 0.85 0.79
Immigration is threat -0.98* -0.96*
Age (continuous) - 0.02*




Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 1.44*** 1.45***
Aligned core constituency -0.95* -1.06**
Welfare policy: neither 1.82*** 1.82***
Welfare policy: bad 2.86*** 2.85***
Immigration is threat 2.05*** 2.10***
Age (continuous) - -0.03*
Sex: men - 0.96*
Constant -3.23*** -2.63***
Non-voting Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 1.92*** 1.62***
Aligned core constituency -0.11 -0.27
Welfare policy: neither 1.36*** 1.39***
Welfare policy: bad 1.89** 1.97**
Immigration is threat 0.27 0.26
Age (continuous) - -0.10***
Sex: men - 0.58!
Constant -3.08*** 0.38
N 1153 1153
Nagelkerke’s R2 38.9 47.0
BIC’ -267.68 -86.39
Note: ***: signifi cant at .001- level, **: signifi cant at 0.01-level, *: signifi cant at 0.05-level, !: 
signifi cant at 0.1-level Reference category for party choice. Unity List and other parties not 
shown. Further control variables for region not shown.
 APPENDICES
 Appendix D: Appendix to Chapter 7 (Sweden)
 Data sources
Riks-som 1996 survey, study no. snd 0589
Riks-som 1998 survey, study no. snd 0739
Riks-som 2002 survey, study no. snd 0801
valu 1998 – svt exit poll survey parliamentary election 1998, study no. 
snd 0630
valu 2002 – svt exit poll survey parliamentary election 2002, study no. 
snd 0787
 Description of variables used in analysis
Items and their wording for measurement of attitudes towards reform 
proposals in Table 7.5:
Nedan finns ett antal förslag som har förekommit i den politiska debatten. 
Vilken är Din åsikt om vart och ett av dem?
(Below are some proposals that appeared in the political debate. What is 
your opinion on each of these proposals?)
V127: Minska den offentliga sektorn (Reduce the size of the public sector)
 1. Mycket bra förslag (Very good proposal)
 2. Ganska bra förslag (Good proposal)
 3. Varken bra eller dåligt förslag (Neither good nor bad)
 4 Ganska dåligt förslag (Bad proposal)
 5. Mycket dåligt förslag (Very bad proposal)
Categories 1 and 2 have been merged into ‘good proposal’ and 4 and 5 into 
‘bad proposal’ in Table 4.5.
Här finns ett antal förslag som förekommit den politiska debatten om ar-
betslösheten. Vilken är Din åsikt om vart och ett av dem?
(Here are some proposals that appeared in the political debate on unem-
ployment. What is your opinion on each of these proposals?)
V143: Satsa mer på beredskapsarbeten/ungdomspraktik/alu etc (Increase 
use of almp and job creation schemes)
V146: Sänka arbetslöshetserstatningen (Reduce unemployment ben-
efits)
APPENDIX D: APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 7 (SWEDEN)
V270 Tidsbegränsa rätten till arbetslöshetsersättning (introduce limited 
eligibility period for unemployment benefits)
 1. Mycket bra förslag (Very good proposal)
 2. Ganska bra förslag (Good proposal)
 3. Varken bra eller dåligt förslag (Neither good nor bad)
 4 Ganska dåligt förslag (Bad proposal)
 5. Mycket dåligt förslag (Very bad proposal)
Categories 1 and 2 have been merged into ‘good proposal’ and 4 and 5 into 
‘bad proposal’ in Table 4.5.
V245: Vad tycker Du om den politik som bedrivs i Sverige inom följande 
samhällsområden? [Arbetslösheten]
(What do you think about the policy that is currently pursued in Sweden 
concerning the following political issue [unemployment]?)
 1. Mycket bra politik (Very good policy)
 2. Ganska bra politik (Good policy)
 3. Varken bra eller dåligt politik (Neither good nor bad)
 4. Ganska dåligt politik (Bad policy)
 5. Mycket dåligt politik (Very bad policy)
Categories 1 and 2 have been merged into ‘good policy’ and 4 and 5 into 
‘bad policy’ in Table 7.5.
 Items and their wording for measurement of attitudes towards reform 
proposals in Table 7.7:
V44: Summarised grade on politics – Social Democrats. Which sum-
marised grade would you like to give the politics of the different parties? 
[Social Democrats]
 1. Very good
 2. Fairly good
 3. Passed
 4. Fairly bad
 5. Very bad
Categories 1, 2 and 3 have been re-coded into ‘well/neither’ and 4 and 5 
into ‘badly’ for the empirical analysis presented in Table 7.7.
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 Items and their wording for measurement of attitudes towards reform 
proposals in Table 7.9:
F85a: Sänka arbetslöshetserstatningen (Reduce unemployment benefits)
1. Mycket bra förslag (Very good proposal)
2. Ganska bra förslag (Good proposal)
3. Varken bra eller dåligt förslag (Neither good nor bad)
4 Ganska dåligt förslag (Bad proposal)
5. Mycket dåligt förslag (Very bad proposal)
Categories 1, 2 and 3 have been merged into category ‘reform-minded’ and 
4 and 5 into ‘reform-averse’ for the analysis presented in Table 7.9.
Table A4.1 Eff ects of voter group membership and assessment of SAP policy on party 
choice in Swedish Riksdag Election 1998. Coeffi  cients from multinomial 
logistic regression models






Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 1.63*** 1.55***
Aligned core constituency -0.67*** -0.66***










Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 0.70*** 0.66***
Aligned core constituency -3.30*** -3.19***
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Table A4.1 Eff ects of voter group membership and assessment of SAP policy on party 
choice in Swedish Riksdag Election 1998. Coeffi  cients from multinomial 
logistic regression models







Centre Party Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 0.78*** 0.76***
Aligned core constituency -2.95*** -3.02***










Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 0.83*** 0.79***
Aligned core constituency -2.82*** -2.72***










Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 1.01*** 1.00***
Aligned core constituency -2.45*** -2.45***
Assessment SAP policy: bad 3.92*** 3.89***
Age (continouos) -0.02***
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Table A4.1 Eff ects of voter group membership and assessment of SAP policy on party 
choice in Swedish Riksdag Election 1998. Coeffi  cients from multinomial 
logistic regression models










Greens Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 1.23*** 1.06***
Aligned core constituency -2.03** -2.08***









Nagelkerke’s R2 49.5 53.5
BIC’ -4672.836 -4616.974
Notes: ***: signifi cant at .001- level, **: signifi cant at 0.01-level, *: signifi cant at 0.05-level, !: 
signifi cant at 0.1-level. Reference category for party choice: SAP. Other parties not shown.
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Table A4.2 Eff ects of voter group membership and attitudes towards lower 
unemployment benefi ts on party choice in Swedish Riksdag Election 2002. 
Coeffi  cients from multinomial logistic regression models
Party Choice Variable Model without controls
Left Party
(Vänsterpartiet)
Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency 0.12




Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency -1.16***
Lower unemployment benefi ts: no -1.65***
Constant 0.09
Centre Party Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency -0.24




Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency -0.73***
Lower unemployment benefi ts: no -0.88***
Constant 0.13
Christian Democrats Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency -0.99**
Lower unemployment benefi ts: no -1.31***
Constant 0.97***
Greens Voter group (Reference: non-core 
constituency)
Non-aligned core constituency -0.22





Note: ***: signifi cant at .001- level, **signifi cant at 0.01-level, *signifi cant at 0.05-level, 





 I will use the label ‘Third Way’ for those social democratic parties that under-
went a transformation during the last two or three decades, even though not 
all parties used such a label explicitly (Green-Pedersen et al. ).
2 Theoretical Background
 I do not consider countries with compulsory voting, such as Australia or Bel-
gium, where the electoral effects may follow their own logic.
 See Giger (: chap.  and ) for an excellent and thorough discussion on 
how arguments from the welfare state literature, the partisan politics litera-
ture, and various theories of issue voting and issue competition can be con-
ceptualised into a framework for the study of the electoral consequences of 
welfare state reform and retrenchment.
 I treat the dvu and npd as separate parties in this book, although there have 
been recent efforts to merge the two parties.
 Stöss (: ) explicitly argues that: ‘Conversely right-wing extremist par-
ties have virtually no chances of success, if they directly follow the tradition 
of fascist and authoritarian regimes, especially if those regimes have been 
part of a country’s own history [...]’ (Own translation, CA).
 Evans and Tilley’s recent study () argued and empirically demonstrated 
that the decline of class-party associations in Britain has been the conse-
quence of Labour’s move to the centre ground since the mid-s, and not 
the consequence of social change. Their case study thus provides evidence 
for a policy-based explanation of changing class voting, as advanced in this 
book.
 NOTES
3 Design and Methods
 Ideally one would select a country in which a social democratic party in office 
had pursued no or almost no reforms during the period under review, but this 
was not the case in any advanced Western nation.
 Starke (: ) maintains that there is no ‘clear causal relationship be-
tween retrenchment events and the structure of entitlements’.
 There are some ambiguous cases, such as Ireland or France.
 Lindbom (: ) has claimed that replacement rates are the main ingre-
dient of decommodification.
 For further information, see the respective oecd publications.
 Formerly called ‘Benefit systems and work incentives’.
 The coefficients and some model-fit statistics of each model used are report-
ed in Appendices A-D. Given the parsimonious operationalisation of the core 
constituency concept and the restriction to a limited number of independ-
ent variables, these statistics indicate a good model-fit. All Nagelkerke Pseu-
do-R-values exceed at least  per cent explained variance and all bic-values 
are highly negative, indicating a superior fit compared to the null model or 
models with a high number of control variables. 
 This means that non-voting is always modelled as a category of the depend-
ent variable if applicable.
4 United Kingdom
 The results in Evans & Norris (: Table .) indicate that class generally 
had a remarkable degree of discriminating power for electoral behaviour in 
Britain, as almost each class stuck to a particular party in the period between 
 and .
 Heath et al. (: ff ) state that this allowed the sdp to win a considerable 
share of votes among the moderate centre-left, including working class votes, 
to the disadvantage of Labour.
 Cf. Bara & Budge () and Webb () for the ideological and strategic 
positioning of the Liberal Democrats after .
 Norris & Wlezien (: ) state that the Tories tried to mobilise their own 
voter base, but not traditional Labour voters or constituencies.
 I do not consider regional parties here, as they only contest elections in con-
stituencies in Northern Ireland, Scotland or Wales.
 This aspect will be further discussed in the chapter’s conclusion.
 The variables used are presented and described in Appendix A.
NOTES
 Due to their very low number of observations in the data sets, it was not pos-
sible to examine the results for small parties on the margins (e.g. Respect, 
ukip or bnp) separately.
 This was obtained by the vote recall item in the  bes. A similar pro-
cedure was used for the  election.
 An indirect effect can be observed here, however. If only party shares with-
out non-voting are calculated, the share of the Liberal Democrats among La-
bour’s voter base increases from about  per cent in  to  per cent in 
. Likewise, the share of minor parties in this voter group rose from  to 
 per cent in this period. This will be further addressed below.
 The coefficients of the models can be found in Appendix A.
 Unfortunately, the  dataset does not contain the vote recall question for 
the  election, which would allow us to generate a panel for the elections 
 to .
 Moreover, the bnp got parliamentary representation with the election to the 
European Parliament in , held under list pr. It also entered several local 
councils, especially councils that had previously been dominated by Labour 
(Ford ; Ford & Goodwin : ).
5 Germany
 New Labour was a role model for the spd in its quest to regain office after  
years of Christian democratic rule. This culminated in the publication of the 
Schröder/Blair paper in , which laid out some proposals on the transfor-
mation of European social democracy.
 One exception was the  pension reform (effective in ), which was 
passed not only with the support of the governmental majority (cdu, csu 
and fdp), but also with that of the social democrats (cf. Schmidt : 
).
 I will use the label pds to refer to the party before the merger with the 
wasg in , and will use the label Left Party (Linkspartei) to refer to the 
party after this. This is to aid clarity, since the party had various tempo-
rary labels after the unification, such as ‘Sed-pds’, pds-Linke Listen’ and 
 ‘Linkspartei.pds’. It also used the label ‘Die Linke’ (The Left) after the  
election.
 The s and the s in particular were characterised by remarkable po-
larisation on non-economic issues such as the ‘Neue Ostpolitik’ in s, the 
fierce debate about the ‘nato Double-Track Decision’ beginning in the late 
s, and the discussion about nuclear power in Germany.
 NOTES
 This can be demonstrated by separating party choice and class by region (re-
sults not shown). The support for the pds among those classes in Western 
Germany was almost non-existent until .
 The party never gained much more than  per cent in the Western part of 
Germany (Picot : ; www.Bundeswahlleiter.de).
 The pension scheme was named after the then Minister of Labour and Social 
Affairs, Walter Riester.
 The Riester reform was accompanied by the introduction of a means-tested 
minimum pension.
 Egle & Henkes () claim that the first term nevertheless set the stage for 
future policy changes, as the spd’s internal balances of powers shifted to-
wards ‘the modernisers’, away from ‘the traditionalists’. 
 With the Hartz iii reform, the name changed to ‘Bundesagentur für Arbeit’.
 In this vein, the Hartz iv reform is an illustrative example of Huo’s argument 
about a paradigm shift towards prioritarian egalitarianism, as the core work 
force was no longer the target group of the new alg ii, but various groups of 
labour market outsiders who had often claimed Sozialhilfe in the past. The 
political debate on the reform often focused on an equity conflict, as work-
ers with long contribution records could lose a large share of their former 
income, whereas labour market outsiders could now claim (almost) the same 
benefits as people with long contribution records.
 There were exceptions for the unemployed older than  with eligibility peri-
ods up to  months.
 In , the pds gained . per cent of the vote, barely passing the  per cent 
threshold. The party gained parliamentary representation in  by winning 
more than two constituencies in Eastern Germany (the so-called ‘Grundman-
dateklausel’). In , the party benefited from the separate application of the 
 per cent threshold for both parts of Germany as the party only passed the 
threshold in the new Länder (like the Greens).
 Th is can, of course, be seen as a blame-avoidance strategy in a Piersonian sense.
 Picot () claims that the spd was encouraged to reform due to the lack 
of left-wing opposition, but underestimated the risk of the rise of the pds or 
another left competitor and thus ignored the possibility of changes in party 
competition. In this respect, the lack of serious reforms and the German elec-
torate’s welfare bias (Padgett , ) should account for the failure to 
establish a left socialist party at the federal level until .
 One motivation for Gerhard Schröder to call early elections was that the elec-
tion would explicitly be a referendum on his reform agenda (cf. Zohlnhöfer 
& Egle ; Kornelius & Roth : ; Jesse :  for discussions of this 
motivation).
NOTES
 The npd and dvu launched some protest campaigns against the Hartz re-
forms, but were only able to pass the  per cent threshold in two eastern 
states in  (see Jesse ; Niedermayer ). 
 All items used and the coefficients of the logistic regression models can be 
found in Appendix B.
 The distribution of the party shares in the  and  election studies 
diverges considerably from the actual results, which may explain the figures 
reported in Table ..
 It is worth mentioning that the Left Party/pds also gained many votes af-
ter the reforms in all but two state elections, namely Mecklenburg-West 
 Pomerania and Berlin, where the party was in coalition with the spd and had 
to implement the labour market reforms and engage in retrenchment. Here, 
the party lost in the state elections, going against the national trend and sup-
porting the claim that ‘dirty hands’ make a difference (cf. Werz & Schoon 
 and Niedermayer & Stöss  for analyses of these two elections).
 In this respect, future analysis should tap into the problem of whether the 
first period of red-green government was a transition period in which the 
spd already alienated parts of its core constituency, which later became 
available to the Left Party after it emerged on the national scene. This means 
that there was not only a direct but also an indirect realignment in this peri-
od, as some dissatisfied social democratic core voters broke with their party 
in Schröder’s first electoral term, but had no party to align with until  
(see Picot ).
6 Denmark
 This section draws heavily on Petersen’s analysis () of the Danish social 
democratic party’s ideology and welfare policy in party manifestos and party 
constitutions after .
 The  constitution also stipulates that the eligibility period for unemploy-
ment benefits should be unlimited.
 Nineteen members of the party’s parliamentary group abstained in the final 
vote on the reform of the health system, however.
 See also the respective sections in Petersen () matching the program-
matic positions of the parties with their actual behaviour in daily politics, 
especially in the legislative procedures concerning the development of the 
Danish welfare state.
 This does not exclude other parties, including parties of the centre-right, 
from occasionally supporting the expansion of the welfare state and also im-
 NOTES
plementing universality principles in the Danish welfare state when in gov-
ernment.
 Parts of the labour market reform came into force in , however.
 The sd won some votes in this election (see above), but the Centre-Demo-
crats had stepped out of the government in .
 Similarly, the social democratic government reformed the disability pension 
scheme (Førtidspensionen) in  by tightening the eligibility criteria to in-
crease the labour supply (Green-Pedersen b: f ).
 The data in Scruggs’ study () also point to a reduction in replacement 
rates under the social democrats, since both the single and the family re-
placement rates declined by  percentage points from -.
 The Red-Green Alliance emerged as a fusion of various far-left splinter par-
ties after .
 I do not focus on the Red-Green Alliance here, as all arguments apply equally 
or even more so to this party. Moreover, due to the party’s far left stance at 
that time, it was not electable in the view of a large part of the Danish elector-
ate.
 This is especially true for the period under consideration, given the decline of 
the centre parties in the s.
 Klitgaard (: ) states that the sf was against the first labour market 
reform package in , when the sd governed as a majority government and 
the socialists were not part of the sd’s parliamentary base.
 The exact wording of the items can be found Appendix C.
 The coefficients of the model can be found in Appendix C. Another model 
with immigration as control was also run. As there are no fundamental differ-
ences between the parties’ results, I only report important differences caused 
by immigration in the text.
 The group of ‘other parties’ also gained more votes compared to the left-hand 
side of the panel. The Conservatives in particular make some gains if these 
conditions apply.
 The results also suggest that the  election was not only a deviating elec-
tion, as claimed by Qvortrup (), but a critical election due to the lasting 
realignment of voter groups to the df and the Liberals (see Borre  for a 
more critical assessment).
 One may speculate whether the party appears as a functional equivalent to 
Western European Christian democratic parties after its ideological transfor-
mation into a cross-class party.
NOTES
7 Sweden
 The sap typically governed as a minority government with changing partners 
in legislation. However, between  and  it formed a coalition with 
the Agrarian Union (renamed the Centre Party in ) and in the period 
between  and , the sap governed with an absolute majority.
 A coalition of the Centre Party, the Liberals and the Moderates led by the 
Centre Party governed Sweden from -, followed by a minority govern-
ment of the liberal Folkparti in -. After the  election, the Centre 
Party again led a coalition with the Liberals and the Moderates until , 
when the latter stepped out and the remaining two parties continued as a 
minority government until the  election (Arter a: Table .).
 See Olsson (: ) for a schematic overview of the austerity measures of 
the early s.
 Esping-Andersen also identifies this reform as a major reason for the sap’s 
outstanding electoral performance in the .
 In addition, the effects of the changed indexation rules are more difficult to 
detect and their effects will become evident in the long run. The symbolic 
raising of maximum amounts also obfuscates this type of austerity measure 
(Christiansen et al. ; cf. also Timonen : ).
 Other welfare schemes were affected by temporary cutbacks between  
and , but reversed with the  budget (Timonen : ; Starke : 
).
 Palme et al. () nevertheless report that this was not accompanied by an 
increase in the number of people not eligible for any kind of unemployment 
benefits, but that the respective figures decreased. This indicates that these 
measures did not have far-reaching effects, as the number of persons con-
cerned can be expected to be rather limited.
 This section on the pension reform draws on the works of Palme & Wennemo 
() and Anderson & Meyer ().
 Waiting days had been discussed under previous sap administrations during 
the s and s (cf. Lindbom : ).
 In Germany, the corresponding period was already one year in the s. 
The Danish social democrats introduced a qualification period of one year of 
employed work in . In comparison, the sap’s reform of the qualification 
period is very modest.
 The pension reform can be regarded as a big-bang reform, but without out-
right retrenchment or recommodification as discussed above.
 According to Huo (: ) there was much more progress in reforming 
social assistance than unemployment insurance.
 NOTES
 The party changed its name from Kristdemokratiska Samhällspartiet to 
Kristdemokraterna in .
 The Sweden Democrats surpassed the threshold in the  Riksdag elec-
tion, which is discussed in section . below.
 Originally, the party’s name was Sweden’s Communist Party (Sveriges Kom-
munistiska Parti, skp) but in  the name was changed to the Left Party 
Communists (Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna, vpk).
8 Comparative Summary
 Evans and Tilley’s recent study on class-based party affi  liations found a similar 
pattern in Britain since . Th e increase of voters with no party identifi cation 
is strongest among the working class.
 As outlined in Chapter , the party seems to benefi t more indirectly through the 
abstention of former Labour voters and always had some working class support 
as the successor party to the sdp.
 I will focus on the sf, as similar arguments apply to the small and far-left Red-
Green Alliance and the party did not make signifi cant gains during the period 
under investigation.
 Th e Progress Party did not make gains among social democratic core voters 
in the s when the immigration and refugee issue emerged on the political 
agenda, which confi rms the importance of the welfare dimension.
 See Evans & Tilley () for a similar conclusion in their study of the eff ect of 
Labour’s ideological change on class voting in Britain in recent decades.
 In Germany, the spd’s coalition partner changed in  from the Greens to the 
cdu/csu for the electoral term -.
9 Discussion
 The name is written as one word, in contrast to the British ‘New Labour’.
 Analysing the case of Australia would be a really strong test of the claim 
that majoritarian electoral systems produce lower turnout of social demo-
cratic core voters. Like New Zealand, Australia experienced welfare state 
reforms and has a quasi majoritarian system for the House of Representa-
tives, but also compulsory voting. Under such conditions, reform-averse 
social democratic voters might have no other viable option than to stick to 
the party, as the opponents of the Australian Labor Party are two market 
liberal parties.
NOTES
 Like the Swedish sap, the dna also advocated almps and notions of mild 
workfare from early on.
 I owe thanks to Patrick Emmenegger for making this instructive example at the 
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